The role of monetary incentives in prediction markets: a time series approach

Prediction markets serve as popular devices to aggregate beliefs and to assess market estimated probabilities. By looking at the interaction between real- and play-money prediction markets, this paper shows that traded volume has a significant positive effect on the probability of real- and play-money market cointegration. This indicates that the information aggregation process, eliminating individual traders'' biases, operates even when not inducing truthful belief revelation with monetary incentives. The study is based on data from four markets covering the 2008 presidential election in the United States of Americafinancial economics and financial management ;

Elicitation of expectations using Colonel Blotto

We develop a mechanism based on the Colonel Blotto game to elicit (subjective) expectations in a group-based manner. In this game, two players allocate resources over possible future events. A fixed prize is awarded based on the amounts the players allocate to the realized event. We consider two payoff variations: under the proportional-prize rule, the award is split proportionally to the resources that players allocate to the realized event; under the winner-takes-all rule, the full award is given to the player who allocate the most resources to the realized event. When probabilities by which events realize are common knowledge to the players, both games are Bayesian–Nash incentive compatible in the sense that (expected) equilibrium allocations perfectly reflect the true realization probabilities. By means of a laboratory experiment, we find that in a setting where realization probabilities are common knowledge the game with the proportional-prize rule (Prop) elicits better distributions compared to both the winner-takes-all variation (Win) and a benchmark mechanism based on an individual-based proper scoring rule (Ind). Without common knowledge of realization probabilities Prop is at least as good as Ind, showing that it is possible to use a game to elicit expectations in a similar fashion to using a proper scoring rule

Security auctions with cash- and equity-bids:An experimental study

We study the performance of cash- and equity-bid security auctions in an experiment using first- and second-price pricing rules. Theory predicts revenue equivalence between first- and second-price formats, equity auctions to generate more revenue than cash auctions, and for all formats to be efficient. We find that, on average, equity auctions produce larger revenue than cash auctions in absolute terms but not relative to equilibrium predictions. Important factors driving this result are substantial underbidding, large variance, and bidding functions being flatter in equity auctions. Furthermore, we find that first-price auctions produce larger revenues than second-price auctions, and cash auctions to be more efficient

Cost-(in)effective public good provision: an experimental exploration

This paper investigates the determinants of cost-(in)effective giving to public goods. We conduct a pre-registered experiment to elucidate how factors at the institutional and individual levels shape individual contributions and the cost-effectiveness of those contributions in a novel public good game. In particular, we examine the role of consequential uncertainty over the value of public good contributions (institutional level) as well as individual characteristics like risk and ambiguity attitudes, giving type, and demographics (individual level). We find cost-ineffective contributions in all institutions, but total contribution levels and the degree of cost-ineffectiveness are similar across institutions. Meanwhile, cost-effectiveness varies by giving type—which is a novel result that is consistent with hypotheses we generate from theory—but other individual characteristics have little influence on the cost-effectiveness of contributions. Our work has important positive and normative implications for charitable giving and public good provision in the real world, and it is particularly germane to emerging online crowdfunding and patronage platforms that confront users with a multitude of competing opportunities for giving

Cost-(in)effective public good provision: An experimental exploration

This paper investigates the determinants of cost-(in)effective giving to public goods. We conduct a pre-registered experiment to elucidate how factors at the institutional and individual levels shape individual contributions and the cost-effectiveness of those contributions in a novel public good game. In particular, we examine the role of consequential uncertainty over the value of public good contributions (institutional level) as well as individual characteristics like risk and ambiguity attitudes, giving type, and demographics (individual level). We nd that consequential uncertainty tends to reduce overall contributions, but not the cost-effectiveness of those contributions. Meanwhile, cost-effectiveness varies by giving type-which is a novel result that is consistent with hypotheses we generate from theory-but other individual characteristics have little influence on contributions or cost-effectiveness. Our work has important positive and normative implications for charitable giving and public good provision in the real world, and it is particularly germane to emerging online crowdfunding and patronage platforms that confront users with a multitude of competing opportunities for giving

Non-Standard Errors

In statistics, samples are drawn from a population in a data-generating process (DGP). Standard errors measure the uncertainty in estimates of population parameters. In science, evidence is generated to test hypotheses in an evidence-generating process (EGP). We claim that EGP variation across researchers adds uncertainty: Non-standard errors (NSEs). We study NSEs by letting 164 teams test the same hypotheses on the same data. NSEs turn out to be sizable, but smaller for better reproducible or higher rated research. Adding peer-review stages reduces NSEs. We further find that this type of uncertainty is underestimated by participants

The genetic architecture of the human cerebral cortex

The cerebral cortex underlies our complex cognitive capabilities, yet little is known about the specific genetic loci that influence human cortical structure. To identify genetic variants that affect cortical structure, we conducted a genome-wide association meta-analysis of brain magnetic resonance imaging data from 51,665 individuals. We analyzed the surface area and average thickness of the whole cortex and 34 regions with known functional specializations. We identified 199 significant loci and found significant enrichment for loci influencing total surface area within regulatory elements that are active during prenatal cortical development, supporting the radial unit hypothesis. Loci that affect regional surface area cluster near genes in Wnt signaling pathways, which influence progenitor expansion and areal identity. Variation in cortical structure is genetically correlated with cognitive function, Parkinson's disease, insomnia, depression, neuroticism, and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder

The Influence of Manga on the Graphic Novel

This material has been published in The Cambridge History of the Graphic Novel edited by Jan Baetens, Hugo Frey, Stephen E. Tabachnick. This version is free to view and download for personal use only. Not for re-distribution, re-sale or use in derivative works. © Cambridge University PressProviding a range of cogent examples, this chapter describes the influences of the Manga genre of comics strip on the Graphic Novel genre, over the last 35 years, considering the functions of domestication, foreignisation and transmedia on readers, markets and forms