Primate and ungulate responses to teak agroforestry in a southern Amazonian landscape

Agroforestry systems are widely extolled as a biodiversity-friendly alternative to food and wood production. However, few studies on large-vertebrates in the tropics consistently support this assumption. In the Amazonian ‘arch of deforestation’, commodity cropland and pastures for beef production have relentlessly replaced native forests. Agroforestry should therefore be both economically profitable and a more wildlife-friendly land-use alternative. Here we assess the local abundance and habitat use by forest primates and ungulates in a landscape mosaic containing large areas of primary forest and teak (Tectona grandis) agroforestry. We focused on animals of these groups because they have similar day ranges and home ranges, and are at the same trophic level. We surveyed 12 transects in both of these environments, totalling 485 km walked. We recorded four ungulate (Tayassu pecari, Pecari tajacu, Mazama americana, and Tapirus terrestris) and seven primate species (Ateles chamek, Lagothrix cana, Sapajus apella, Saimiri ustus, Chiropotes albinasus, Plecturocebus cf. moloch and Mico cf. emiliae). We indicate the importance of a species-level approach to evaluate the contribution of agroforests to population persistence. Large-bodied atelids, which are ripe-fruit-pulp specialists, were never recorded in teak agroforest. Sakis were more common in primary forest, while the smallest faunivore-frugivores had similar sighting rates in both environments. Ungulates exhibited subtler differences in their use of space than primates, but their sighting rates and track counts indicated temporal niche partition. White-lipped peccaries and red brocket deer were the only ungulates more frequently recorded in primary forest areas. Teak agroforestry still harbours some large and midsized frugivores, which may contribute with some biotic ecosystem services if their patches are connected to primary tropical forests. However, teak agroforestry should not be used to justify population subsidies for all Amazonian forest vertebrate species, since at least some threatened species clearly avoid forest stands dominated by this fast-growing exotic tree

Measurement of the cross-section of high transverse momentum vector bosons reconstructed as single jets and studies of jet substructure in pp collisions at √s = 7 TeV with the ATLAS detector

This paper presents a measurement of the cross-section for high transverse momentum W and Z bosons produced in pp collisions and decaying to all-hadronic final states. The data used in the analysis were recorded by the ATLAS detector at the CERN Large Hadron Collider at a centre-of-mass energy of √s = 7 TeV;{\rm Te}{\rm V}$and correspond to an integrated luminosity of$4.6\;{\rm f}{{{\rm b}}^{-1}}$. The measurement is performed by reconstructing the boosted W or Z bosons in single jets. The reconstructed jet mass is used to identify the W and Z bosons, and a jet substructure method based on energy cluster information in the jet centre-of-mass frame is used to suppress the large multi-jet background. The cross-section for events with a hadronically decaying W or Z boson, with transverse momentum${{p}_{{\rm T}}}\gt 320\;{\rm Ge}{\rm V}$and pseudorapidity$|\eta |\lt 1.9$, is measured to be${{\sigma }_{W+Z}}=8.5\pm 1.7$ pb and is compared to next-to-leading-order calculations. The selected events are further used to study jet grooming techniques

Search for the neutral Higgs bosons of the minimal supersymmetric standard model in pp collisions at root s=7 TeV with the ATLAS detector

A search for neutral Higgs bosons of the Minimal Supersymmetric Standard Model (MSSM) is reported. The analysis is based on a sample of proton-proton collisions at a centre-of-mass energy of 7TeV recorded with the ATLAS detector at the Large Hadron Collider. The data were recorded in 2011 and correspond to an integrated luminosity of 4.7 fb-1 to 4.8 fb-1. Higgs boson decays into oppositely-charged muon or τ lepton pairs are considered for final states requiring either the presence or absence of b-jets. No statistically significant excess over the expected background is observed and exclusion limits at the 95% confidence level are derived. The exclusion limits are for the production cross-section of a generic neutral Higgs boson, φ, as a function of the Higgs boson mass and for h/A/H production in the MSSM as a function of the parameters mA and tan β in the mhmax scenario for mA in the range of 90GeV to 500 GeV. Copyright CERN

Search for direct pair production of the top squark in all-hadronic final states in proton-proton collisions at s√=8 TeV with the ATLAS detector

The results of a search for direct pair production of the scalar partner to the top quark using an integrated luminosity of 20.1fb−1 of proton–proton collision data at √s = 8 TeV recorded with the ATLAS detector at the LHC are reported. The top squark is assumed to decay via t˜→tχ˜01 or t˜→ bχ˜±1 →bW(∗)χ˜01 , where χ˜01 (χ˜±1 ) denotes the lightest neutralino (chargino) in supersymmetric models. The search targets a fully-hadronic final state in events with four or more jets and large missing transverse momentum. No significant excess over the Standard Model background prediction is observed, and exclusion limits are reported in terms of the top squark and neutralino masses and as a function of the branching fraction of t˜ → tχ˜01 . For a branching fraction of 100%, top squark masses in the range 270–645 GeV are excluded for χ˜01 masses below 30 GeV. For a branching fraction of 50% to either t˜ → tχ˜01 or t˜ → bχ˜±1 , and assuming the χ˜±1 mass to be twice the χ˜01 mass, top squark masses in the range 250–550 GeV are excluded for χ˜01 masses below 60 GeV

Search for pair-produced long-lived neutral particles decaying to jets in the ATLAS hadronic calorimeter in ppcollisions at √s=8TeV

The ATLAS detector at the Large Hadron Collider at CERN is used to search for the decay of a scalar boson to a pair of long-lived particles, neutral under the Standard Model gauge group, in 20.3fb−1of data collected in proton–proton collisions at √s=8TeV. This search is sensitive to long-lived particles that decay to Standard Model particles producing jets at the outer edge of the ATLAS electromagnetic calorimeter or inside the hadronic calorimeter. No significant excess of events is observed. Limits are reported on the product of the scalar boson production cross section times branching ratio into long-lived neutral particles as a function of the proper lifetime of the particles. Limits are reported for boson masses from 100 GeVto 900 GeV, and a long-lived neutral particle mass from 10 GeVto 150 GeV

Past, present, and future of global health financing : a review of development assistance, government, out-of-pocket, and other private spending on health for 195 countries, 1995-2050

Background Comprehensive and comparable estimates of health spending in each country are a key input for health policy and planning, and are necessary to support the achievement of national and international health goals. Previous studies have tracked past and projected future health spending until 2040 and shown that, with economic development, countries tend to spend more on health per capita, with a decreasing share of spending from development assistance and out-of-pocket sources. We aimed to characterise the past, present, and predicted future of global health spending, with an emphasis on equity in spending across countries. Methods We estimated domestic health spending for 195 countries and territories from 1995 to 2016, split into three categories-government, out-of-pocket, and prepaid private health spending-and estimated development assistance for health (DAH) from 1990 to 2018. We estimated future scenarios of health spending using an ensemble of linear mixed-effects models with time series specifications to project domestic health spending from 2017 through 2050 and DAH from 2019 through 2050. Data were extracted from a broad set of sources tracking health spending and revenue, and were standardised and converted to inflation-adjusted 2018 US dollars. Incomplete or low-quality data were modelled and uncertainty was estimated, leading to a complete data series of total, government, prepaid private, and out-of-pocket health spending, and DAH. Estimates are reported in 2018 US dollars, 2018 purchasing-power parity-adjusted dollars, and as a percentage of gross domestic product. We used demographic decomposition methods to assess a set of factors associated with changes in government health spending between 1995 and 2016 and to examine evidence to support the theory of the health financing transition. We projected two alternative future scenarios based on higher government health spending to assess the potential ability of governments to generate more resources for health. Findings Between 1995 and 2016, health spending grew at a rate of 4.00% (95% uncertainty interval 3.89-4.12) annually, although it grew slower in per capita terms (2.72% [2.61-2.84]) and increased by less than $1 per capita over this period in 22 of 195 countries. The highest annual growth rates in per capita health spending were observed in upper-middle-income countries (5.55$ 8.0 trillion (7.8-8.1) in 2016 (comprising 8.6% [8.4-8.7] of the global economy and $10.3 trillion [10.1-10.6] in purchasing-power parity-adjusted dollars), with a per capita spending of US$ 5252 (5184-5319) in high-income countries, $491 (461-524) in upper-middle-income countries,$ 81 (74-89) in lower-middle-income countries, and $40 (38-43) in low-income countries. In 2016, 0.4$ 9.5 billion, 24.3% of total DAH), although spending on other infectious diseases (excluding tuberculosis and malaria) grew fastest from 2010 to 2018 (6.27% per year). The leading sources of DAH were the USA and private philanthropy (excluding corporate donations and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation). For the first time, we included estimates of China's contribution to DAH ($644.7 million in 2018). Globally, health spending is projected to increase to$ 15.0 trillion (14.0-16.0) by 2050 (reaching 9.4% [7.6-11.3] of the global economy and $ 21.3 trillion [19.8-23.1] in purchasing-power parity-adjusted dollars), but at a lower growth rate of 1.84% (1.68-2.02) annually, and with continuing disparities in spending between countries. In 2050, we estimate that 0.6% (0.6-0.7) of health spending will occur in currently low-income countries, despite these countries comprising an estimated 15.7% of the global population by 2050. The ratio between per capita health spending in high-income and low-income countries was 130.2 (122.9-136.9) in 2016 and is projected to remain at similar levels in 2050 (125.9 [113.7-138.1]). The decomposition analysis identified governments' increased prioritisation of the health sector and economic development as the strongest factors associated with increases in government health spending globally. Future government health spending scenarios suggest that, with greater prioritisation of the health sector and increased government spending, health spending per capita could more than double, with greater impacts in countries that currently have the lowest levels of government health spending. Interpretation Financing for global health has increased steadily over the past two decades and is projected to continue increasing in the future, although at a slower pace of growth and with persistent disparities in per-capita health spending between countries. Out-of-pocket spending is projected to remain substantial outside of high-income countries. Many low-income countries are expected to remain dependent on development assistance, although with greater government spending, larger investments in health are feasible. In the absence of sustained new investments in health, increasing efficiency in health spending is essential to meet global health targets.Peer reviewe

Past, present, and future of global health financing: a review of development assistance, government, out-of-pocket, and other private spending on health for 195 countries, 1995–2050

Background: Comprehensive and comparable estimates of health spending in each country are a key input for health policy and planning, and are necessary to support the achievement of national and international health goals. Previous studies have tracked past and projected future health spending until 2040 and shown that, with economic development, countries tend to spend more on health per capita, with a decreasing share of spending from development assistance and out-of-pocket sources. We aimed to characterise the past, present, and predicted future of global health spending, with an emphasis on equity in spending across countries. Methods: We estimated domestic health spending for 195 countries and territories from 1995 to 2016, split into three categories—government, out-of-pocket, and prepaid private health spending—and estimated development assistance for health (DAH) from 1990 to 2018. We estimated future scenarios of health spending using an ensemble of linear mixed-effects models with time series specifications to project domestic health spending from 2017 through 2050 and DAH from 2019 through 2050. Data were extracted from a broad set of sources tracking health spending and revenue, and were standardised and converted to inflation-adjusted 2018 US dollars. Incomplete or low-quality data were modelled and uncertainty was estimated, leading to a complete data series of total, government, prepaid private, and out-of-pocket health spending, and DAH. Estimates are reported in 2018 US dollars, 2018 purchasing-power parity-adjusted dollars, and as a percentage of gross domestic product. We used demographic decomposition methods to assess a set of factors associated with changes in government health spending between 1995 and 2016 and to examine evidence to support the theory of the health financing transition. We projected two alternative future scenarios based on higher government health spending to assess the potential ability of governments to generate more resources for health. Findings: Between 1995 and 2016, health spending grew at a rate of 4·00% (95% uncertainty interval 3·89–4·12) annually, although it grew slower in per capita terms (2·72% [2·61–2·84]) and increased by less than $1 per capita over this period in 22 of 195 countries. The highest annual growth rates in per capita health spending were observed in upper-middle-income countries (5·55 in lower-middle-income countries (3·71$8·0 trillion (7·8–8·1) in 2016 (comprising 8·6% [8·4–8·7] of the global economy and $10·3 trillion [10·1–10·6] in purchasing-power parity-adjusted dollars), with a per capita spending of US$5252 (5184–5319) in high-income countries, $491 (461–524) in upper-middle-income countries,$81 (74–89) in lower-middle-income countries, and $40 (38–43) in low-income countries. In 2016, 0·4 countries, despite these countries comprising 10·0 DAH targeted HIV/AIDS ($9·5 billion, 24·3% of total DAH), although spending on other infectious diseases (excluding tuberculosis and malaria) grew fastest from 2010 to 2018 (6·27% per year). The leading sources of DAH were the USA and private philanthropy (excluding corporate donations and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation). For the first time, we included estimates of China’s contribution to DAH ($644·7 million in 2018). Globally, health spending is projected to increase to$15·0 trillion (14·0–16·0) by 2050 (reaching 9·4% [7·6–11·3] of the global economy and $21·3 trillion [19·8–23·1] in purchasing-power parity-adjusted dollars), but at a lower growth rate of 1·84% (1·68–2·02) annually, and with continuing disparities in spending between countries. In 2050, we estimate that 0·6% (0·6–0·7) of health spending will occur in currently low-income countries, despite these countries comprising an estimated 15·7% of the global population by 2050. The ratio between per capita health spending in high-income and low-income countries was 130·2 (122·9–136·9) in 2016 and is projected to remain at similar levels in 2050 (125·9 [113·7–138·1]). The decomposition analysis identified governments’ increased prioritisation of the health sector and economic development as the strongest factors associated with increases in government health spending globally. Future government health spending scenarios suggest that, with greater prioritisation of the health sector and increased government spending, health spending per capita could more than double, with greater impacts in countries that currently have the lowest levels of government health spending Interpretation: Financing for global health has increased steadily over the past two decades and is projected to continue increasing in the future, although at a slower pace of growth and with persistent disparities in per-capita health spending between countries. Out-of-pocket spending is projected to remain substantial outside of high-income countries. Many low-income countries are expected to remain dependent on development assistance, although with greater government spending, larger investments in health are feasible. In the absence of sustained new investments in health, increasing efficiency in health spending is essential to meet global health targets. Funding: Bill & Melinda Gates Foundatio

Health sector spending and spending on HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria, and development assistance for health: progress towards Sustainable Development Goal 3

Background: Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 3 aims to “ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages”. While a substantial effort has been made to quantify progress towards SDG3, less research has focused on tracking spending towards this goal. We used spending estimates to measure progress in financing the priority areas of SDG3, examine the association between outcomes and financing, and identify where resource gains are most needed to achieve the SDG3 indicators for which data are available. Methods: We estimated domestic health spending, disaggregated by source (government, out-of-pocket, and prepaid private) from 1995 to 2017 for 195 countries and territories. For disease-specific health spending, we estimated spending for HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis for 135 low-income and middle-income countries, and malaria in 106 malaria-endemic countries, from 2000 to 2017. We also estimated development assistance for health (DAH) from 1990 to 2019, by source, disbursing development agency, recipient, and health focus area, including DAH for pandemic preparedness. Finally, we estimated future health spending for 195 countries and territories from 2018 until 2030. We report all spending estimates in inflation-adjusted 2019 US$, unless otherwise stated. Findings: Since the development and implementation of the SDGs in 2015, global health spending has increased, reaching$7·9 trillion (95% uncertainty interval 7·8–8·0) in 2017 and is expected to increase to $11·0 trillion (10·7–11·2) by 2030. In 2017, in low-income and middle-income countries spending on HIV/AIDS was$20·2 billion (17·0–25·0) and on tuberculosis it was $10·9 billion (10·3–11·8), and in malaria-endemic countries spending on malaria was$5·1 billion (4·9–5·4). Development assistance for health was $40·6 billion in 2019 and HIV/AIDS has been the health focus area to receive the highest contribution since 2004. In 2019,$374 million of DAH was provided for pandemic preparedness, less than 1% of DAH. Although spending has increased across HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria since 2015, spending has not increased in all countries, and outcomes in terms of prevalence, incidence, and per-capita spending have been mixed. The proportion of health spending from pooled sources is expected to increase from 81·6% (81·6–81·7) in 2015 to 83·1% (82·8–83·3) in 2030. Interpretation: Health spending on SDG3 priority areas has increased, but not in all countries, and progress towards meeting the SDG3 targets has been mixed and has varied by country and by target. The evidence on the scale-up of spending and improvements in health outcomes suggest a nuanced relationship, such that increases in spending do not always results in improvements in outcomes. Although countries will probably need more resources to achieve SDG3, other constraints in the broader health system such as inefficient allocation of resources across interventions and populations, weak governance systems, human resource shortages, and drug shortages, will also need to be addressed. Funding: The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundatio