Letter to the Editor: Metacognitive training and metacognitive therapy. A reply to Lora Capobianco and Adrian Wells

© 2018 Elsevier. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ This author accepted manuscript is made available following 24 month embargo from date of publication (Jan 2018) in accordance with the publisher’s archiving policyTo the Editor: It is indeed unfortunate that our metacognitive treatment programs use a similar name as the psychotherapy developed by Adrian Wells. Nevertheless, we believe that our use of the term ‘metacognitive’ is justified. The term ‘metacognition’ is somewhat over-inclusive. Coined by Flavell (1979) it is usually understood as “thinking about one's thinking”. Yet, subsequent research used the term in various ways (Koriat, 2002). For example, confidence/doubt is at the heart of metacognition according to Asher Koriat (Koriat & Levy-Sadot, 1999). In neuropsychology, a discrepancy between subjective and objective performance is termed a deficit in metacognition (for an early study see Anderson-Parenté, 1994). Moreover, Flavell's definition of metacognitive knowledge about oneself versus others is quite close to the concept of social cognition, further blurring the boundaries (p. 906). The idea for metacognitive training for psychosis originated in the early 2000s based on research suggesting ‘cognitive biases’ in people with psychosis (Garety & Freeman, 1999), such as jumping to conclusions (JTC), incorrigibility and overconfidence (note that these are not “thought contents” as Capobianco and Wells write, but rather overarching distortions in the processing of information; see Pohl, 2004). Importantly, awareness of these biases is poor in many patients. The primary goal of our approach was to ‘straighten’ these cognitive biases (not to be confused with emotional distortions/biases proposed by Aaron Beck) and raise metacognitive awareness in a gentle, non-confrontational manner (e.g., through playful exercises that generate surprising outcomes [i.e., metacognitive experience] and through education regarding cognitive biases [i.e., metacognitive knowledge]). A recurring theme in MCT for psychosis is that patients should check whether their confidence in a given judgment is justified (metacognitive strategy, cf. Koriat, 2002) and to “sow the seeds of doubt”. Importantly, MCT exercises on cognitive biases use delusion-neutral material. Although the ultimate goal is to improve delusions, this is achieved indirectly, as the main emphasis of the intervention remains on the modification at a meta-level of processing (e.g., confidence in judgements). We therefore reject the claim by Capobianco and Wells that our program “is clearly a cognitive behavioral approach that deals with the content of negative thoughts." Over the years, we incorporated compatible elements from CBT, while the focus remained on metacognition. Why did we do this? Initially, we had the perhaps naive hope that our MCT would run alongside other psychotherapeutic programs in mental health institutions. However, as the literature shows, psychotherapy for psychosis is rarely provided. In order to address this problem within our low-threshold program, the newest versions of MCT and MCT + include additional modules with a CBT orientation, dealing with issues deemed by patients to be a priority in treatment, namely self-esteem and stigma. We have devised a number of MCT interventions for other disorders, which are clearly rooted in the setup and presentation mode of MCT for psychosis. These disorder-specific versions were developed as hybrids to amalgamate a cognitive and a metacognitive perspective, as we do not view working on a cognitive or metacognitive level as mutually exclusive. Wells' work dates back to the 1990s - however, to the best of our knowledge, the term ‘metacognitive therapy’ was introduced much later. When we became aware of its existence, MCT for psychosis was already available and used in many different languages (currently 33 languages). Therefore, changing its name would have created new confusion; however, we used slightly different names or acronyms (e.g., myMCT) to distinguish the two approaches

Beads task vs. box task: The specificity of the jumping to conclusions bias

Previous research involving the probabilistic reasoning 'beads task' has consistently demonstrated a jumping-to-conclusions (JTC) bias, where individuals with delusions make decisions based on limited evidence. However, recent studies have suggested that miscomprehension may be confounding the beads task. The current study aimed to test the conventional beads task against a conceptually simpler probabilistic reasoning "box task" METHODS: One hundred non-clinical participants completed both the beads task and the box task, and the Peters et al. Delusions Inventory (PDI) to assess for delusion-proneness. The number of 'draws to decision' was assessed for both tasks. Additionally, the total amount of on-screen evidence was manipulated for the box task, and two new box task measures were assessed (i.e., 'proportion of evidence requested' and 'deviation from optimal solution').; Despite being conceptually similar, the two tasks did not correlate, and participants requested significantly less information on the beads task relative to the box task. High-delusion-prone participants did not demonstrate hastier decisions on either task; in fact, for box task, this group was observed to be significantly more conservative than low-delusion-prone group.; Neither task was incentivized; results need replication with a clinical sample.; Participants, and particularly those identified as high-delusion-prone, displayed a more conservative style of responding on the novel box task, relative to the beads task. The two tasks, whilst conceptually similar, appear to be tapping different cognitive processes. The implications of these results are discussed in relation to the JTC bias and the theoretical mechanisms thought to underlie it

Towards a reliable repeated-measures beads task for assessing the jumping to conclusions bias

© 2017 Elsevier BV. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ This author accepted manuscript is made available following 12 month embargo from date of publication (April 2018) in accordance with the publisher’s archiving policyThe jumping to conclusions bias (JTC), in which some people gather less information than others before making a decision, has been linked to delusions in psychosis. JTC is usually identified via the beads task, in which a sequence of beads (the “target” sequence) is used to measure the amount of evidence participants require before making a decision. Yet, despite its common use, the reliability of the task has never been properly investigated. We investigated its reliability, and tested an alternate version which used distractor sequences to obfuscate the target sequence. Healthy participants (N = 212) were randomised into two groups. One group completed ten trials using the target sequence, while the other completed ten trials of the target sequence and three distractor sequences. Our data indicated the standard task may not be reliable over repeated measures, but that by including distractor sequences, the task becomes more believable, repeatable, and reliable. Additionally, excluding first-trial data (a “silent” practice trial) also improves repeatability. These improvements to the task are relevant to single trial studies, and will be especially useful to repeated-measures longitudinal, experimental, and treatment studies. Such repeated-measures studies are important for investigating the causal link between JTC and delusions

Prolonged rather than hasty decision-making in schizophrenia using the box task. Must we rethink the jumping to conclusions account of paranoia?

Accepted manuscript version, licensed CC BY-NC-ND 4.0. Jumping to conclusions (JTC) is the best established cognitive bias in schizophrenia and is increasingly targeted in interventions aimed to improve positive symptoms. To address shortcomings of the standard measure to capture JTC, the beads task, we developed a new variant—the box task—which was subsequently validated in people with elevated psychotic-like experiences. For the first time, the box task was administered in a sample of individuals with manifest schizophrenia. We hypothesized that patients with schizophrenia would display an elevated JTC bias relative to controls. Method - We recruited a large sample of 101 patients with schizophrenia and matched them to an online sample recruited from the general population. In the box task, participants must decide which of two kinds of colored balls are presented more often. Participants are told that the task may end prematurely, and that task performance will be counted as an error if no decision had been made before that point. The primary measure was the number of draws to decision (DTD), where fewer DTD corresponds to greater JTC. Results - In contrast to expectations, participants with schizophrenia showed significantly higher DTD (i.e., reduced JTC). Consistent with our previous findings, patients also displayed a lowered decision threshold compared to controls. Response confidence for the final decision was lower in patients and correlated with self-esteem and positive symptoms. While there was evidence that previous knowledge of the box task lowered DTD, exclusion of participants with experience on the box task did not substantially change results. Discussion - The study fits a growing body of experiments casting doubt on the generalizability of the JTC effect in schizophrenia across different tasks. While the study tentatively supports a liberal acceptance account of psychosis, caution is warranted and we recommend that research should explore and control for potentially important mediators (e.g., task difficulty, stress, test-taking attitudes)

Sowing the seeds of doubt: a narrative review on metacognitive training in schizophrenia

AbstractThe present article provides a narrative review of empirical studies on metacognitive training in psychosis (MCT). MCT represents an amalgam of cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT), cognitive remediation (CRT) and psychoeducation. The intervention is available in either a group (MCT) or an individualized (MCT+) format. By sowing the seeds of doubt in a playful and entertaining fashion, the program targets positive symptoms, particularly delusions. It aims to raise patients’ awareness for common cognitive traps or biases (e.g., jumping to conclusions, overconfidence in errors, bias against disconfirmatory evidence) that are implicated in the formation and maintenance of psychosis. The majority of studies confirm that MCT meets its core aim, the reduction of delusions. Problems (e.g., potential allegiance effects) and knowledge gaps (i.e., outcome predictors) are highlighted. The preliminary data suggest that the individual MCT format is especially effective in addressing symptoms, cognitive biases and insight. We conclude that MCT appears to be a worthwhile complement to pharmacotherapy

Investigation of sex differences in delusion-associated cognitive biases

© 2018 Published by Elsevier Ltd. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ This author accepted manuscript is made available following 12 month embargo from date of publication (December 2018) in accordance with the publisher’s archiving policyIn the past few decades, sex differences have been identified in a number of clinical, cognitive and functional outcomes in patients with schizophrenia spectrum disorders. However, to date, sex differences in higher-order cognitive biases have not been systematically studied. The present study aimed to examine sex differences in jumping-to-conclusions and evidence integration impairment based on data collected in two previous studies in patients with schizophrenia spectrum disorders and healthy controls. For this purpose, data from n = 58 patients and n = 60 healthy controls on the Fish Task (as a measure of jumping to conclusions) and bias against disconfirmatory evidence (BADE; as a measure of evidence integration) task were analyzed. Results indicated a lack of sex differences in jumping-to-conclusions and evidence integration impairment both in patients with schizophrenia spectrum disorders and healthy controls. Although the present study was adequately powered to detect sex differences of a low medium effect size, larger studies are warranted to exclude differences of a smaller magnitude between men and women regarding delusion-associated cognitive biases

C-Reactive Protein: Higher During Acute Psychotic Episodes and Related to Cortical Thickness in Schizophrenia and Healthy Controls

Copyright © 2018 Jacomb, Stanton, Vasudevan, Powell, O'Donnell, Lenroot, Bruggemann, Balzan, Galletly, Liu, Weickert and Weickert. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.There is increasing evidence for the role of inflammation in schizophrenia, yet the stability of increased peripheral inflammation in acute psychosis and the degree to which peripheral inflammation relates to cortical thickness, a measure of the degree of neuropathology, are unknown. In independent samples, we assessed the peripheral inflammation marker C-reactive protein (CRP) to determine the extent to which: (1) CRP was elevated and stable across admissions for acute psychosis, (2) cognition, daily function and symptom severity are characteristic of chronically ill patients with schizophrenia displaying elevated CRP, and (3) CRP levels predict cortical thickness. Study 1 assessed peripheral CRP (primary outcome) and other blood measures in 174/280 people with acute psychosis while Study 2 assessed peripheral CRP, cognition and cortical thickness (primary outcomes), symptoms, and daily function in 85/97 chronically ill patients with schizophrenia and 71/87 healthy controls. In acute psychosis, CRP and neutrophil-to-lymphocyte ratio were significantly elevated relative to a normal cutoff (with 59.8% of patients having elevated CRP) which remained elevated across admissions. CRP was significantly elevated in 43% of chronically ill patients with schizophrenia compared to 20% in controls. Elevated CRP patients displayed significantly worse working memory and CRP was inversely correlated with cortical thickness in frontal, insula, and temporal brain regions. This work supports the role of inflammation in psychotic illnesses and suggests that use of peripheral markers (e.g., CRP) in conjunction with diagnosis could be used to identify patients with more cortical neuropathology and cognitive deficits

Guidelines for the use and interpretation of assays for monitoring autophagy (3rd edition)

In 2008 we published the first set of guidelines for standardizing research in autophagy. Since then, research on this topic has continued to accelerate, and many new scientists have entered the field. Our knowledge base and relevant new technologies have also been expanding. Accordingly, it is important to update these guidelines for monitoring autophagy in different organisms. Various reviews have described the range of assays that have been used for this purpose. Nevertheless, there continues to be confusion regarding acceptable methods to measure autophagy, especially in multicellular eukaryotes. For example, a key point that needs to be emphasized is that there is a difference between measurements that monitor the numbers or volume of autophagic elements (e.g., autophagosomes or autolysosomes) at any stage of the autophagic process versus those that measure fl ux through the autophagy pathway (i.e., the complete process including the amount and rate of cargo sequestered and degraded). In particular, a block in macroautophagy that results in autophagosome accumulation must be differentiated from stimuli that increase autophagic activity, defi ned as increased autophagy induction coupled with increased delivery to, and degradation within, lysosomes (inmost higher eukaryotes and some protists such as Dictyostelium ) or the vacuole (in plants and fungi). In other words, it is especially important that investigators new to the fi eld understand that the appearance of more autophagosomes does not necessarily equate with more autophagy. In fact, in many cases, autophagosomes accumulate because of a block in trafficking to lysosomes without a concomitant change in autophagosome biogenesis, whereas an increase in autolysosomes may reflect a reduction in degradative activity. It is worth emphasizing here that lysosomal digestion is a stage of autophagy and evaluating its competence is a crucial part of the evaluation of autophagic flux, or complete autophagy. Here, we present a set of guidelines for the selection and interpretation of methods for use by investigators who aim to examine macroautophagy and related processes, as well as for reviewers who need to provide realistic and reasonable critiques of papers that are focused on these processes. These guidelines are not meant to be a formulaic set of rules, because the appropriate assays depend in part on the question being asked and the system being used. In addition, we emphasize that no individual assay is guaranteed to be the most appropriate one in every situation, and we strongly recommend the use of multiple assays to monitor autophagy. Along these lines, because of the potential for pleiotropic effects due to blocking autophagy through genetic manipulation it is imperative to delete or knock down more than one autophagy-related gene. In addition, some individual Atg proteins, or groups of proteins, are involved in other cellular pathways so not all Atg proteins can be used as a specific marker for an autophagic process. In these guidelines, we consider these various methods of assessing autophagy and what information can, or cannot, be obtained from them. Finally, by discussing the merits and limits of particular autophagy assays, we hope to encourage technical innovation in the field