Quine: Underdetermination and naturalistic metaphysics

Quine’s naturalism has no room for a point of view outside science from which one might criticize science, or a transcendental point of view from which one could ask questions about the adequacy of science with respect to reality (‘as it is in itself’). Adrian Moore sniffs out some genuine tensions in this, arguing in effect that Quine is forced by his own views to admit those sorts of questions as legitimate. I venture that Quine, even if he would grant that the posing of such questions is an inevitable feature of reason in some sense, would take such curiosity to be strictly speaking a mistake, something like that of thinking there must be a single truth-predicate for all levels of Tarski’s hierarchy

Quine, publicity, and pre-established harmony

No abstract available

MS-008: Papers of William H. Young

The William H. Young Collection is divided into two Series. I. Biographical Information; and II. Correspondence. This collection consists primarily of correspondence between William H. Young and his wife Susan from August 10, 1862 through March 18, 1865 (with gaps). Most of the letters are written by Young to his wife, with the exception of one dated February 8, 1863, which she writes to him. This collection focuses on the battles between the Confederate and Union armies in the Western Theater of the war. Young writes about the Yankees attempt to capture Vicksburg, Mississippi and also gives a detailed account of the battle at Nashville where he was captured. These letters also describe the life of a common soldier who has gone off to war and left his wife and children behind at home. Special Collections and College Archives Finding Aids are discovery tools used to describe and provide access to our holdings. Finding aids include historical and biographical information about each collection in addition to inventories of their content. More information about our collections can be found on our websitehttp://www.gettysburg.edu/special_collections/collections/.https://cupola.gettysburg.edu/findingaidsall/1007/thumbnail.jp

Science versus the Humanities: Hyman on Wollhein on Depiction

I criticize John Hyman’s criticism of Richard Wollheim’s account of depiction or pictorial representation. The underlying issue appears to be fundamental: do we go with Hyman’s account of the essence of depiction as straightforwardly geometrical, or do we agree with Wollheim that depiction must be understood as proceeding through the human mind

Sociological self images : paradigms and pluralisms in sociological theory, 1960s-1990s : a thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Philosophy in Sociology at Massey University

This thesis explores the identity and self-understanding of sociology as expressed chiefly in discourses of sociological theory. It takes as its starting point the 'identity crisis' of sociology that began in the 1960s with the demise of structural-functionalism, and continues into the present day. The thesis consists of three main parts. In the first chapter I discuss the methods by which the history of sociology can be reconstructed. I argue that the issues raised by these historical methodologies shed light on wider issues of sociological identity. In particular, the question of the coherence and openness/closure of sociological approaches is considered. In the next three chapters, I engage in a close reading of a number of substantive 'manifestos' for sociology, that attempt to delineate an epistemologically privileged space for sociological analysis. These are chosen to exemplify recent trends in sociological analysis including reflexive sociology, structural Marxism, neofunctionalism, structuration theory, sociology of postmodernity, and postmodern feminism. Each manifesto is considered with regard to its own particular merits and difficulties, but is also analysed in terms of a wider pattern of theoretical development. This pattern is termed the dialectic of openness and closure, a process whereby theories construct their arguments by criticising the closures and one-sidedness of previous approaches, only to create new closures themselves, in order to provide compelling explanations of important social phenomena. I argue that even though the emphasis on openness has become greater in recent times, closures are still effected by many sociologically-inspired theorists. In the concluding chapter, I examine pragmatic philosophies of social science as the logical end-point of the increasing openness of sociological approaches. I argue that these philosophies, if fully accepted, could lead in effect to a liberal approach that contains few critical resources. As an alternative, I suggest that the continuing operation of the dialectic of openness and closure is a good thing for sociology, allowing continued development, whilst still focusing explanatory power