How to Argue for (and against) Ethical Veganism

This paper has two goals. The first is to offer a carefully reasoned argument for ethical veganism: the view that it is (at least typically) wrong to eat or otherwise use animal products. The second goal is to give you, the reader, some important tools for developing, evaluating, and replying to reasoned arguments for ethical conclusions. I begin by offering you a brief essay, arguing that it is wrong to eat meat. This essay both introduces central elements of my case for veganism, and serves as one helpful model of a short ethics essay. In the remainder of this paper, I use the model essay as a target, to illustrate important strategies for developing objections to ethical arguments. I will also illustrate a range of important ways for the vegan to reply to these objections. You can use the models and skills I illustrate here in your own essays, and in your reasoned evaluation of ethical arguments. I conclude that the arguments and replies offered in this paper add up to a powerful reasoned case for ethical veganism. You can practice the skills I illustrate here to deciding for yourself – in a reasoned way – whether my conclusion is correct

The Ethical Basis for Veganism

This chapter examines the ethical case that can be mounted for veganism. Because there has been comparatively little discussion in ethics focused directly on veganism, the central aim of this chapter is threefold: to orient readers to (some of) the most important philosophical literature relevant to the topic, to provide a clear explanation of the current state of the ethical case for veganism, and to focus attention on the most important outstanding or underexplored questions in this domain. The chapter examines the range of positions that deserve to be called ethical veganism, and some of the types of reasons that philosophers can potentially appeal to in arguing for veganism. It then spells out the core of the most promising case for veganism, which argues directly for the wrongness of making animals suffer and die. The chapter then considers three ways of arguing from this conclusion to an ethical defense of the vegan lifestyle, which appeal respectively to the ethical significance of the effects of individual use of animal products, of group efficacy, and of complicity with wrongdoing. The chapter concludes by examining several neglected complications facing the ethical case for veganism

Yardtapes: History, Identity and Diaspora in a Dancehall Style

A thesis submitted in part-fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of M.A., Institute for the Study of the Americas, 2008

Why I Am a Vegan (and You Should Be One Too)

This paper argues for what I call modest ethical veganism: the view that it is typically wrong to use or eat products made from or by animals such as cows, pigs, or chickens. The argument has three central parts. First, I argue that a central explanation for the wrongness of causing suffering rests upon what it is like to experience such suffering, and that we have good reasons to think that animals suffer in ways that are relevantly analogous to humans. Second, I argue that animals can have better and worse lives, and that a central explanation for the wrongness of killing is that it deprives the victim of the valuable life that they would otherwise have had. Third, I argue that it is wrong to cooperate with massive wrongdoing. By consuming animal products, we typically support institutions that engage in massive and systematic wrongful treatment of animals. We thus ought to become vegan

The Methodological Irrelevance of Reflective Equilibrium

John Rawls’ method of reflective equilibrium is the most influential methodology in contemporary ethics.This paper argues that this influence is undeserved, for two reasons. First, reflective equilibrium fails to accomplish two tasks that give us reason to care about methodology. On the one hand, it fails to explain how (or whether) moral knowledge is possible.This is because the method is explicitly oriented towards the distinct (and less interesting) task of characterizing our moral sensibilities. On the other hand, the method fails to provide an informative way of adjudicating central methodological debates in ethics. Second, where Rawls’ method –and the background methodology he uses to motivate it –do have substance, that substance is implausible. The role of dispositions in the method entails that it endorses obviously irrational inferences. Further, the method makes substantively implausible distinctions between the dispositions that are allowed to play a methodological role. Rawls' background methodology appeals to the idea of a psychology in ‘wide reflective equilibrium’. However, both formal and empirical path-dependence considerations strongly suggest that there is nothing even minimally determinate that is someone’s psychology in ‘wide reflective equilibrium’. I close by exploring salient attempts to salvage the spirit of reflective equilibrium by abandoning elements of Rawls’ approach. I argue that none of these attempts succeed. I conclude that appeal to the method of reflective equilibrium is not a helpful means of addressing pressing methodological questions in ethics. In a slogan, reflective equilibrium is methodologically irrelevant

A Moorean Defense of the Omnivore?

Philosophers have offered several apparently powerful arguments against the permissibility of eating meat. However, the idea that it is okay to eat meat can seem like a bit of ethical common sense. This paper examines the attempt to adapt one of the most influential philosophical defenses of common sense –G. E. Moore’s case against the skeptic andthe idealist –in support of the omnivore. I first introduce and explain Moore’s argument against the skeptic. I then explain how that argument can be adapted to address two influential philosophical arguments against the omnivore, due to Tom Regan and James Rachels. The adapted Moorean arguments appear strikingly similar to the original. However, I argue that we should not simply assume that all Moorean arguments are created equal. Instead, I propose a set of principled criteria that can be used to test Moorean arguments on a case-by-case basis. Those criteria give the Moorean reason for optimism against the skeptic, but suggest that the Moorean’s case is much weaker against the ethical vegetarian. I conclude that the Moorean omnivore’s argument has potentially uncomfortable implications for all sides in debates about ethical vegetarianism, and illuminates important and neglected questions about the force of philosophical arguments in applied ethics

Progression in Kent: schools taking charge

This report sets out research into the practice of careers work in Kent.This report has been prepared by the International Centre for Guidance Studies (iCeGS) for Kent County Council. iCeGS was commissioned to conduct an independent investigation into the implications of the Education Act 2011 for schools in Kent. The findings were gathered from schools and key stakeholders in Kent. The conclusions do not necessarily represent official Kent County Council policy.Kent County Counci

Careering towards a wall? Careers guidance policy and election 2015

This article reviews recent policy in career guidance in the context of the 2015 election

A new estimation of the Archeops angular power spectrum

We present a refined angular power spectrum of the Cosmic Microwave Background (CMB) anisotropies using the Archeops last flight data. The estimation of the Cl described here is performed using Xspect, a method which uses the cross-power spectra of the maps of 6 different detectors. It covers multipole range from l=10 to l=700 in 25 bins and confirms a strong evidence of a plateau followed by the presence of two Doppler peaks. Archeops was conceived as a precursor of the Planck HFI instrument by using the same optical design and the same technology for the detectors and their cooling. Since last publication, specific methods have been developed, extra bolometers were used and the sky coverage, of about 20%, is almost twice larger. We also present a comparison with first-year WMAP data both using individually spectra and by computing the cross-power spectrum of the two experiments.Comment: 4 pages, 2 figures, to appear in the proceedings of the XXXIXth Rencontres de Moriond "Exploring the Universe", La Thuile, Italy, March 28-April 4, 200