Geography lost and found in economics

The contribution will consist of two parts. The first part will demonstrate the contrast between the great and increasing importance of geographic factors for economic development and the small and decreasing attention mainstream economic theory paid to spatial aspects until recently. It thereby reveals how much mainstream economic theory cannot explain. The second part will elaborate the geographical innovations of modern economic theory, their under-exposed predecessors and it will try to investigate into the scope of a further approximation. The demonstration of the contrast between the importance of geography for economic development will start with the earliest history: Human settlements developed where the best geographical conditions for human survival existed. As civilisation spread out geographic dissimilarities, especially mineral wealth, induced trade, and for several thousand years the important trading routes dominated the geographical distribution of wealth around the world. The rise of (national) states since the 15th century partitioned the attention of geographic factors into domestic, i.e. regional aspects - central planning to imporve efficiency and strengthen the military potential - and foreign aspects - the importance of an export surplus for acquiring gold, synonymous with national wealth at that time. The dichotomy of geographical influences - regional as different from foreign - persisted until recently. Industrialisation and the steamship, subsequently the railway, enhanced the importance of geography for economics: For the first time a considerable geographical division of labor arose, benefiting from economies of scale, and based on locally available, region-specific factors of production and skill. Neo-classical economic theory nevertheless concentrated on the abstraction of the one-good/two-factor economy, modelled not as an area but as a point in space, and foreign trade theory modelled two such point economies trading with each other, the famous 2-by-2-by-2-case - two countries (points), two factors of production and two goods. The highly abstract neo-classical approach yielded important results, economics came out as a science, but geography was lost en route, for almost a century. Outsiders only dealt with spatial aspects of the economy. Integration in the Post-World War II world enforced a new interest in geography: The slowly increasing de-facto integration of the world economy in the last two decades demonstrated the unrealistic nature of the neo-classical convergence assumptions; why some countries or regions develop better than others got again the honour to be considered as a problem of economic theory. Even more important proved the rapidly increasing integration of Europe: Countries effectively lost their national demand-side policy instruments and a competitive race of regions started. All the old, outside-the-mainstream theories were unearthed, renovated, and marketed in a way, that disguises in many cases how little has actually been added. The second part of the paper therefore will try to collect all the new theoretical attempts to deal with geographic aspects, to investigate into their innovations and to evaluate their explanatory power. Has economics already found all its geographical connections?

Informationsgesellschaft und flexiblere Arbeitsmärkte [Information society and flexible labour markets]

It is widely believed that the Information Society and its economic counterpart, the New Economy, require more flexibility especially in the labour market (i.e. less long term contracts) to allow faster reactions to the increased speed of change. The paper argues that increased complexity rather than faster change is the real problem. Dealing with complexity requires adaptability and organisational learning. Short term flexi-bility, however, is detrimental to adaptability and learning as it hinders the accumulation of firm-specific capabilities - and country-specific ones on the macro level. The ability of the firm to absorb and act upon knowledge depends to a large extent on staff continuity.Informationsgesellschaft, Arbeitsmarkt, Flexibilität, Komplexität, firmenspezifisches Humankapital

Technikfolgen-Abschätzung: Entscheidungshilfe in einer komplexen Welt [Technology Assessment: Decision Support in a Complex World]

The public and even scientists consider prevention and promotion of technologies as technology assessments’ primary task. This view is incompatible with democracy and devoid of any scientific foundation. Evaluating the cost and benefits of a technology affords value judgements, and the disputing parties lack common risk concepts, world views and visions. Insofar TA cannot substitute a decision by elected politicians, but it can improve the policy decision by assessing likely consequences. Support of this type is needed as cumulating knowledge made our world increasingly complex. General specialisation and, in particular, specialisation of scientists was the unavoidable consequence. It enabled the impressive technical progress but hinders holistic assessments as they afford general interdisciplinary knowledge. TAs’ task is to fill this gap and prepare decisions in all those cases where a problem presents itself differently to experts of different fields. The paper discusses for which questions and in which fields TA can offer such assistance, by discussing several studies of the Austrian Institute for Technology Assessment.Technikfolgen-Abschätzung, technology assessment, Riskokonzepte, risc concepts, Spezialisierung, specialisation, Entscheidungsvorbereitung, preparation of decison-making, expert knowledge, Expertenwissen, Interdisziplinarität, interdisciplinarity

Die Risikogesellschaft – Ein vernachlässigtes Konzept in der europäischen Stagnationsdiskussion [The Risk Society - An under-researched concept in the European debate on stagnation ]

The first years of the new century are characterised by a persistent stagnation of the European economy. In contrast to the long-term trend, but similarly to the late sixties or early eighties, the economic gap between Europe and the US widens again, giving rise to heated discussions on both sides of the Atlantic. Most observers tend to attribute Europe’s slack to insufficient deregulation and privatisation, excessive social expenditures and an underrating of new technologies. Too restrictive monetary and fiscal policies are added by some observers. All of these explanations are not incorrect, but they cannot suffice. On the one hand, they neglect the substantial differences within Europe: Distinctive stagnation is restricted to the three large EU economies, while the small countries in the North grow quite as fast as the US. On the other hand, the explanations remain superficial in not analysing the reasons for the large economies’ shortcomings. This paper attempts to demonstrate that all three explanations of the European stagnation – lack of reforms, lack of innovation and stability-biased policy – are caused by deep-rooted uncertainty of investors as well as of consumers, showing up as distinctive risk aversion: Surveys reveal that economic agents’ uncertainty is highly pronounced in the three large economies, but almost lacking in the North. The large countries’ uncertainty could be caused by their sustained stagnation, but the study finds little evidence for this direction of causation. The surveys make the opposite causation highly plausible: that the populations’ uncertainty, their attentism, and the resulting stagnation are mainly caused by the large countries’ inconsequent economic policy, shying away from approaching urgent problems and proposing fair solutions. -- Europa befindet sich – wie schon in den späten sechziger oder den frühen achtziger Jahren – abermals in einer Stagnationsphase und fällt in seiner Wirtschaftsleistung hinter die USA zurück. Das Phänomen wird auf beiden Seiten des Atlantik hitzig diskutiert und zumeist auf ein Nachhinken Europas bei Deregulierung und Privatisierung, auf überhöhte Sozialausgaben und einen Rückstand bei neuen Technologien zurückgeführt, zuweilen auch auf restriktivere Konjunkturpolitik. Alle diese Erklärungen sind nicht unrichtig, können aber aus zwei Gründen nicht genügen: Erstens vernachlässigen sie die erheblichen Unterschiede innerhalb Europas: Wachstumsschwach sind vor allem die drei großen EU-Staaten, wogegen vor allem die skandinavischen Staaten keineswegs langsamer wachsen als die USA. Zweitens greifen die Argumente insofern zu wenig tief, als sie auf die Ursachen der behaupteten Mängel nicht eingehen. Die vorliegende Arbeit versucht zu zeigen, dass hinter allen drei Erklärungsversuchen der europäischen Stagnation – Reformscheu, Innovationsscheu und inflationsfixierte Konjunkturpolitik – eine wichtige Ursache in der tiefliegenden Verunsicherung der Bevölkerung und der daraus resultierenden Risikoscheu liegt. Umfragen lassen klar erkennen, dass die Verunsicherung in den wachstumsschwachen großen Ländern Deutschland, Frankreich und Italien merklich stärker ausgeprägt ist als etwa in Skandinavien. Selbst wenn die Kausalität von der Wachstumsschwäche zur Verunsicherung laufen sollte, wäre das für die Wirtschaftspolitik nicht irrelevant, desto mehr, wenn – wie zu zeigen versucht wird – Attentismus und Stagnation Folgen einer, nicht zuletzt (wirtschafts-)politisch ausgelösten Verunsicherung sind.Risikogesellschaft, Wirtschaftspolitik, Vergleich USA/EU/Skandinavien, Deregulierung, Vertrauen, risk society, economic policy, comparison USA/EU/Scandinavia, dergulation, trust

Beeinträchtigung der Privatsphäre in der Informationsgesellschaft [Detraction of Privacy in the Information Society]

Digitizing, Minimizing and Networking are the prerequisites for the evolving Information-Society, whose most attracting features are gathering, storing, linking and providing of enormous amounts of data. Best-known advantages are easy communication via e-Mail, easy access to information via Internet, comfortable services in e-Commerce and e-Government. On the other hand there are substantial dangers for privacy coming along with these developments. This paper shows basic technological developments, different actors and their use of personal data and deals with short and long-term effects of detraction of privacy. Special emphasis is given to the analysis of existing trade-offs between efficiency and security on the one hand and privacy on the other. Based on existing privacy regulations some recommendations for further policy actions are given. -- Digitalisierung, Minia-turisierung und Vernetzung haben die Voraussetzungen für eine Informationsgesellschaft geschaffen, die durch Sammlung, Speicherung und Verknüpfung enormer Datenmengen und deren breite Verfügbarkeit gekennzeichnet ist. Das schafft für die meisten Staatsbürger erhebliche Vorteile, die durch Schlagworte wie e-Mail, Internet, e-Commerce, aber auch elektronische Erledigung von Behördenwegen umschrieben werden können. Die verfügbaren Datenmassen entfalten aber auch ein Eigenleben, das in die Privatsphäre der meisten Staatsbürger in vielfacher Weise eingreift; den meisten ist gar nicht bewusst, wieviel Informationen über sie verfügbar sind und z.T. auch gehandelt wer-den. Im Folgenden sollen zunächst die neuen technischen Möglichkeiten der Informationssammlung, -speicherung und -verknüpfung beschrieben werden; es wird aufgezeigt, welche dieser neuen Möglichkeiten vom wem genutzt werden, und mit welchen Konsequenzen. Dann wird das Janusgesicht der Informationsgesellschaft herausgearbeitet, die kritische Austauschbeziehung zwischen Effizienz und Sicherheit auf der einen Seite, die durch die intensive Informationssammlung und -verarbeitung überhaupt erst ermöglicht wird, und dem daraus resultierenden z.T. tiefen Eindringen in die Privatsphäre auf der anderen. Aus einer Diskussion der bestehenden Datenschutzbestimmungen wird versucht, erste Ansatzpunkte für Lösungen abzuleiten. Das stößt auf zahlreiche Schwierigkeiten: Die Dynamik des Sektors, ein in weiten Bereichen noch mangelndes Problembewusstsein, international erheblich differierende Vorstellungen über Art und Umfang der Schutzbedürftigkeit, aber auch die Tatsache, dass es einer ausgewogenen Kombination gesetzlicher Maßnahmen mit Selbstbeschränkung, also bewusstem Verzicht der Nutzer auf manchen Komfort bedarf.Privatsphäre, Privacy, Datenschutz, Informationsgesellschaft, problemorientierte Technikfolgenabschätzung

Europa in der Vertrauenskrise?

Die Europäische Union scheint sich in einer Vertrauenskrise zu befinden. Vor allem nach der Finanz- und Eurokrise kam es weiträumig zu langanhaltenden Vertrauensverlusten. Die Einschätzung wirtschaftspolitischer Probleme unterscheidet sich aber zwischen verschiedenen regionalen Gruppen deutlich. Auch die Erklärungsansätze für diese Unterschiede wurzeln in heterogenen historischen Entwicklungen. Allerdings ist weder eine generelle Gefährung der Demokratie noch eine grundsätzliche Skepsis der Bevölkerung gegenüber der Europäischen Union zu erkennen.Europe is said to be in a trust crisis. The finance crisis and the euro crisis caused a wide-ranging and sustained loss of trust and the media suspected this to be the culmination of a long-term trend. This may be true for the United States but not for Europe. Trust in Europe recovered within a decade, but with significant regional differences. While trust in democracy is not at all endangered in the EU’s northern and central countries, it could be at risk in the southern and the eastern ones. The paper shows that the problems in the East are exaggerated and may turn out as transitory, while the political instability in the South is more risky. Due to the fact that almost all member countries manifest a relatively high trust in the EU and a strong resolve to remain, these problems are unlikely to put European democracy at risk

TRY plant trait database - enhanced coverage and open access

Plant traits-the morphological, anatomical, physiological, biochemical and phenological characteristics of plants-determine how plants respond to environmental factors, affect other trophic levels, and influence ecosystem properties and their benefits and detriments to people. Plant trait data thus represent the basis for a vast area of research spanning from evolutionary biology, community and functional ecology, to biodiversity conservation, ecosystem and landscape management, restoration, biogeography and earth system modelling. Since its foundation in 2007, the TRY database of plant traits has grown continuously. It now provides unprecedented data coverage under an open access data policy and is the main plant trait database used by the research community worldwide. Increasingly, the TRY database also supports new frontiers of trait-based plant research, including the identification of data gaps and the subsequent mobilization or measurement of new data. To support this development, in this article we evaluate the extent of the trait data compiled in TRY and analyse emerging patterns of data coverage and representativeness. Best species coverage is achieved for categorical traits-almost complete coverage for 'plant growth form'. However, most traits relevant for ecology and vegetation modelling are characterized by continuous intraspecific variation and trait-environmental relationships. These traits have to be measured on individual plants in their respective environment. Despite unprecedented data coverage, we observe a humbling lack of completeness and representativeness of these continuous traits in many aspects. We, therefore, conclude that reducing data gaps and biases in the TRY database remains a key challenge and requires a coordinated approach to data mobilization and trait measurements. This can only be achieved in collaboration with other initiatives

TRY plant trait database - enhanced coverage and open access

This article has 730 authors, of which I have only listed the lead author and myself as a representative of University of HelsinkiPlant traits-the morphological, anatomical, physiological, biochemical and phenological characteristics of plants-determine how plants respond to environmental factors, affect other trophic levels, and influence ecosystem properties and their benefits and detriments to people. Plant trait data thus represent the basis for a vast area of research spanning from evolutionary biology, community and functional ecology, to biodiversity conservation, ecosystem and landscape management, restoration, biogeography and earth system modelling. Since its foundation in 2007, the TRY database of plant traits has grown continuously. It now provides unprecedented data coverage under an open access data policy and is the main plant trait database used by the research community worldwide. Increasingly, the TRY database also supports new frontiers of trait-based plant research, including the identification of data gaps and the subsequent mobilization or measurement of new data. To support this development, in this article we evaluate the extent of the trait data compiled in TRY and analyse emerging patterns of data coverage and representativeness. Best species coverage is achieved for categorical traits-almost complete coverage for 'plant growth form'. However, most traits relevant for ecology and vegetation modelling are characterized by continuous intraspecific variation and trait-environmental relationships. These traits have to be measured on individual plants in their respective environment. Despite unprecedented data coverage, we observe a humbling lack of completeness and representativeness of these continuous traits in many aspects. We, therefore, conclude that reducing data gaps and biases in the TRY database remains a key challenge and requires a coordinated approach to data mobilization and trait measurements. This can only be achieved in collaboration with other initiatives.Peer reviewe