Structure-mapping processes enable infants' learning across domains including language

Humans have an astounding ability to acquire new information. Like many other animals, we can learn by association and by perceptual generalization. However, unlike most other species, we also acquire new information by means of relational generalization and transfer. In this chapter, we explore the origins of a uniquely developed human capacity-our ability to learn relational abstractions through analogical comparison. We focus on whether and how infants can use analogical comparison to derive relational abstractions from examples. We frame our work in terms of structure-mapping theory, which has been fruitfully applied to analogical processing in children and adults. We find that young infants show two key signatures of structure mapping: first, relational abstraction is fostered by comparing alignable examples, and second, relational abstraction is hampered by the presence of highly salient objects. The studies we review make it clear that structure-mapping processes are evident in the first months of life, prior to much influence of language and culture. This finding suggests that infants are born with analogical processing mechanisms that allow them to learn relations through comparing examples

Infant physical knowledge

Physical reasoning is the ability to go beyond the information in the immediate perceptual array. For example, if I were to dangle my keys in front of me with the intention of letting go of them, everyone would predict that the moment I let go of the keys, they will fall towards the ground. Similarly, if I hide my keys behind my back, everyone has the expectation that the keys continue to exist and that the shape and size of the keys remain the same as they were before they were hidden from view. These two examples demonstrate that people share the same basic ideas about how objects behave and interact. These expectations may be universal across all humans, and they may even be shared by some other species. However, researchers are still puzzled by some aspects of these fundamental abilities. For instance, even though most people can effortlessly draw similar predictions about these events, we have yet to build a computer that can rival the physical reasoning abilities of a typically developing 1-year-old infant. In this chapter, we argue that one way to resolve some of the mysteries about physical reasoning is to look at the origins of the abilities and how they change over time. We start by reviewing the literature on the physical reasoning abilities of human infants. First, we present two case studies: knowledge about objects and knowledge about substances (e.g., liquid, sand, etc.). Each case begins by offering key distinctions that define physical reasoning abilities and then reviews the evidence that support these claims and how these findings provide information about the nature of the representation abilities. The final sections review how these findings relate to neuroscience, sociocultural, and policy perspectives