Ferromagnetic resonance study of sputtered Co|Ni multilayers

We report on room temperature ferromagnetic resonance (FMR) studies of [$t$ Co$|2t$ Ni]$\times$N sputtered films, where $0.1 \leq t \leq 0.6$ nm. Two series of films were investigated: films with same number of Co$|$Ni bilayer repeats (N=12), and samples in which the overall magnetic layer thickness is kept constant at 3.6 nm (N=1.2/$t$). The FMR measurements were conducted with a high frequency broadband coplanar waveguide up to 50 GHz using a flip-chip method. The resonance field and the full width at half maximum were measured as a function of frequency for the field in-plane and field normal to the plane, and as a function of angle to the plane for several frequencies. For both sets of films, we find evidence for the presence of first and second order anisotropy constants, $K_1$ and $K_2$. The anisotropy constants are strongly dependent on the thickness $t$, and to a lesser extent on the total thickness of the magnetic multilayer. The Land\'e g-factor increases with decreasing $t$ and is practically independent of the multilayer thickness. The magnetic damping parameter $\alpha$, estimated from the linear dependence of the linewidth, $\triangle H$, on frequency, in the field in-plane geometry, increases with decreasing $t$. This behaviour is attributed to an enhancement of spin-orbit interactions with $t$ decreasing and in thinner films, to a spin-pumping contribution to the damping.Comment: 18 pages, 13 figure

One Right Answer?: The Meta Edition

Legal philosophers concerned with the nature of law have focused much of their attention to the relationships between law and morality. Much less attention has been paid to the question of the relationship between law and politics. In this essay I examine this question by comparing the way the relationship between law and politics is understood in two legal systems usually thought to be fairly similar - the American and the British. I argue, first, that this relationship is understood in fundamentally different ways in the two legal systems; second, that this difference is reflected in the legal philosophers of (British) H.L.A. Hart and (American) Ronald Dworkin; and third and most important, that these differences pose a challenge to attempts to identify the nature of law through a priori conceptual analysis. This last point depends on showing that there are different prevailing understandings of politics, and that these different understandings of politics lead, through the interaction of law with politics, to different understandings of what law is. If, plausibly, there is no right answer to the question of the nature of politics, the link between law and politics suggests there is also no right answer to the question of the nature of law. I conclude, however, on a more positive note suggesting tentatively that there might be a different way of thinking about the nature of law: not through a priori reflection on law, but through a posteriori investigation of human nature and its potential implications for law

Writing in Britain and Ireland, c. 400 to c. 800

No abstract available

Russia’s Legal Transitions: Marxist Theory, Neoclassical Economics and the Rule of Law

We review the role of economic theory in shaping the process of legal change in Russia during the two transitions it experienced during the course of the twentieth century: the transition to a socialist economy organised along the lines of state ownership of the means of production in the 1920s, and the transition to a market economy which occurred after the fall of the Soviet Union in the 1990s. Despite differences in methodology and in policy implications, Marxist theory, dominant in the 1920s, and neoclassical economics, dominant in the 1990s, offered a similarly reductive account of law as subservient to wider economic forces. In both cases, the subordinate place accorded to law undermined the transition process. Although path dependence and history are frequently invoked to explain the limited development of the rule of law in Russia during the 1990s, policy choices driven by a deterministic conception of law and economics also played a role.This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s40803-015-0012-