Quantum Information and the PCP Theorem

We show how to encode $2^n$ (classical) bits $a_1,...,a_{2^n}$ by a single quantum state $|\Psi>$ of size O(n) qubits, such that: for any constant $k$ and any $i_1,...,i_k \in \{1,...,2^n\}$, the values of the bits $a_{i_1},...,a_{i_k}$ can be retrieved from $|\Psi>$ by a one-round Arthur-Merlin interactive protocol of size polynomial in $n$. This shows how to go around Holevo-Nayak's Theorem, using Arthur-Merlin proofs. We use the new representation to prove the following results: 1) Interactive proofs with quantum advice: We show that the class $QIP/qpoly$ contains ALL languages. That is, for any language $L$ (even non-recursive), the membership $x \in L$ (for $x$ of length $n$) can be proved by a polynomial-size quantum interactive proof, where the verifier is a polynomial-size quantum circuit with working space initiated with some quantum state $|\Psi_{L,n} >$ (depending only on $L$ and $n$). Moreover, the interactive proof that we give is of only one round, and the messages communicated are classical. 2) PCP with only one query: We show that the membership $x \in SAT$ (for $x$ of length $n$) can be proved by a logarithmic-size quantum state $|\Psi >$, together with a polynomial-size classical proof consisting of blocks of length $polylog(n)$ bits each, such that after measuring the state $|\Psi >$ the verifier only needs to read {\bf one} block of the classical proof. While the first result is a straight forward consequence of the new representation, the second requires an additional machinery of quantum low-degree-test that may be interesting in its own right.Comment: 30 page

Arithmetic Circuit Lower Bounds via MaxRank

We introduce the polynomial coefficient matrix and identify maximum rank of this matrix under variable substitution as a complexity measure for multivariate polynomials. We use our techniques to prove super-polynomial lower bounds against several classes of non-multilinear arithmetic circuits. In particular, we obtain the following results : As our main result, we prove that any homogeneous depth-3 circuit for computing the product of $d$ matrices of dimension $n \times n$ requires $\Omega(n^{d-1}/2^d)$ size. This improves the lower bounds by Nisan and Wigderson(1995) when $d=\omega(1)$. There is an explicit polynomial on $n$ variables and degree at most $\frac{n}{2}$ for which any depth-3 circuit $C$ of product dimension at most $\frac{n}{10}$ (dimension of the space of affine forms feeding into each product gate) requires size $2^{\Omega(n)}$. This generalizes the lower bounds against diagonal circuits proved by Saxena(2007). Diagonal circuits are of product dimension 1. We prove a $n^{\Omega(\log n)}$ lower bound on the size of product-sparse formulas. By definition, any multilinear formula is a product-sparse formula. Thus, our result extends the known super-polynomial lower bounds on the size of multilinear formulas by Raz(2006). We prove a $2^{\Omega(n)}$ lower bound on the size of partitioned arithmetic branching programs. This result extends the known exponential lower bound on the size of ordered arithmetic branching programs given by Jansen(2008).Comment: 22 page

On the zone of the boundary of a convex body

We consider an arrangement \A of $n$ hyperplanes in $\R^d$ and the zone $\Z$ in \A of the boundary of an arbitrary convex set in $\R^d$ in such an arrangement. We show that, whereas the combinatorial complexity of $\Z$ is known only to be $O$ \cite{APS}, the outer part of the zone has complexity $O$ (without the logarithmic factor). Whether this bound also holds for the complexity of the inner part of the zone is still an open question (even for $d=2$)

Expert-oriented abilities vs. novice-oriented abilities: An alternative account of epistemic authority

According to a recent account of epistemic authority proposed by Linda Zagzebski (2012), it is rational for laypersons to believe on authority when they conscientiously judge that the authority is more likely to form true beliefs and avoid false ones than they are in some domain. Christoph Jäger (2016) has recently raised several objections to her view. By contrast, I argue that both theories fail to adequately capture what epistemic authority is, and I offer an alternative account grounded in the abilities that different kinds of authorities are required to possess