An investigation into hybrid power trains for vehicles with regenerative braking

Imperial Users onl

Justice (Vol. 10, Iss. 5)

v.18:suppl. (1987

The flux suppression at the highest energies

Almost half a century ago, Greisen, Zatsepin and Kuz'min (GZK) predicted a "cosmologically meaningful termination" of the spectrum of cosmic rays at energies around $10^{20}$ eV due to their interaction with the cosmic microwave background, as they propagate from distant extragalactic sources. A suppression of the flux above $4\times 10^{19}$ eV is now confirmed. We argue that current data are insufficient to conclude whether the observed feature is due to energy loss during propagation, or else to the fact that the astrophysical accelerators reach their limit, or indeed to a combination of both source properties and propagation effects. We discuss the dependence of the spectral steepening upon the cosmic-ray composition, source properties, and intervening magnetic fields, and speculate on the additional information that may be necessary to reach unambiguous conclusions about the origin of the flux suppression and of the mechanisms behind the acceleration of cosmic rays up to the highest observed energies.Comment: Invited review prepared for Comptes Rendus Physique (2014), in pres

Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with public goods

This paper provides a characterization of the class of incentive compatible (i.e., strategy-proof) allocation mechanisms for decision problems associated with classical economic environments. It is shown that when at least one public good is provided, then only dictatorial allocation mechanisms are incentive compatible. Dictatorial mechanisms are very unsatisfactory, as any conflict of interest is always resolved in favor of a single individual (the dictator). This result reveals a basic incompatibility between incentive compatibility and any other desirable property (e.g., any kind of efficiency, fairness, etc.) of an allocation mechanism. In particular, incentive compatible allocation mechanisms typically produce inefficient outcomes

Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for pure public goods economies when preferences are monotonic

A fundamental problem in public finance is that of allocating a␣given budget to financing the provision of public goods (education, transportation, police, etc.). In this paper it is established that when␣admissible preferences are those representable by continuous and increasing utility functions, then strategy-proof allocation mechanisms whose (undominated) range contains three or more outcomes are dictatorial on the set of profiles of strictly increasing utility functions, a dense subset of the domain in the topologies commonly used in this context. If admissible utility functions are further restricted to be strictly increasing, or if mechanisms are required to be non-wasteful, then strategy-profness leads to (full) dictatorship.Publicad