Reliable but not home free? What framing effects mean for moral intuitions

Various studies show moral intuitions to be susceptible to framing effects. Many have argued that this susceptibility is a sign of unreliability and that this poses a methodological challenge for moral philosophy. Recently, doubt has been cast on this idea. It has been argued that extant evidence of framing effects does not show that moral intuitions have a unreliability problem. I argue that, even if the extant evidence suggests that moral intuitions are fairly stable with respect to what intuitions we have, the effect of framing on the strength of those intuitions still needs to be taken into account. I argue that this by itself poses a methodological challenge for moral philosophy

An Estimation of the Entomological Inoculation Rate for Ifakara: A Semi-Urban Area in a Region of Intense Malaria Transmission in Tanzania.

An entomological study on vectors of malaria and their relative contribution to Plasmodium falciparum transmission in the semi-urban area of Ifakara, south-eastern Tanzania, was conducted. A total of 32 houses were randomly sampled from the area and light trap catches (LTC) performed in one room in each house every 2 weeks for 1 year. A total of 147 448 mosquitoes were caught from 789 LTC; 26 134 Anopheles gambiae s.l., 615 A. funestus, 718 other anophelines and 119 981 culicines. More than 60% of the total A. gambiae s.l. were found in five (0.6%) LTCs, with a maximum of 5889 caught in a single trap. Of 505 A. gambiae s.l. speciated by polymerase chain reaction, 91.5% were found to be A. arabiensis. Plasmodium falciparum sporozoite enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay tests were performed on 10 108 anopheles mosquitoes and 39 (0.38%) were positive. Entomological inoculation rate (EIR) estimates were generated using a standard method and an alternative method that allows the calculation of confidence intervals based on a negative binomial distribution of sporozoite positive mosquitoes. Overall EIR estimates were similar; 31 vs. 29 [95% confidence interval (CI): 19, 44] infectious bites per annum, respectively. The EIR ranged from 4 (95% CI: 1, 17) in the cool season to 108 (95% CI: 69, 170) in the wet season and from 54 (95% CI: 30, 97) in the east of the town to 15 (95% CI: 8, 30) in the town centre. These estimates show large variations over short distances in time and space. They are all markedly lower than those reported from nearby rural areas and for other parts of Tanzania

Computational ethics

Technological advances are enabling roles for machines that present novel ethical challenges. The study of 'AI ethics' has emerged to confront these challenges, and connects perspectives from philosophy, computer science, law, and economics. Less represented in these interdisciplinary efforts is the perspective of cognitive science. We propose a framework – computational ethics – that specifies how the ethical challenges of AI can be partially addressed by incorporating the study of human moral decision-making. The driver of this framework is a computational version of reflective equilibrium (RE), an approach that seeks coherence between considered judgments and governing principles. The framework has two goals: (i) to inform the engineering of ethical AI systems, and (ii) to characterize human moral judgment and decision-making in computational terms. Working jointly towards these two goals will create the opportunity to integrate diverse research questions, bring together multiple academic communities, uncover new interdisciplinary research topics, and shed light on centuries-old philosophical questions

Does ought imply can?

Most philosophers believe that a person can have an obligation only insofar as she is able to fulfil it, a principle generally referred to as “Ought Implies Can”. Arguably, this principle reflects something basic about the ordinary concept of obligation. However, in a paper published recently in this journal, Wesley Buckwalter and John Turri presented evidence for the conclusion that ordinary people in fact reject that principle. With a series of studies, they claimed to have demonstrated that, in people’s judgements, obligations persist irrespective of whether those who hold them have the ability to fulfil them. We argue in this paper that due to some problems in their design, Buckwalter & Turri’s conclusions may not be warranted. We present the results of a series of studies demonstrating the problems with their design and showing that, with an improved design, people judge that obligation depends on ability after all

A MicroRNA Linking Human Positive Selection and Metabolic Disorders

Postponed access: the file will be accessible after 2021-10-14Positive selection in Europeans at the 2q21.3 locus harboring the lactase gene has been attributed to selection for the ability of adults to digest milk to survive famine in ancient times. However, the 2q21.3 locus is also associated with obesity and type 2 diabetes in humans, raising the possibility that additional genetic elements in the locus may have contributed to evolutionary adaptation to famine by promoting energy storage, but which now confer susceptibility to metabolic diseases. We show here that the miR-128-1 microRNA, located at the center of the positively selected locus, represents a crucial metabolic regulator in mammals. Antisense targeting and genetic ablation of miR-128-1 in mouse metabolic disease models result in increased energy expenditure and amelioration of high-fat-diet-induced obesity and markedly improved glucose tolerance. A thrifty phenotype connected to miR-128-1-dependent energy storage may link ancient adaptation to famine and modern metabolic maladaptation associated with nutritional overabundance.acceptedVersio

Mind Perception Is the Essence of Morality

Mind perception entails ascribing mental capacities to other entities, whereas moral judgment entails labeling entities as good or bad or actions as right or wrong. We suggest that mind perception is the essence of moral judgment. In particular, we suggest that moral judgment is rooted in a cognitive template of two perceived minds—a moral dyad of an intentional agent and a suffering moral patient. Diverse lines of research support dyadic morality. First, perceptions of mind are linked to moral judgments: dimensions of mind perception (agency and experience) map onto moral types (agents and patients), and deficits of mind perception correspond to difficulties with moral judgment. Second, not only are moral judgments sensitive to perceived agency and experience, but all moral transgressions are fundamentally understood as agency plus experienced suffering—that is, interpersonal harm—even ostensibly harmless acts such as purity violations. Third, dyadic morality uniquely accounts for the phenomena of dyadic completion (seeing agents in response to patients, and vice versa), and moral typecasting (characterizing others as either moral agents or moral patients). Discussion also explores how mind perception can unify morality across explanatory levels, how a dyadic template of morality may be developmentally acquired, and future directions

Moralizing biology: the appeal and limits of the new compassionate view of nature

In recent years, a proliferation of books about empathy, cooperation and pro-social behaviors (Brooks, 2011a) has significantly influenced the discourse of the life-sciences and reversed consolidated views of nature as a place only for competition and aggression. In this article I describe the recent contribution of three disciplines – moral psychology (Jonathan Haidt), primatology (Frans de Waal) and the neuroscience of morality – to the present transformation of biology and evolution into direct sources of moral phenomena, a process here named the ‘moralization of biology’. I conclude by addressing the ambivalent status of this constellation of authors, for whom today ‘morality comes naturally’: I explore both the attractiveness of their message, and the problematic epistemological assumptions of their research-programs in the light of new discoveries in developmental and molecular biology

Pan-cancer analysis of whole genomes

Cancer is driven by genetic change, and the advent of massively parallel sequencing has enabled systematic documentation of this variation at the whole-genome scale(1-3). Here we report the integrative analysis of 2,658 whole-cancer genomes and their matching normal tissues across 38 tumour types from the Pan-Cancer Analysis of Whole Genomes (PCAWG) Consortium of the International Cancer Genome Consortium (ICGC) and The Cancer Genome Atlas (TCGA). We describe the generation of the PCAWG resource, facilitated by international data sharing using compute clouds. On average, cancer genomes contained 4-5 driver mutations when combining coding and non-coding genomic elements; however, in around 5% of cases no drivers were identified, suggesting that cancer driver discovery is not yet complete. Chromothripsis, in which many clustered structural variants arise in a single catastrophic event, is frequently an early event in tumour evolution; in acral melanoma, for example, these events precede most somatic point mutations and affect several cancer-associated genes simultaneously. Cancers with abnormal telomere maintenance often originate from tissues with low replicative activity and show several mechanisms of preventing telomere attrition to critical levels. Common and rare germline variants affect patterns of somatic mutation, including point mutations, structural variants and somatic retrotransposition. A collection of papers from the PCAWG Consortium describes non-coding mutations that drive cancer beyond those in the TERT promoter(4); identifies new signatures of mutational processes that cause base substitutions, small insertions and deletions and structural variation(5,6); analyses timings and patterns of tumour evolution(7); describes the diverse transcriptional consequences of somatic mutation on splicing, expression levels, fusion genes and promoter activity(8,9); and evaluates a range of more-specialized features of cancer genomes(8,10-18).Peer reviewe