Examining the Interactive Effects of Group Status and Perceived Morality on Personality Judgments

We have a tendency to show a preference towards those who are most similar to ourselves. Most commonly, these biases feed into the perceived ideas that those similar to us (the in-group) are good and that those different from ourselves (the out-group) are bad (Rosenbaum & Holtz, 1985). In addition, Ruthland et al. (2010) demonstrated that the morality bias (i.e., preferring those that are good) often is stronger than the group bias (i.e., preferring the in-group); that is, moral preference is given priority over group membership. We sought to understand the interaction between how Christian participants perceive and rate individuals varying in group status (Christianity: in-group vs. Muslim: out-group) and morality (good vs. bad). The 118 participants were assigned to one of four conditions: moral/in-group, immoral/in-group, moral/out-group, and immoral/out-group. They completed a series of religious questionnaires, including quest religiousness, which is the perception of religion as a journey. Those who endorse quest religiousness indicate that they have a high tolerance for religious doubt and uncertainty. The participants were presented with descriptions of a fictitious individual that matched their condition and rated the individual on personality descriptor and interests to interact. A main effect revealed a preference for moral over immoral targets. However, a significant three-way interaction between quest religiousness, target morality, and group status revealed that when rating moral individuals, those high in quest religiousness rated the out-group member more favorably, and those low in quest religiousness rated the in-group member more favorably. This interaction indicates that a potential reverse of in-group bias occurs in those who view religion as a quest: such individuals rate more favorably those who are moral and religiously dissimilar than those who are moral and religiously similar

The Effects of Threats to Meaning on Attitudes Toward Evolution

Humans have an innate need to make sense of the world and give it meaning (Heine, Proulx, & Vohs, 2006), and do so by creating and defending cultural worldviews (Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszcynski, 2004). Threats to meaning cause existential anxiety, and to protect ourselves from this existential fear, we reject, eliminate, or avoid threats to our cultural worldviews (Schmeichel & Martens, 2005). In addition, following threats to meaning, we compensate by showing aggression towards those who are dissimilar (Rosenblatt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Lyon, 1989). Science and religion are two prominent cultural worldviews that can provide meaning. We predict that following a meaning threat, participants high in religious fundamentalism would report a less favorable attitude toward evolution than those low in religious fundamentalism. Sixty introductory self-identified religious students at Hope College participated in this study. Participants first completed a measure of religious fundamentalism. They were then randomly assigned to complete a writing task based on condition: meaning challenge (writing about life’s lack of meaning), meaning affirmation (writing about how they find meaning in life), or neutral (writing about their plans for next week). Finally, they read an essay that presented mixed evidence about evolution and rated the essay and their views on evolution. Data were analyzed using an ANOVA examining the interaction between religious fundamentalism and priming condition on attitudes toward evolution. We found a significant interaction showing that religious fundamentalists were more critical of evolution when their meaning was challenged. Given that religious fundamentalists have been found to hold negative attitudes toward evolution (Poling & Evans, 2004), meaning threats may enhance these negative attitudes as a way of regaining meaning. These results highlight that individuals bolster different sources of meaning that are aligned with their values

The Role of Meaning in Attitudes toward Evolution

Humans seek to have meaning in their lives. Worldviews, such as science and religion, help structure one’s world and provide meaning. Both the Meaning Maintenance Model (Heine, Proulx, & Vohs, 2006) and Terror Management Theory, suggest the importance of meaning (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1986). Threats to one’s meaning create existential anxiety, which causes one to reject competing worldviews (Greenberg et al., 1990). Worldviews manage existential anxiety by providing order and security (Rosenblatt et al., 1989). This existential anxiety and the need to validate our meaning may cause tension between competing worldviews—particularly between science and religion. Data were collected from a sample of 197 community members and Hope College students combined. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: meaning affirmation, meaning challenge, or control. Participants completed questionnaires regarding their views towards religion, science, and meaning in life. Next, participants read a fabricated essay, supposedly written by a Harvard scholar. Depending on condition, the essay addressed life’s importance (affirmation), life’s meaninglessness (challenge), or computers (control). Participants then completed measures of biased thinking. Next, participants read a mixed-evidence essay on evolution, rated the essay, and completed questionnaires regarding their attitude toward evolution. Participants also completed measures regarding their attitudes toward science, religion, and evolution again. Participants were then debriefed. Our hypotheses were supported and the results revealed that threats to meaning enhance biases. We also found that participants who hold religious beliefs centered on God’s protection and promises of specialness perceived the mixed-evidence essay to be significantly more critical of evolution when their meaning was threatened. This supports our hypothesis that meaning threats elicit worldview-consistent information processing, resulting in more negative attitudes towards evolution. This study shows that when our life’s meaning is challenged, we rely so much on our own worldviews that we dismiss divergent worldviews

The Effects of Priming Humility on Defensive Reactions Following Criticism of One’s Cherished Values

This study examined the role of humility in moderating defensive reactions following criticisms of one’s cherished values. Previous research has found that humility involves an accurate view of oneself and openness to new ideas, contradictory information, and advice (Tangney, 2000; Exline, 2009), as well as an appreciation of how different people and varying perspectives can contribute to the world (Tangney, 2000). We predicted that humility would result in reduced defensiveness when people were confronted with an opposing viewpoint. 124 undergraduates participants wrote essays on a cherished social or cultural issue and were told it would be swapped with another participant. Following the essay, participants were implicitly primed with humble, arrogant or neutral words, using a subliminal priming induction (flashing construct-relevant words on a computer for 20ms). They were then given a fixed essay that was critical of religion and told it was from a fellow participant. Participants were then given fixed negative feedback on their own essay and given the opportunity to rate the fixed essay. Lastly, participants were given the opportunity to administer hot sauce to the fake participant after being told that the critical partner did not like spicy food. We predicted that participants in the humility condition would rate the fixed-essay author more favorably and show less behavioral aggression by administering less hot sauce. Although priming condition did not affect essay ratings, there was a significant effect on the amount of hot sauce administered. Participants primed with humility administered significantly less hot sauce than those in the neutral condition. The arrogant priming did not vary significantly from either condition. It appears that humility may help reduce defensiveness

The Effects of Existential Threats and Relationship Security on Social Attitudes

Human beings function best when they have a sense of meaning in their lives. We imbue meaning to things in our lives as a shield against our overwhelming fear of death (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1986). After facing thoughts of death, it has been suggested that one increases defensiveness towards outgroup members (Van Tongeren, Green, Davis, Worthington, & Reid). Past research has indicated that relationship commitment correlates with a range of positive psychological outcomes. In the present study, our aim is to determine whether positive relationships act as a terror management mechanism to decrease defensiveness towards members of the out-group (feminists). We hypothesize that priming a secure relationship and thoughts about physical pain will lead to less negative ratings of an out-group member (confederate posing as a feminist) than the ratings of a participant primed with an insecure relationship and thoughts about their own death. After completing a series of individual difference measures, participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions (secure relationship/physical pain; secure relationship/death; insecure relationship/physical pain; insecure relationship/death). Both primes consisted of a writing activity. Following this, participants completed another series of relationship and outcome measures. Once completing the packet, participants were directed to a room to be debriefed by a lab assistant wearing a shirt that read, “this is what a feminist looks like.” After the debriefing, participants were to evaluate the RA. We discuss our findings and the implications of our research. This study will contribute to the understanding of Terror Management Theory and what potential safeguards might be beneficial