Impact of globalization on monetary policy

Monetary policy ; Globalization ; Banks and banking, Central ; Inflation (Finance) ; Stocks

Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles

There is an extensive empirical literature on political business cycles, but its theoretical foundations are grounded in pre-rational expectations macroeconomic theory. Here we show that electoral cycles in taxes, government spending and money growth can be modeled as an equilibrium signaling process. The cycleis driven by temporary information asymmetries which can arise if, for example,the government has more current information on its performance in providing for national defense. Incumbents cheat least when their private informationis either extremely favorable or extremely unfavorable. An exogenous increase in the incumbent partyts popularity does not necessarily imply a damped policy cycle.

Global Implications of Self-Oriented National Monetary Rules

It is well known that if international linkages are relatively small, the potential gains to international monetary policy coordination are typically quite limited. But what if goods and financial markets are tightly linked? Is it then problematic if countries unilaterally design their institutions for monetary stabilization? Are the stabilization gains from having separate currencies largely squandered in the absence of effective international monetary coordination? We argue that under plausible assumptions the answer is no. Unless risk aversion is very high, lack of coordination in rule setting is a second-order problem compared to the overall gains from monetary policy stabilization.

Serial Default and Its Remedies

The main theme of this paper is that debt cycles deeply entrenched in the process of development, and one must be careful about trusting magic elixirs that purport to finesse the problem entirely. Middle income countries nascent political and economic institutions, often simultaneously face extremely high degrees of economic uncertainty, not least stemming from the extraordinary volatility of world commodity and agricultural prices. At the same time, many of these countries have exhausted autarkic growth strategies, and find themselves desparately needing to deepen financial markets in order to efficiently allocate scarce saving and expand growth. But this process of deepening – often associated with increased international capital market integration – almost invariably exposes them to heightened risks. And, unfortunately, once a country suffers one bout of default, its institutions and markets become weaker and more vulnerable to more debt problems, a phenomenon Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano term “Debt Intolerance.”

Debt and Growth Revisited

In a recent paper, we studied economic growth and inflation at different levels of government and external debt. The public discussion of our empirical strategy and results has been somewhat muddled. Here, we attempt to clarify matters, particularly with respect sample coverage (our evidence encompasses forty-four countries over two centuries--not just the United States), debt-growth causality (our book emphasizes the bi-directional nature of the relationship), as well as nonlinearities in the debt-growth connection and thresholds evident in the data (absolutely central points that seem to have been lost in some commentary.) In addition to clarifying the earlier results, this paper enriches our original analysis by providing further discussion of the high debt (over 90 percent of GDP) episodes and their incidence. Some of the implications of our analysis, including for the United States, are taken up in the final section.debt, growth, crisis, advanced economies, historical

Serial default and the “paradox” of rich to poor capital flows

Lucas (1990) argued that it was a paradox that more capital does not flow from rich countries to poor countries. He rejected the standard explanation of expropriation risk and argued that paucity of capital flows to poor countries must instead be rooted in externalities in human capital formation favoring further investment in already capital rich countries. In this paper, we review the various explanations offered for this “paradox.” There is no doubt that there are many reasons why capital does not flow from rich to poor nations – yet the evidence we present suggests some explanations are more relevant than others. In particular, as long as the odds of non repayment are as high as 65 percent for some low income countries, credit risk seems like a far more compelling reason for the paucity of rich-poor capital flows. The true paradox may not be that too little capital flows from the wealthy to the poor nations, but that too much capital (especially debt) is channeled to “debt intolerant” serial defaulters.capital flows debt default low income countries equity