Epistemic Limitations and Precise Estimates in Analog Magnitude Representation

This chapter presents a re-understanding of the contents of our analog magnitude representations (e.g., approximate duration, distance, number). The approximate number system (ANS) is considered, which supports numerical representations that are widely described as fuzzy, noisy, and limited in their representational power. The contention is made that these characterizations are largely based on misunderstandings—that what has been called “noise” and “fuzziness” is actually an important epistemic signal of confidence in one’s estimate of the value. Rather than the ANS having noisy or fuzzy numerical content, it is suggested that the ANS has exquisitely precise numerical content that is subject to epistemic limitations. Similar considerations will arise for other analog representations. The chapter discusses how this new understanding of ANS representations recasts the learnability problem for number and the conceptual changes that children must accomplish in the number domain

Nienależne świadczenie w polskim Kodeksie zobowiązań z 1933 r. na tle porównawczym

This paper discusses the concept of undue payment in the Polish Code of Obligations of 1933 within a comparative perspective which includes a number of other contemporary codes (the Napoleonic Code, the Austrian ABGB, the German BGB and the Swiss Obligationrecht), Roman law, and the Polish Civil Code of 1964. The discussion is concerned with the framework of legal provisions constituting undue payment in each of the codes. Furthermore, while tracing the relationship between the Roman condictiones and its successors in modern law, the paper analyses the concept of legal ground of action. This is followed by a close examination of the conditions and circumstances which made the payor’s claim for the restitution of his payment admissible or inadmissible in the eyes of the court. The paper also examines the issue of liability in this type of actions that were actually heard at Polish courts. In the summary, the author attempts to make a reassessment of the functioning of undue payment in the Code of Obligations, a historic landmark of Polish legislation

Instytucja niesłusznego zbogacenia w polskim Kodeksie zobowiązań z 1933 r. na tle współczesnych kodyfikacji

THE UNJUST ENRICHMENT AS REGULATED IN THE CODE OF OBLIGATIOON OF 1933 AND COMPARED WITH SIMILAR SOLUTIONS FOUND IN THE OTHER CODES F THE TIME The paper discusses the unjust enrichmennt as found in the Polish Code of Obligations of 1933. The discussion is conducted in a comparative way and makes allusions to other regulations of the time (those detectable in the ABGB, Code Civil, BGB, Obligationenrecht). It also makes reference to the solution accepted in the Polish Civil Code of 1964. What was discussed was the very construction of unjust enrichment as found in the aforementioned regulations (1), grounds for the claims (2), the scope within which the duty to return the enrichment applied (3), the nature of the claim – whether it was autonomous or subsidiary (4). In his final remarks, the author tried to assess the discussed institution as regulated in the Code of Obligations (5)

Dzieje doktryny actio personalis moritur cum persona w angielskim common law

Pursuant to the maxim that actio personalis moritur cum persona, the claims and debts of the party become extinct on the day of its death. That is the reason why in English common law the successors could not sue their predecessor’s debtors; on the other hand, they were protected against the creditors of the deceased. It is difficult to exaggerate the importance of doctrine for the legal relations, especially within the scope of contract law. In the early years (12th–13th centuries) of the functioning of the doctrine nearly all personal actions came into play. However, lawyers began to create more and more exceptions that narrowed the maxim’s impact. As a result, at the beginning of the 17th century (the Pynchon’s case, 1611) the court had in fact transformed the doctrine of actio personalis moritur cum persona into the exception. It is worthwhile to note that the maxim’s history may act as an example of the peculiarity of English law and the domination of its procedural rules. Throughout the centuries the most important reason against the transmission of rights and duties was the practical impossibility of the wager of law’s application. In that case lawyers could only modify rules of evidence. Instead, in England it was decided to treat the claims and debts of the deceased as extinct. As a result, the consequences of the actio personalis moritur cum persona doctrine went much too far

Angielska doktryna promissory estoppel a polska klauzula nadużycia prawa

The English doctrine of promissory estoppel and the Polish clause of abuse of lawThe article discusses the problem of evolution and the premises used in applying the English concept known as promissory estoppel. The birth of this legal concept has been discussed on the example of the most important court cases, the so called leading cases, such as, among others, that of High Trees (1947) and Combe v. Combe (1951), in which it was lord Denning who adjudicated. In the article, the author also analyzes the general principles of invoking promissory estoppel. He indicates that in the course of a court trial it is necessary to prove the existence of a promise, on the basis of which the person who was promised something, while acting in accordance with the common sense, decided to withdraw and by undertaking certain definite steps ultimately suffered a loss, whereas withdrawal on the part of the person making a promise would be unjustified. The author of the paper made an effort to try to answer the question whether the abuse of right clause mentioned in Art. 5 of the Civil Code may be regarded as the Polish equivalent of promissory estoppel

Parallels between Roman civil law and English common law as exemplified by the rules that govern litigation and obligations

Artykuł rozpoczyna się od przedstawienia czynników, które prawdopodobnie stoją za analogiami między rzymskim ius civile a angielskim common law (1). Czynniki te dotyczą charakteru źródeł prawa - dominacji orzecznictwa, dogmatu niezmiennego dobrego starego prawa (2). Następnie przedstawia zjawisko dominacji reguł proceduralnych nad materialnoprawnymi. Nawet angielscy historycy prawa, choć niechętnie przyznają, że romanizacja miała również miejsce w Albionie, przyznają, że do pewnego stopnia „ich” oryginalne writs i forms of action działały podobnie do systemu formularnego w prawie rzymskim(3). Wiele podobieństw można dostrzec również w sferze prawa materialnego. Następnie artykuł koncentruje się na prawie zobowiązań, w szczególności prawie umów (4) i bezpodstawnym wzbogaceniu (5). Ze względów proceduralnych (zasada „ubi remedium, ibi ius”) odrębne części prawa zobowiązań powstały w oparciu o zamknięty katalog umów nazwanych, czynów niedozwolonych (6) i konkretnych tzw. unjust factors, tj. czynników prowadzących do restytucji. Co istotne, analogii tych nie należy uważać za przykłady recepcji prawa rzymskiego przez sądy angielskie (7).The paper starts with the presentation of factors that propably stand behind the analogies be-tween Roman Civil Law and English Common Law (1). These factors concern the framework of sources of law – the dominance of case-law, the dogma of unalterable good-old law (2). Then the text presents the phenomenon of domination of procedural rules over the substantive ones. Even English legal historians, although reluctant to concede that Romanisation also took place in Albion, admit that to a certain degree “their” original writs and forms of action in common law functioned similarly to the formulary system of Roman law (3). A number of parallels was detectable in the sphere of substantive law as well. There the paper focuses on the obligation law, especially the contract law (4) and restitution law (5). Due to the procedur-al reasons (“ubi remedium, ibi ius” - rule), the separate branches of obligation law were found-ed on the closed systems of nominate contracts, torts (6) and unjust factors leading to restitu-tion respectively. It is emphasized, however, that these analogies should not be deemed to be the examples of the reception of the Roman law by the English courts (7)

Fibrosa S.A. v. Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour Ltd (1942). The Company from Kresy (Polish Eastern Borderlands) Before the House of Lords

The paper discusses Fibrosa S.A. v. Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour Ltd (1942), a case considered as one of several landmark cases in the English law of restitution. What was at stake in litigation before the House of Lords was whether a Polish plaintiff should recover a prepayment transferred pursuant to a contract that had become frustrated because of the outbreak of war in 1939. The lords had to decide on the application of two potentially dissonant doctrines – frustration and total failure of consideration. But what made the Fibrosa case famous was an obiter dictum delivered by lordWright. This eminent judge declared that English law should provide remedies for unjust enrichment. That is the very reason why the case is still being cited by the lawyers [email protected] JagiellońskiRozporządzenie Prezydenta Rzeczypospolitej z dnia 27 października 1933 r. – Kodeks zobowiązań (Dz.U. Nr 82, poz. 598).Ustawa z dnia 23 kwietnia 1964 r. – Kodeks cywilny (Dz.U. Nr 16, poz. 93).Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act (1943) 6&7 George VI c. 40. – rozporządzenie Parlamentu Europejskiego i Rady (WE) nr 593/2008 z dnia 17 czerwca 2008 r. w sprawie prawa właściwego dla zobowiązań umownych (Rzym I). – Trading with the Enemy Act (1939) 2&3 George VI c. 86. – ustawa z dnia 2 sierpnia 1926 r. o prawie właściwem dla stosunków prywatnych międzynarodowych.Appleby v. Myers (1867) L.R. 2 C.P. 651.BP Exploration Co (Libya) v. Hunt (No 2) (1979) 1 W.L.R. 783.Brook’s Wharf and Bull Wharf, Ltd. v. Goodman Bros.(1937) 1 K.B. 534.Cadogan Petroleum Holdings Ltd v. Global Process Systems LLC (2013) 1 C.L.C. 733–734.Cantiare San Rocco S.A. v. Clyde Shipbuilding and Engineering Co. Ltd. (1924) A.C. 227.Chandler v. Webster (1904) 1 K.B. 493.Dutch v. Warren (1720) Strange I 406.Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour Ltd (1943) A.C. 32.French Marine v. Compagnie Neapolitaine d’Eclairage et de Chauffage par le Gas (1921) 2 A.C. 494.Great Peace Shipping Ltd v. Tsavliris Salvage (International) Ltd (2002) EWCA Civ 1407.Kiriri Cotton Co. v. Dewani (1960) A.C. 192.Krell v. Henry (1903) 2 K.B. 740.Lipkin Gorman v. Karpnale Ltd (1991) 2 A.C. 548.Giedo van der Garde BV v. Force India Formula One Team Ltd (2010) EWHC 2373.Greater Manchester Police v. Wigan Athletic Afc Ltd (2007) EWHC 3095 (Ch).Kleinwort Benson Ltd v. Glasgow City Council (1997) 3W.L.R. 923, (1999) 1 A.C. 186.Kleinwort Benson Ltd v. Lincoln City Council (1998) 3 WLR 1095.London Street Tramways v. London City Council (1898) A.C. 375.Moses v. MacFerlan (1760) 2 Burrow 1005.Practical Statement (1966) 3 All E.R. 77.Russkoe Obschestvo d’lia Izgstovlenia Snariadov l’voennick Pripassov v. John Stirk & Sons (1922), Ld. 10 Ll.L.Rep.214.Rowe v. Vale of White Horse (2003) EWHC 388.Sempra Metals Limited (formerly Metallgesellschaft Limited) v. Her Majesty’sCommissioners of Inland Revenue and another (2007) 3 W.L.R. 407–408.Stocznia Gdanska S.A. v. Latvian Shipping Co. Latreefer Inc. and Others (1998) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 609.Taylor v. Caldwell (1863) 3 B. & S. 826.Toovey & Anor, R (on the application of) v. Law Society (2002) EWHC 391.United Australia v. Barclays Bank (1941) A.C. 1.Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v. Islington London Borough Council (1996) 2 A.C. 710.Whincup v. Hughes (1871) L.R. 6 C.P. 78.Woolwich Equitable Building Society v. IRC (1993) 1 A.C. 80.P. Atiyah, S. Smith, Atiyah’s Introduction to the Law of Contract, Oxford 2005.P. Birks, Unjust Enrichment, Oxford 2004.G. B. Burke, The Proper Law of a Contract for the Sale of Goods, Arbitration 1924.Burrows, A Casebook on Contract, Oxford 2009.A.T. Denning, „The Law of Restitution”, by Robert Goff, Gareth Jones, London 1966, (recenzja), “LQR” 1967, nr 83.N. Duxbury, Lord Wright and Innovative Traditionalism, “University of Toronto Law Journal” 2009, nr 59.J. Edelman, Money Had and Received: Modern Pleading of an Old Count, “Restitution Law Review” 2000, nr 8.R. Evans-Jones, Roman Law in Scotland and England and the Developement of one Law for Britain, “The Law Quarterly Review” 1999, nr 115.R. Evans-Jones, Roman Law in Britain, [w:] Questiones Iuris. Festschrift fur Joseph Georg Wolf zum 70. Geburtstag, red. U. Manthe, C. Krampe, Berlin 2000.R. Goff, G. Jones, The Law of Restitution, London 2002.J. Halberda, Historia zobowiązań quasi-kontraktowych w common law, Kraków 2012.J. Halberda, Zasada bezpodstawnego wzbogacenia w prawie angielskim, „Studia Prawa Prywatnego” 2014, nr 2.S. Hedley, Restitution in English Common Law, [w:] The Oxford International Encyclopedia of Legal History, red. S.N. Katz, t. V, Oxford 2009.Ł.J. Korporowicz, Prawo rzymskie w wybranych orzeczeniach Izby Lordów w latach 1999–2009, Z dziejów prawa, t. 4 (12), Katowice 2011.Landmark cases in the Law of Restitution, red. Ch. Mitchell, P. Mitchell, Oxford 2006.W. Litewski, Słownik encyklopedyczny prawa rzymskiego, Kraków 1998.Ł. Marzec, Sprawa Fibrosa vs Fairbairn. Polska spółka, Izba Lordów i prawo rzymskie, „Zeszyty Prawnicze UKSW” 2007, nr 7/1.M. McInnes, The Reason to Reverse: Unjust Factors and Juristic Reasons, „Boston University Law Review” 2012, nr 92.G. McMeel, Casebook on restitution, London 1996.P. Mitchell, Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour, Limited (1942), [w:] Landmark cases in the Law of Restitution, red. Ch. Mitchell, P. Mitchell, Oxford 2006.M. Sobczyk, Zamierzony cel świadczenia nie został osiągnięty (condictio ob rem). Przykład przydatności myśli jurystów rzymskich dla wykładni przepisów kodeksu cywilnego, „Kwartalnik Prawa Prywatnego” 2004, nr 4.J. Strange, Reports of Adjudged Cases In the Courts of Chancery, King’s Bench, Common Pleas and Exchequer, From Trinity Term in the second Year of King George I To Trinity Term in the twenty-first Year of King George II, Savoy (London) 1755.F. Wilmot-Smith, Reconsidering “total” failure, “Cambridge Law Journal” 2013, nr 72, s. 423.197-21714119721

The principle of good faith and fair dealing in English contract law

Given that continental civil law scholarship applies the concept of good faith in either a subjective (honesty in fact) or objective sense (good faith and fair dealing), the present article focuses on the latter one. The traditional view in England and Wales discards the recognition of a general principle of good faith and fair dealing in English law. English courts have adopted a piecemeal solutions approach (as shown by the judicial decisions issued in Interfoto Picture Library (1987) and Walford v. Miles (1992)). Meanwhile, the principle in question, along with the concept of the freedom of contract, is one of the most important principles of the continental civil law tradition (cf. art. 1104 of the French Civil Code, § 157, § 242 of the German Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, art. 2 (1) of the Swiss Zivilgesetzbuch, art. 6:2 Burgerlijk Wetboek, art. 5 of the Polish Civil Code, art. 2 (1) Common European Sales Law, art. 1:201 Principles of European Contract Law, art. III- 1:103 Draft Common Frame of Reference). The current work analyzes recent English case law (in particular Yam Seng (2013)), which seems to acknowledge the principle of good faith and fair dealing while rejecting the traditional view mentioned above. The comparative approach — references to American, and Commonwealth law, as well as to that of particular European states — is taken into account. The author claims that hostility to the concept of good faith in an objective sense in English law is superficial. One may expect that in the near future courts in England and Wales will follow the path taken by courts in the United States (§ 205 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1981)), Australia (Renard Constructions (1992)) and Canada (Bhasin v. Hrynew (2014)), and they will finally recognize good faith as an underlying principle