Bar press and bar release as avoidance responses

Two experiments were performed in which rats had to avoid shock by both pressing and releasing a bar within specified intervals. When the release-shock interval was held constant and the press-shock interval was increased, response rate decreased and bar holding increased. When the press-shock interval was held constant and the release-shock interval was increased, both response rate and bar holding decreased

Thigh-length compression stockings and DVT after stroke

Controversy exists as to whether neoadjuvant chemotherapy improves survival in patients with invasive bladder cancer, despite randomised controlled trials of more than 3000 patients. We undertook a systematic review and meta-analysis to assess the effect of such treatment on survival in patients with this disease

Left, Right, and Center: Strategic Information Acquisition and Diversity in Judicial Panels

In the last fifteen years, a number of empirical studies of multi-member judicial panels have documented a phenomenon popularly known as "panel effects. " Two principal findings of this literature are: (1) the inclusion (non-pivotal) members from outside the dominant ideology on the panel predicts higher reversal rates of administrative agencies that are “like minded ” with the panel’s median voter; and (2) when mixed panels do not reverse, they frequently issue unanimous decisions. These apparently moderating effects of mixed panel composition pose a challenge to conven-tional median voter theory. In the face of this challenge, many scholars have offered their own explanation for panel effects (including collegial-ity; deliberation effects, whistle-blowing, and others). In this paper, we propose a general model that (among other things) predicts panel effects as a byproduct of strategic information acquisition. The kernel of our argument is that (non-pivotal) minority members of mixed panels have incentives to engage in costly searches for information in cases where the majority members would rationally choose not to do so. As a result, the inclusion of ideologically diverse members may induce more information production in a way that increases the likelihood that a mixed panel will overturn ideologically allied agency actors. Our informational account — if true — has normative implications for the composition of judicial panels in particular, and for deliberative groups more generally