Cultural evolution and prosociality: widening the hypothesis space

Norenzayan and colleagues suggest that Big Gods can be replaced by Big Governments. We examine forms of social and self-monitoring and ritual practice that emerged in Classical China, heterarchical societies like those that emerged in pre-Columbian Mesoamerica, and the contemporary Zapatista movement of Chiapas, and we recommend widening the hypothesis space to include these alternative forms of social organization

Oppressive Things

In analyzing oppressive systems like racism, social theorists have articulated accounts of the dynamic interaction and mutual dependence between psychological components, such as individuals’ patterns of thought and action, and social components, such as formal institutions and informal interactions. We argue for the further inclusion of physical components, such as material artifacts and spatial environments. Drawing on socially situated and ecologically embedded approaches in the cognitive sciences, we argue that physical components of racism are not only shaped by, but also shape psychological and social components of racism. Indeed, while our initial focus is on racism and racist things, we contend that our framework is also applicable to other oppressive systems, including sexism, classism, and ableism. This is because racist things are part of a broader class of oppressive things, which are material artifacts and spatial environments that are in congruence with an oppressive system

Drawing the boundaries of animal sentience

We welcome Mikhalevich & Powell’s (2020) (M&P) call for a more “‘inclusive”’ animal ethics, but we think their proposed shift toward a moral framework that privileges false positives over false negatives will require radically revising the paradigm assumption in animal research: that there is a clear line to be drawn between sentient beings that are part of our moral community and nonsentient beings that are not

Distributing Cognition: A Defense of Collective Mentality

While ordinary language allows for the attribution of mental states to collectivities, there is broad agreement among philosophers and cognitive scientists that such attributions should not be taken literally because they are at best explanatorily superfluous and at worst wildly implausible. I argue that the widely shared philosophical assumption that mentality is exclusively a property of individuals is mistaken. One prominent objection to the idea that collectives could be in genuinely mental states is that they lack self-consciousness and the capacity for qualitative consciousness. I argue that neither self-consciousness nor qualitative consciousness is necessary for mentality. But I also show that both collective self-consciousness and qualitative consciousness are possible. Another objection states that collectives cannot possess representations above and beyond the representations in the minds of the individuals that compose them. I counter that representations in individual minds often depend on representations in lower-level subsystems and I argue that collective representations can arise in a similar way. I conclude by demonstrating that collective cognition is not a mere possibility; there are cases of collective cognition in the actual world

Group Virtues: No Great Leap Forward with Collectivism

A body of work in ethics and epistemology has advanced a collectivist view of virtues. Collectivism holds that some social groups can be subjects in themselves which can possess attributes such as agency or responsibility. Collectivism about virtues holds that virtues (and vices) are among those attributes. By focusing on two different accounts, I argue that the collectivist virtue project has limited prospects. On one such interpretation of institutional virtues, virtue-like features of the social collective are explained by particular group-oriented features of individual role-bearers that are elicited by institutional structures or goals. On another account of groups as moral agents unbound by formal institutional constraints, to the extent that group characteristics meet the collectivist requirement, they fail to stand up as virtues in the substantive sense of a character trait. These two positions’ respective drawbacks and insights support a non-collectivist conclusion: Where there is a substantive virtue of some social group, it consists only in certain group-specific attitudes and motives of individuals qua members of that group. I end by outlining some risks in adopting collectivism about virtues as an explanatory or normative doctrine, and suggesting that we can abandon it without embracing an equally undesirable individualism in virtue theory

Comparing Notes: Recording and Criticism

This chapter charts the ways in which recording has changed the nature of music criticism. It both provides an overview of the history of recording and music criticism, from the advent of Edison’s Phonograph to the present day, and examines the issues arising from this new technology and the consequent transformation of critical thought and practice

Wider Still and Wider: British Music Criticism since the Second World War

This chapter provides the first historical examination of music criticism in Britain since the Second World War. In the process, it also challenges the simplistic prevailing view of this being a period of decline from a golden age in music criticism

Commonsense concepts of phenomenal consciousness: Does anyone care about functional zombies? Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences,

Abstract It would be a mistake to deny commonsense intuitions a role in developing a theory of consciousness. However, philosophers have traditionally failed to probe commonsense in a way that allows these commonsense intuitions to make a robust contribution to a theory of consciousness. In this paper, I report the results of two experiments on purportedly phenomenal states and I argue that many disputes over the philosophical notion of 'phenomenal consciousness' are misguided-they fail to capture the interesting connection between commonsense ascriptions of pain and emotion. With this data in hand, I argue that our capacity to distinguish between 'mere things' and 'subjects of moral concern' rests, to a significant extent, on the sorts of mental states that we take a system to have

Collective responsibility and fraud in scientific communities

Given the importance of scientific research in shaping our perception of the world, and our senses of what policies will and won’t succeed in altering that world, it is of great practical, political, and moral importance that we carry out scientific research with integrity. The phenomenon of scientific fraud stands in the way of that, as scientists may knowingly enter claims they take to be false into the scientific literature, often knowingly doing so in defiance of norms they profess allegiance to. In this chapter we take a look at some of the causes of scientific fraud, and how it might be manifested in large-scale research teams and situations of anonymous authorship. We find that such cases make trouble for what might seem like intuitive answers to the question “who should be held responsible for this fraud?”, and we argue that in such cases it would be better to hold the entire community responsible for seeing to it that there is less fraud