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Chris Cannings: A Life in Games
Chris Cannings was one of the pioneers of evolutionary game theory. His early work was inspired by the formulations of John Maynard Smith, Geoff Parker and Geoff Price; Chris recognized the need for a strong mathematical foundation both to validate stated results and to give a basis for extensions of the models. He was responsible for fundamental results on matrix games, as well as much of the theory of the important war of attrition game, patterns of evolutionarily stable strategies, multiplayer games and games on networks. In this paper we describe his work, key insights and their influence on research by others in this increasingly important field. Chris made substantial contributions to other areas such as population genetics and segregation analysis, but it was to games that he always returned. This review is written by three of his students from different stages of his career
Persistence of power: Repeated multilateral bargaining with endogenous agenda setting authority
We extend a simple repeated, multilateral bargaining model to allow successful agenda setters to hold on to power as long as they maintain the support of a majority of other committee members. Theoretically and experimentally, we compare this Endogenous Power environment with a standard Random Power environment in which agenda setters are appointed randomly each period. Although the theoretical analysis predicts that the two environments are outcome equivalent, the experimental analysis shows substantial differences in behavior and outcomes across the games. The Endogenous Power environment results in the formation of more stable coalitions, less-equitable budget allocations, the persistence of power across periods, and higher long-run inequality than the Random Power environment. We present evidence that the stationary equilibrium refinements traditionally used in the literature fail to predict behavior in either game
Two-population replicator dynamics and number of Nash equilibria in random matrix games
We study the connection between the evolutionary replicator dynamics and the
number of Nash equilibria in large random bi-matrix games. Using techniques of
disordered systems theory we compute the statistical properties of both, the
fixed points of the dynamics and the Nash equilibria. Except for the special
case of zero-sum games one finds a transition as a function of the so-called
co-operation pressure between a phase in which there is a unique stable fixed
point of the dynamics coinciding with a unique Nash equilibrium, and an
unstable phase in which there are exponentially many Nash equilibria with
statistical properties different from the stationary state of the replicator
equations. Our analytical results are confirmed by numerical simulations of the
replicator dynamics, and by explicit enumeration of Nash equilibria.Comment: 9 pages, 2x2 figure
Evolutionarily stable strategies of random games, and the vertices of random polygons
An evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is an equilibrium strategy that is
immune to invasions by rare alternative (``mutant'') strategies. Unlike Nash
equilibria, ESS do not always exist in finite games. In this paper we address
the question of what happens when the size of the game increases: does an ESS
exist for ``almost every large'' game? Letting the entries in the
game matrix be independently randomly chosen according to a distribution ,
we study the number of ESS with support of size In particular, we show
that, as , the probability of having such an ESS: (i) converges to
1 for distributions with ``exponential and faster decreasing tails'' (e.g.,
uniform, normal, exponential); and (ii) converges to for
distributions with ``slower than exponential decreasing tails'' (e.g.,
lognormal, Pareto, Cauchy). Our results also imply that the expected number of
vertices of the convex hull of random points in the plane converges to
infinity for the distributions in (i), and to 4 for the distributions in (ii).Comment: Published in at http://dx.doi.org/10.1214/07-AAP455 the Annals of
Applied Probability (http://www.imstat.org/aap/) by the Institute of
Mathematical Statistics (http://www.imstat.org
Evolution of Coordination in Social Networks: A Numerical Study
Coordination games are important to explain efficient and desirable social
behavior. Here we study these games by extensive numerical simulation on
networked social structures using an evolutionary approach. We show that local
network effects may promote selection of efficient equilibria in both pure and
general coordination games and may explain social polarization. These results
are put into perspective with respect to known theoretical results. The main
insight we obtain is that clustering, and especially community structure in
social networks has a positive role in promoting socially efficient outcomes.Comment: preprint submitted to IJMP
Fixation and escape times in stochastic game learning
Evolutionary dynamics in finite populations is known to fixate eventually in
the absence of mutation. We here show that a similar phenomenon can be found in
stochastic game dynamical batch learning, and investigate fixation in learning
processes in a simple 2x2 game, for two-player games with cyclic interaction,
and in the context of the best-shot network game. The analogues of finite
populations in evolution are here finite batches of observations between
strategy updates. We study when and how such fixation can occur, and present
results on the average time-to-fixation from numerical simulations. Simple
cases are also amenable to analytical approaches and we provide estimates of
the behaviour of so-called escape times as a function of the batch size. The
differences and similarities with escape and fixation in evolutionary dynamics
are discussed.Comment: 19 pages, 9 figure
Evolutionary games on graphs
Game theory is one of the key paradigms behind many scientific disciplines
from biology to behavioral sciences to economics. In its evolutionary form and
especially when the interacting agents are linked in a specific social network
the underlying solution concepts and methods are very similar to those applied
in non-equilibrium statistical physics. This review gives a tutorial-type
overview of the field for physicists. The first three sections introduce the
necessary background in classical and evolutionary game theory from the basic
definitions to the most important results. The fourth section surveys the
topological complications implied by non-mean-field-type social network
structures in general. The last three sections discuss in detail the dynamic
behavior of three prominent classes of models: the Prisoner's Dilemma, the
Rock-Scissors-Paper game, and Competing Associations. The major theme of the
review is in what sense and how the graph structure of interactions can modify
and enrich the picture of long term behavioral patterns emerging in
evolutionary games.Comment: Review, final version, 133 pages, 65 figure
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