Is Rich Phenomenology Fragmented?

Some philosophers argue that the content of iconic memory is conscious, called the Rich View. However, critics ain that only fragments of the content of iconic memory are conscious, called the Fragment View. Both sides cite different psychological experimental data to support their positions. Proponents of the Fragment View tend to assert that their view uniquely explains the data they rely on. The uniqueness of the Fragment View is challenged here. Newly introduced evidence suggests that the data supporting the Fragment View may also be compatible with the Rich View. Given the theoretical advantages of the Rich View in other respects, there are reasons to consider it the superior one

Maxwell's Demon Is Foiled by the Entropy Cost of Measurement, Not Erasure

I dispute the conventional claim that the second law of thermodynamics is saved from a "Maxwell's Demon" by the entropy cost of information erasure, and show that instead it is measurement that incurs the entropy cost. Thus Brillouin, who identified measurement as savior of the second law, was essentially correct, and putative refutations of his view, such as Bennett's claim to measure without entropy cost, are seen to fail when the applicable physics is taken into account. I argue that the tradition of attributing the defeat of Maxwell's Demon to erasure rather than to measurement arose from unphysical classical idealizations that do not hold for real gas molecules, as well as a physically ungrounded recasting of physical thermodynamical processes into computational and information-theoretic conceptualizations. I argue that the fundamental principle that saves the second law is the quantum uncertainty principle applying to the need to localize physical states to precise values of observables in order to effect the desired disequilibria aimed at violating the second law. I obtain the specific entropy cost for localizing a molecule in the Szilard engine, which coincides with the quantity attributed to Landauer's principle. I also note that an experiment characterized as upholding an entropy cost of erasure in a "quantum Maxwell's Demon" actually demonstrates an entropy cost of measurement

On the unfairness of the “fair-share principle” for health research

How ought scarce health research resources be allocated, where health research spans “basic”, translational, clinical, health systems and public health research? In this paper I first outline a previously suggested answer to this question: the “fair-share principle” stipulates that total health research funding ought to be allocated in direct proportion with suffering caused by each disease. Second, I highlight a variety of problems the fair-share principle faces. The principle is inattentive to problems of aggregation and distribution of harms incurred from disease and benefits accrued from research, and neglects considerations of cost-effectiveness. Moreover, the principle fails to recognise that using Global Burden of Disease Study estimates as proxies for “suffering” underdetermines health research resource allocation. Importantly, in drawing on these estimates, which are disease-centric and only take “proximal” causes of health loss into account, the fair-share principle disregards the social determinants of health. Along with them, the principle ignores public health research, which often focusses on “distal” causes of health loss to improve population health and reduce health inequalities. Following the principle therefore leads to inequitable priority-setting. I conclude that despite relatively widespread appeals to it, the fair-share principle is not an ideal to aim for during priority-setting

Challenging Gauge/Gravity Duality: A Potential-Centric Perspective

The AdS/CFT correspondence posits a holographic equivalence between a gravitational theory in Anti-de Sitter (AdS) spacetime and a conformal field theory (CFT) on its boundary, linked by gauge-invariant quantities like field strengths F_{\mu\nu} and fluxes \Phi. This paper examines that link, drawing on my prior analysis of the Aharonov-Bohm (AB) effect, where such quantities exhibit nonlocality, discontinuity, and incompleteness. I demonstrate that gauge potentials A_\mu in the Lorenz gauge—not their invariant derivatives—mediate the AB effect’s local, continuous dynamics, a reality extending to gravitational fields g_{\mu\nu} as substantival entities. In AdS/CFT, the CFT’s reduction of bulk A_\mu and g_{\mu\nu} to gauge-invariant imprints fails to reflect this ontology, a flaw so fundamental that it excludes exact gauge/gravity duality—neither standard mappings nor reformulations suffice. A new mathematical proof formalizes this: the bulk’s diffeomorphism freedom cannot correspond to the boundary’s gauge freedoms, Abelian or non-Abelian, under this reality. This critique spans the gauge/gravity paradigm broadly, from AdS/CFT to holographic QCD, where symmetry invisibility obscures bulk physics. While duality’s successes in black hole thermodynamics and strongly coupled systems highlight its utility, I suggest these reflect approximations within specific regimes, not a full equivalence. I propose a shift toward a framework prioritizing A_\mu and g_{\mu\nu}’s roles, with gravitational AB effects in AdS as a testing ground. This work seeks to enrich holography’s dialogue, advancing a potential-centric view for quantum gravity

A Category-theoretic Interpretation of the Homology Concept in Biology

Homology is a fundamental but controversial concept in biology, referring to the sameness of biological characters across organisms. Despite its crucial role, its ontological nature has been a subject of intense debate, with a dichotomy between individualist and natural kind views. This study proposes a category-theoretic framework to reconcile these views by emphasizing the processual nature of homology. We first review major philosophical views of homology with their respective advantages and disadvantages. Next, we highlight the dynamic and evolving nature of homologs through two thought experiments. Through mathematical formulation, we then show that the individualist and natural kind views represent ordered set- and groupoid-like aspects, derived from a primary category-theoretical model based on a process-first dynamic view of homology. Our model covers a wide range of phenomena linked with homology, such as atavism, deep homology, and developmental system drift (DSD). Furthermore, it provides a unified perspective on the ontological nature of homology, overcoming the longstanding dichotomy between individuals and kinds in Western philosophy

From Redundancy to Reality: Local Gauge Invariance as a Physical Symmetry

This paper proposes a transformative reinterpretation of local gauge invariance, a cornerstone of gauge theories, as a physical symmetry rather than a mathematical redundancy. Conventionally, gauge invariance ensures that only gauge-invariant quantities, such as the electromagnetic field strength Fµν = ∂µAν − ∂νAµ, bear physical significance, rendering the potential Aµ a calculational tool. Challenging this view, I argue that local gauge invariance, analogous to translation invariance, reflects a fundamental phase freedom of quantum fields, with Aµ and the wave function ψ, fixed in the Lorenz gauge (∂µAµ = 0), constituting real physical states. This thesis is grounded in a novel analysis of the Aharonov-Bohm effect [1], where Aµ drives continuous phase shifts in field-free regions, evidencing its causal role. A rigorous derivation demonstrates that the minimal coupling rule, Dµ = ∂µ + iqAµ, emerges naturally from this symmetry, paralleling translation invariance’s role in free wave equations. Robust counterarguments address objections, including Aµ’s non-uniqueness and the primacy of invariants, affirming the Lorenz gauge’s unique determination. A critique of Rivat’s Lorentz-driven derivation highlights its limitations, reinforcing the proposed view’s generality and empirical grounding. This potential-centric ontology, rooted in the phase structure of quantum fields, suggests a unified framework for gauge interactions and gravity. The paper concludes with future directions, including dynamic Aharonov-Bohm experiments and extensions to non-Abelian theories and quantum gravity, redefining the foundations of gauge theories and their place in modern physics

Why water may not be a natural kind after all

I present an argument that undermines the standardly held view that chemical substances are natural kinds. This argument is based on examining the properties required to pick out members of these purported kinds. In particular, for a sample to be identified as -say- a member of the kind-water, it has to be stable in the chemical sense of stability. However, the property of stability is artificially determined within chemical practice. This undermines the kindhood of substances as they fail to satisfy one of two key requirements: namely that they are picked out by (some) natural properties and that they are categorically distinct. This is a problem specifically for the natural realist interpretation of kinds. I discuss whether there are other ways to conceive of kinds in order to overcome it

Process

In this paper I discuss the process ontology that has been the central focus of my research for almost 20 years. I explain what this is, and illustrate how it applies to biology through the example of the organism. I also aim to show how naturally process ontology fits with the disordered world I described in the preceding article. Finally, I show how process philosophy illuminates a number of topics relating to the human condition, including personal identity and freedom of the will, and provides a deeper understanding of the issue around human classification, notably by sex and gender and by race

From Hamilton-Jacobi to Bohm: Why the Wave Function Isn't Just Another Action

This paper examines the physical meaning of the wave function in Bohmian mechanics (BM), addressing the debate between causal and nomological interpretations. While BM postulates particles with definite trajectories guided by the wave function, the ontological status of the wave function itself remains contested. Critics of the causal interpretation argue that the wave function's high-dimensionality and lack of back-reaction disqualify it as a physical entity. Proponents of the nomological interpretation, drawing parallels to the classical Hamiltonian, propose that the wave function is a "law-like" entity. However, this view faces challenges, including reliance on speculative quantum gravity frameworks (e.g., the Wheeler-DeWitt equation) and conceptual ambiguities about the nature of "nomological entities". By systematically comparing BM to Hamilton-Jacobi theory, this paper highlights disanalogies between the wave function and the classical action function. These differences, particularly the wave function's dynamical necessity and irreducibility, support a sui generis interpretation, where the wave function represents a novel ontological category unique to quantum theory. The paper concludes that the wave function's role in BM resists classical analogies, demanding a metaphysical framework that accommodates its non-local, high-dimensional, and dynamically irreducible nature