Pushing the bounds of rationality: Argumentation and extended cognition

One of the central tasks of a theory of argumentation is to supply a theory of appraisal: a set of standards and norms according to which argumentation, and the reasoning involved in it, is properly evaluated. In their most general form, these can be understood as rational norms, where the core idea of rationality is that we rightly respond to reasons by according the credence we attach to our doxastic and conversational commitments with the probative strength of the reasons we have for them. Certain kinds of rational failings are so because they are manifestly illogical – for example, maintaining overtly contradictory commitments, violating deductive closure by refusing to accept the logical consequences of one’s present commitments, or failing to track basing relations by not updating one’s commitments in view of new, defeating information. Yet, according to the internal and empirical critiques, logic and probability theory fail to supply a fit set of norms for human reasoning and argument. Particularly, theories of bounded rationality have put pressure on argumentation theory to lower the normative standards of rationality for reasoners and arguers on the grounds that we are bounded, finite, and fallible agents incapable of meeting idealized standards. This paper explores the idea that argumentation, as a set of practices, together with the procedures and technologies of argumentation theory, is able to extend cognition such that we are better able to meet these idealized logical standards, thereby extending our responsibilities to adhere to idealized rational norms

Attenuating indigenous property rights: land policy after the Wik decision

In December 1996, the High Court of Australia handed down its judgment in the Wik case finding, by a 4:3 majority, that pastoral leases did not necessarily extinguish native title. An intense political campaign by both pastoral and indigenous interests, and their political representatives, was aimed, in the case of the former, at legislative extinguishment of native title on pastoral leases and, in the case of the latter, at defending property rights which the High Court found had never been extinguished. In this article it argued that an efficient re-allocation of property rights is unlikely to result from extinguishment, but requires Coasian-type bargains between pastoral and indigenous interests.Land Economics/Use,

Valuing Ecosystem Services: a critical review

Although there has been much writing about ecosystem services in the last decade, there has been insufficient which clearly elucidates their value. Rather, much of the writing has been classificatory rather than analytical (e.g. the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, Total Economic Value (TEV), and environmental accounting) and has tended to complicate rather than enlighten. Further, these classification systems are not necessarily internally consistent, nor consistent with each other. There is no systematic analysis of what economic values to report within these frameworks although the SEEA would account in value added terms, consistent with a national accounting framework, and TEV focuses on economic surpluses but is often inter-temporally muddled. This paper explores the necessary modelling that is required to properly identify the value of ecosystem services, and to distinguish them from "supporting" biophysical processes that only have indirect and derivative anthropogenic values. The paper also explores the limitations of environmental accounting - comparable to national accounting - as policy-relevant analysis.Resource /Energy Economics and Policy,

Mill on logic

Working within the broad lines of general consensus that mark out the core features of John Stuart Mill’s (1806–1873) logic, as set forth in his A System of Logic (1843–1872), this chapter provides an introduction to Mill’s logical theory by reviewing his position on the relationship between induction and deduction, and the role of general premises and principles in reasoning. Locating induction, understood as a kind of analogical reasoning from particulars to particulars, as the basic form of inference that is both free-standing and the sole load-bearing structure in Mill’s logic, the foundations of Mill’s logical system are briefly inspected. Several naturalistic features are identified, including its subject matter, human reasoning, its empiricism, which requires that only particular, experiential claims can function as basic reasons, and its ultimate foundations in ‘spontaneous’ inference. The chapter concludes by comparing Mill’s naturalized logic to Russell’s (1907) regressive method for identifying the premises of mathematics

Dismantling the signposts to public health? NHS data under the Health and Social Care Act 2012

The Health and Social Care Act 2012 will replace the administrative structure of the NHS in England, currently based on the resident populations of defined geographical areas, with one that relates instead to the shifting populations of individuals registered with specific general practices at given points in time.1 This will radically change the longstanding basis for collecting data routinely about the health needs of local populations, making it difficult to monitor the effect of new legislation on the health of the population locally or nationally.2 3 We discuss some of the implications of the act for existing routine data systems and the production of routine statistics that underpin essential NHS functions, including monitoring healthcare provision and ensuring equity of access, allocation of resources, and measurement of outcomes

Hospitals

A hospital was one of the first European institutions set up in Australia in 1788. The aim in this article is to summarise the ensuring events, and particularly to demonstrate how hospitals have dramatically changed. One theme is to clarify the nature of convict hospitals and the low level of care expected in charity hospitals during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Other themes are the impact of medical innovations, and the strong and increasingly interventionist role of the state in hospital governance. More recently, a theme has been the closure of small hospitals and the development of large hospital complexes. Throughout, the role of nurses has been crucial as they have provided the bulk of hospital care. Hospitals have always been plagued by scandals but the striking feature throughout their history in Sydney is the strength of the demand for hospital care

Corroborative evidence

Corroborative evidence can have a dual function in argument whereby not only does it have a primary function of providing direct evidence supporting the main conclusion, but it also has a secondary, bolstering function which increases the probative value of some other piece of evidence in the argument. It has been argued (Redmayne, 2000) that this double function gives rise to the fallacy of double counting whereby the probative weight of evidence is overvalued by counting it twice. Walton has proposed several models of corroborative evidence, each of which seems to accept the fallaciousness of double counting thereby seeming to deny the dual function of corroborative evidence. Against this view, I argue that the bolstering effect is legitimate, and can be explained by recourse to inference to the best explanation

Commentary on Jan Albert van Laar and Erik C. W. Krabbe, “Splitting a Difference of Opinion”

Jan Albert van Laar and Erik Krabbe’s paper “Splitting a difference of opinion” studies an important type of dialogue shift, namely that from a deliberation dialogue over action or policy options where critical and persuasive argumentation is exchanged about the rational acceptability of the policy options proposed by various parties, to a negotiation dialogue where agreement is reached by a series of compromises, or trade-offs, on the part of each side in the disagreement