Inefficient pre-bargaining search

We identify conditions under which a bargainer makes inefficiently large (small) investments in search for information about the opponent’s reservation price. The analysis starts with the observation that a player will invest too much (too little) if the opponent’s expected payoff is decreasing (increasing) in the probability that the player gets information. We develop comparative static results about over- and underinvestment as a function of the efficiency and distributional properties of mechanisms, their dependence on search outcomes, and the nature of the trading problem. The results do not depend on any specific bargaining mechanism and are illustrated in several examples

The Comparative Advantages of Firms, Markets and Contracts: a Unified Theory

The most efficient labour market mechanism depends on the advantages of specialization, workers’ costs of switching between entrepreneurs, and the frequency with which needs change. Multilateral mechanisms are more efficient when specialization is more advantageous, when it is cheap for workers to switch between entrepreneurs, and when individual entrepreneurs cannot occupy a worker on a full-time basis. Given a bilateral mechanism, employment (a firm) is more efficient than contracts when in-process adjustments arise more frequently. There exist three regions in which firms, markets and sequences of bilateral contracts are weakly more efficient than all other mechanisms in a big class

On the role of the RBV in marketing

This short note contains some reflections on the relationship between the resource-based view of the firm (RBV) and marketing. I focus on the main proposition of the RBV—that a firm should focus on what it can do better than others—and argue that it has implications for almost all marketing activities and that much thinking in the field already is consistent with it

Class Pricing

A contract with K-class pricing divides a large set of goods or services into K classes and assigns a single price to any element of a class. Class pricing can be efficient when several different versions may be traded and it is costly to assign individual prices to all of them. It is more likely to be used when the number of buyers is smaller, the number of versions is larger, the variance in costs is smaller, and demand ex ante differs less between versions. Under simple conditions classes should be designed to minimize the sum of squared within-class cost deviations. In bilateral trades, the most efficient game form is that in which classes are designed by the player with less varied gains from trade, while the traded version is chosen by the other player. Decisions are thus made by the player who cares most about them, while the opponent prescribes a set of limits

Small forces and large firms: Foundations of the RBV

This paper was originally prepared as a basis for a lecture when I received an honorary doctorate at the Copenhagen Business School. I am grateful to Nicolai Foss for suggesting that I pursue independent publication to reinvigorate foundational research in strategic management. An anonymous referee greatly aided the exposition

Costs of implementation: Bargaining costs versus allocative efficiency

A mechanism with low direct cost of use may be preferred to alternatives implementing more efficient allocations. We show this experimentally by giving pairs of subjects the option to agree on a single average price for a sequence of trades—in effect pooling several small bargains into a larger one. We make pooling costly by tying it to some inefficient trades, but subjects nevertheless reveal strong tendencies to pool, particularly when more bargains remain to be struck and when bargaining is face to face. The results suggest that implementation costs could play a significant role in the use of many common trading practices

On the Grouping of Tasks into Firms: Make-or-Buy with Interdependent Parts

We study the division of labor within production systems and look for the optimal grouping of tasks into firms. Using a unique dataset on the global automobile industry, we present evidence consistent with the prediction that pairs of tasks requiring more frequent mutual adaptation are more likely to be performed by the same firm. By taking account of interdependencies between tasks, our econometric approach generalizes standard make-or-buy analysis and yields improvements in predictive accuracy

Second Trimester Sunlight and Asthma: Evidence from Two Independent Studies

One in 12 Americans suffers from asthma, and its annual costs are estimated to exceed $50 billion. Yet the root causes of the disease remain unknown. A recent hypothesis posits that maternal vitamin D levels during pregnancy affect the probability the fetus later develops asthma. Employing two large-scale studies, we test this hypothesis using a natural experiment afforded by historical variation in sunlight, a major source of vitamin D. Specifically, holding the birth location and month fixed, we see how exogenous within-location variation in sunlight across birth years affects the probability of asthma onset. We show that this measurement of sunlight correlates with actual exposure, and consistent with preexisting results from the fetal development literature, we find substantial and highly significant evidence in both data sets that increased sunlight during the second trimester lowers the subsequent probability of asthma. Our results suggest policies designed to augment vitamin D levels in pregnant women, the large majority of whom are vitamin D insufficient, could be very cost effective and yield a substantial surplus

Dopamine and Risk Preferences in Different Domains

Individuals differ significantly in their willingness to take risks. Such differences may stem, at least in part, from individual biological (genetic) differences. We explore how risk-taking behavior correlates with different versions of the dopamine receptor D4 gene (DRD4), which has been implicated in previous studies of risk taking. We investigate risk taking in three contexts: economic risk taking as proxied by a financial gamble, self-reported general risk taking, and self-reported behavior in risk-related activities. Our participants are serious tournament bridge players with substantial experience in risk taking. Presumably, this sample is much less varied in its environment than a random sample of the population, making genetic based differences easier to detect. A prior study (Dreber et al. 2010) looked at risk taking by these individuals in their bridge decisions. Here we examine the riskiness of decisions they take in other contexts. We find evidence that individuals with a 7-repeat allele (7R+) of DRD4 take significantly more economic risk in an investment game than individuals without this allele (7R-). Interestingly, this positive relationship is driven by the men in our study, while the women show a negative but non-significant result. Even though the number of 7R+ women in our sample is low, our results may indicate a gender difference in how the 7R+ genotype affects behavior, a possibility that merits further study. Considering other risk measures, we find no difference between 7R+ and 7R- individuals in general risk taking or any of the risk-related activities. Overall, our results indicate that the dopamine system plays an important role in explaining individual differences in economic risk taking in men, but not necessarily in other activities involving risk.Risk preferences; Dopamine; Risk taking; Risk perception; DRD4

Dopamine and Risk Preferences in Different Domains

Individuals differ significantly in their willingness to take risks. Such differences may stem, at least in part, from individual biological (genetic) differences. We explore how risk-taking behavior varies with different versions of the dopamine receptor D4 gene (DRD4), which has been implicated in previous studies of risk taking. We investigate risk taking in three contexts: economic risk taking as proxied by a financial gamble, self-reported general risk taking, and self-reported behavior in risk-related activities. Our participants are serious tournament bridge players with substantial experience in risk taking. Presumably, this sample is much less varied in its environment than a random sample of the population, making genetic-related differences easier to detect. A prior study (Dreber et al. 2010) looked at risk taking by these individuals in their bridge decisions. We examine their risk decisions in other contexts. We find evidence that individuals with a 7-repeat allele (7R+) of the DRD4 genetic polymorphism take significantly more economic risk in an investment game than individuals without this allele (7R-). Interestingly, this positive relationship is driven by the men in our study, while the women show a negative but non-significant result. Even though the number of 7R+ women in our sample is low, our results may indicate a gender difference in how the 7R+ genotype affects behavior, a possibility that merits further study. Considering other risk measures, we find no difference between 7R+ and 7R- individuals in general risk taking or any of the risk-related activities. Overall, our results indicate that the dopamine system plays an important role in explaining individual differences in economic risk taking in men, but not necessarily in other activities involving risk.