Service triads:a research agenda for buyer–supplier–customer triads in business services

Service triads, in which a buyer contracts with a supplier to deliver services directly to the buyer's customer, represent an emerging business model. This special issue is dedicated to this theme. To set the context, in this lead article, we first define service triads, both as a phenomenon and a research topic. We then provide a review of different strands of existing research and various theoretical frameworks that can inform our study of service triads. This culminates in an outline of a research agenda that can guide future study. As such, this paper not only introduces the articles in the special issue, but is also intended as a point of reference and motivation for further work on service triads, and on triads in general

A through-life costing methodology for use in product-service-systems

Availability-based contracts which provide customers with the use of assets such as machines, ships, aircraft platforms or subsystems like engines and avionics are increasingly offered as an alternative to the purchase of an asset and separate support contracts. The cost of servicing a durable product can be addressed by Through-life Costing (TLC). Providers of advanced services are now concerned with the cost of delivering outcomes that meet customer requirements using combinations of assets and activities via a Product Service System (PSS). This paper addresses the question: To what extent are the current approaches to TLC methodologically appropriate for costing the provision of advanced services, particularly availability, through a PSS? A novel methodology for TLC is outlined addressing the challenges of PSS cost assessment with regard to 'what?' (cost object), 'why/to what extent?' (scope and boundaries), and 'how?' (computations). The research provides clarity for those seeking to cost availability in a performance-orientated contractual setting and provides insight to the measures that may be associated with it. In particular, a reductionist approach that focuses on one cost object at a time is not appropriate for a PSS. Costing an advanced service delivered through a PSS is a problem of attributing the value of means to the economic activities carried out for specific ends to be achieved. Cost results from the interplay between monetary and non-monetary metrics, and uncertainties thereof. Whilst seeking to ensure generality of the findings, the application of TLC examined here is limited to a military aircraft platform and subsystems. © 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved

New Models of Contracting in the Public Sector: A Review of Alliance Contracting, Prime Contracting and Outcome-based Contracting Literature

The coordination of public services is an enduring challenge and an important policy priority. One way to achieve collaboration across organizational boundaries, which is being considered in public services such as the English National Health Service (NHS), is through the adoption of alliance contracting, prime provider contracting and outcome-based contracting. This article reviews the cross-sectoral literature concerning the characteristics of these new contractual models, how they function, their impact, and their relation to public sector governance objectives. These new contractual forms are characterized as models which, in line with the New Public Management (NPM)/post-NPM agenda, seek to incentivize providers through the transfer of risk from the commissioners to the providers of services. Key findings are that the models are likely to incur high transaction costs relating to the negotiation and specification of outcomes and rely heavily on the relational aspects of contracting. There is also found to be a lack of convincing cross-sectoral evidence of the impact of the models, particularly in relation to improving coordination across organizations. The article questions the reconciliation of the use of these new contractual models in settings such as the English NHS with the requirements of public sector governance for transparency and accountability. The models serve to highlight the problems inherent in the NPM/post-NPM agenda of the transfer of risk away from commissioners of services in terms of transparency and accountability