36,163 research outputs found

    The stable marriage problem with master preference lists

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    We study variants of the classical stable marriage problem in which the preferences of the men or the women, or both, are derived from a master preference list. This models real-world matching problems in which participants are ranked according to some objective criteria. The master list(s) may be strictly ordered, or may include ties, and the lists of individuals may involve ties and may include all, or just some, of the members of the opposite sex. In fact, ties are almost inevitable in the master list if the ranking is done on the basis of a scoring scheme with a relatively small range of distinct values. We show that many of the interesting variants of stable marriage that are NP-hard remain so under very severe restrictions involving the presence of master lists, but a number of special cases can be solved in polynomial time. Under this master list model, versions of the stable marriage problem that are already solvable in polynomial time typically yield to faster and/or simpler algorithms, giving rise to simple new structural characterisations of the solutions in these cases

    Hard variants of stable marriage

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    The Stable Marriage Problem and its many variants have been widely studied in the literature (Gusfield and Irving, The Stable Marriage Problem: Structure and Algorithms, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1989; Roth and Sotomayor, Two-sided matching: a study in game-theoretic modeling and analysis, Econometric Society Monographs, vol. 18, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990; Knuth, Stable Marriage and its Relation to Other Combinatorial Problems, CRM Proceedings and Lecture Notes, vol. 10, American Mathematical Society, Providence, RI, 1997), partly because of the inherent appeal of the problem, partly because of the elegance of the associated structures and algorithms, and partly because of important practical applications, such as the National Resident Matching Program (Roth, J. Political Economy 92(6) (1984) 991) and similar large-scale matching schemes. Here, we present the first comprehensive study of variants of the problem in which the preference lists of the participants are not necessarily complete and not necessarily totally ordered. We show that, under surprisingly restrictive assumptions, a number of these variants are hard, and hard to approximate. The key observation is that, in contrast to the case where preference lists are complete or strictly ordered (or both), a given problem instance may admit stable matchings of different sizes. In this setting, examples of problems that are hard are: finding a stable matching of maximum or minimum size, determining whether a given pair is stable––even if the indifference takes the form of ties on one side only, the ties are at the tails of lists, there is at most one tie per list, and each tie is of length 2; and finding, or approximating, both an `egalitarian' and a `minimum regret' stable matching. However, we give a 2-approximation algorithm for the problems of finding a stable matching of maximum or minimum size. We also discuss the significant implications of our results for practical matching schemes

    Outsourcing the Law: History and the Disciplinary Limits of Constitutional Reasoning

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    Debates about the use of history in constitutional interpretation find their primary nourishment in the originalism debate. This has generated a vast amount of literature, but also narrowed the terms of the debate. Originalism is a normative commitment wrapped in a questionable methodological confidence. Regardless of the multiple forms originalism takes, originalists are confident that the meaning (in the sense of intention) that animated the framing of the Constitution can be ascertained and, indeed, that they can ascertain it. The debate has largely focused, then, on whether modern-day scholars and jurists can ascertain original historical meaning or, alternatively, whether they have gotten the history right in attempting to do so

    Stable marriage with ties and bounded length preference lists

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    We consider variants of the classical stable marriage problem in which preference lists may contain ties, and may be of bounded length. Such restrictions arise naturally in practical applications, such as centralised matching schemes that assign graduating medical students to their first hospital posts. In such a setting, weak stability is the most common solution concept, and it is known that weakly stable matchings can have different sizes. This motivates the problem of finding a maximum cardinality weakly stable matching, which is known to be NP-hard in general. We show that this problem is solvable in polynomial time if each man's list is of length at most 2 (even for women's lists that are of unbounded length). However if each man's list is of length at most 3, we show that the problem becomes NP-hard (even if each women's list is of length at most 3) and not approximable within some δ>1 (even if each woman's list is of length at most 4)

    Banded Householder representation of linear subspaces

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    We show how to compactly represent any nn-dimensional subspace of RmR^m as a banded product of Householder reflections using n(m−n)n(m - n) floating point numbers. This is optimal since these subspaces form a Grassmannian space Grn(m)Gr_n(m) of dimension n(m−n)n(m - n). The representation is stable and easy to compute: any matrix can be factored into the product of a banded Householder matrix and a square matrix using two to three QR decompositions.Comment: 5 pages, 1 figure, submitted to Linear Algebra and its Application
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