2,225 research outputs found
An observation on Carnapʼs Continuum and stochastic independencies
We characterize those identities and independencies which hold for all probability functions on a unary language satisfying
the Principle of Atom Exchangeability. We then show that if this is strengthen to the requirement that Johnson's Sufficientness Principle holds, thus giving Carnap's Continuum of inductive methods for languages with at least two predicates, then new and somewhat inexplicable identities and independencies emerge, the latter even in the case of Carnap's Continuum for the language with just a single predicate
How tolerant can you be? Carnap on rationality
In this paper I examine a neglected question concerning the centerpiece of Carnap's philosophy: the principle of tolerance. The principle of tolerance states that we are free to devise and adopt any well-defined form of language or linguistic framework we please. A linguistic framework defines framework-internal standards of correct reasoning that guide is in our first-order scientific pursuits. The choice of a linguistic framework, on the other hand, is an `external' question to be settled on pragmatic grounds and so not itself constrained by these (framework-internal) standards. However, even if choosing a framework is a practical matter, we would nevertheless expect the process of framework selection to be subject to rational norms. But which norms might those be? And where do they come from? I begin by showing that these questions are crucial to the success of Carnap's entire philosophical project. I then offer a response on behalf of the Carnapian which guarantees the rationality of the process of framework selection, while remaining true to Carnap's firm commitment to tolerance
To be a realist about quantum theory
I look at the distinction between between realist and antirealist views of the quantum state. I argue that this binary classification should be reconceived as a continuum of different views about which properties of the quantum state are representationally significant. What's more, the extreme cases -- all or none --- are simply absurd, and should be rejected by all parties. In other words, no sane person should advocate extreme realism or antirealism about the quantum state. And if we focus on the reasonable views, it's no longer clear who counts as a realist, and who counts as an antirealist. Among those taking a more reasonable intermediate view, we find figures such as Bohr and Carnap -- in stark opposition to the stories we've been told
The Counterpart Principle of Analogical Support by Structural Similarity
We propose and investigate an Analogy Principle in the context of Unary Inductive Logic based on a notion of support by structural similarity which is often employed to motivate scientific conjectures
There Is No Pure Empirical Reasoning
The justificatory force of empirical reasoning always depends upon the existence of some synthetic, a priori justification. The reasoner must begin with justified, substantive constraints on both the prior probability of the conclusion and certain conditional probabilities; otherwise, all possible degrees of belief in the conclusion are left open given the premises. Such constraints cannot in general be empirically justified, on pain of infinite regress. Nor does subjective Bayesianism offer a way out for the empiricist. Despite often-cited convergence theorems, subjective Bayesians cannot hold that any empirical hypothesis is ever objectively justified in the relevant sense. Rationalism is thus the only alternative to an implausible skepticism
Teleonomic Entropy: Measuring the Phase-Space of End-Directed Systems
We introduce a novel way of measuring the entropy of a set of values undergoing changes. Such a measure becomes useful when analyzing the temporal development of an algorithm designed to numerically update a collection of values such as artificial neural network weights undergoing adjustments during learning. We measure the entropy as a function of the phase-space of the values, i.e. their magnitude and velocity of change, using a method based on the abstract measure of entropy introduced by the philosopher Rudolf Carnap. By constructing a time-dynamic two-dimensional Voronoi diagram using Voronoi cell generators with coordinates of value- and value-velocity (change of magnitude), the entropy becomes a function of the cell areas. We term this measure teleonomic entropy since it can be used to describe changes in any end-directed (teleonomic) system. The usefulness of the method is llustrated when comparing the different approaches of two search algorithms, a learning artificial neural network and a population of discovering agents
Does Experimental Philosophy Have a Role to Play in Carnapian Explication?
Shepherd and Justus argue that experimental philosophy has an important role to play in the method of Carnapian explication, facilitating the preparatory stage during which the concept to be explicated is clarified. I raise concerns about their specific proposal, before sketching an alternative. In particular, I suggest that experimental philosophy can directly aid the construction of fruitful concepts. This provides a clear practical role for experimental philosophy, both within the sciences and theoretical inquiry more generally. In this respect, experimental philosophy may rightly be construed as one aspect of applied philosophy
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