40 research outputs found
LâautodĂ©termination du maintenant Ă©ternel
« LâautodĂ©termination du maintenant Ă©ternel » est un essai central portant sur une question qui ne cessa de prĂ©occuper Nishida tout au long de sa carriĂšre, celle du temps et, corrĂ©lativement, celle du soi vĂ©ritable. Lâanalyse de la temporalitĂ© Ă laquelle il procĂšde constitue lâun des apports majeurs de sa philosophie sur la scĂšne de la philosophie contemporaine. Lâinspiration platonicienne et le rapport constant Ă Augustin sur ce sujet conduisirent Nishida Ă approfondir considĂ©rablement sa « logique du basho » (ć Žæçè«ç bashoteki ronri) ou du lieu et Ă rĂ©interprĂ©ter en retour de maniĂšre « englobante » la temporalitĂ©. Pour lui, tout ce qui est se situe dans le temps, forme fondamentale de la rĂ©alitĂ©. Or, le temps se situe dans le prĂ©sent. Ă partir de cet acquis, Nishida Ă©largit encore plus sa perspective en Ă©tablissant que le prĂ©sent lui-mĂȘme se situe dans le soi. En rĂ©alitĂ©, le vĂ©ritable soi nâest autre que le soi prĂ©sent. Le stade suivant, le plus englobant de tous, est celui du maintenant Ă©ternel, dans lequel tourne le temps. Il rĂ©sulte de la temporalitĂ© « englobante » de Nishida une conception du prĂ©sent qui met lâaccent sur le rapport Ă lâhistoire, sur un soi plus fondamental et Ă©thique, de mĂȘme que sur le thĂšme de lâaltĂ©ritĂ©.âThe Self-determination of the Eternal Nowâ is a central essay on an issue that preoccupied Nishida throughout his life, that of time and, correspondingly, the true self. His analysis of temporality is a significant contribution to contemporary philosophy. Taking his inspiration from Plato and Augustine on that topic, Nishida deepened significantly his âlogic of bashoâ (ć Žæçè«ç bashoteki ronri) (field) and reinterpreted, in return, temporality as âencompassingâ. For him, everything that exists is located in time, which is the fundamental form of reality. But time is located in the present. From this premiss, Nishida widened again his perspective in establishing that the present itself is located in the self. In fact, the true self is precisely the present itself. The most encompassing stage is the eternal now, in which time rotates. The consequence of Nishidaâs âencompassingâ temporality is a conception of the present that emphasizes the connection to history, as well as the insistence on the fundamental and ethical self, and on the topic of otherness
Lâintuition agissante
La notion dâintuition agissante dĂ©signe le mode dâĂȘtre fondamental de lâhumain dans le monde dont celui-ci est Ă©lĂ©ment constitutif. Elle ouvre la dimension oĂč sâĂ©prouve lâimmĂ©diatetĂ© de notre expĂ©rience du monde, et cette immĂ©diatetĂ© est la source de toute connaissance rĂ©elle. Dans cette couche primordiale de notre expĂ©rience du monde, les moments actif et intuitif sont les deux aspects constitutifs de la seule et mĂȘme rĂ©alitĂ© fondamentale qui nâest autre que la vie. Notre action constitue une rĂ©ception du monde en son intĂ©rieur propre par son Ă©lĂ©ment Ă la fois passif et actif, Ă©lĂ©ment que nous sommes.The concept of intuition-action means the fundamental mode of the human being in the world of which it is a constituent element. It opens the dimension where is felt the immediacy of our experience of the world, and this immediacy is the source of any real knowledge. Within this basic level of our experience of the world, active and intuitive moments are the two constituent aspects of the only fundamental reality, that is to say, of life. Like us, our action is both passive and active. It is a reception of the world in ourselves
The twilight of the Liberal Social Contract? On the Reception of Rawlsian Political Liberalism
This chapter discusses the Rawlsian project of public reason, or public justification-based 'political' liberalism, and its reception. After a brief philosophical rather than philological reconstruction of the project, the chapter revolves around a distinction between idealist and realist responses to it. Focusing on political liberalismâs critical reception illuminates an overarching question: was Rawlsâs revival of a contractualist approach to liberal legitimacy a fruitful move for liberalism and/or the social contract tradition? The last section contains a largely negative answer to that question. Nonetheless the chapter's conclusion shows that the research programme of political liberalism provided and continues to provide illuminating insights into the limitations of liberal contractualism, especially under conditions of persistent and radical diversity. The programme is, however, less receptive to challenges to do with the relative decline of the power of modern states