An Analysis of the Influence of Graph Theory When Preparing for Programming Contests

[EN] The subject known as Programming Contests in the Bachelor's Degree in Computer Engineering course focuses on solving programming problems frequently met within contests such as the Southwest Europe Regional Contest (SWERC). In order to solve these problems one first needs to model the problem correctly, find the ideal solution, and then be able to program it without making any mistakes in a very short period of time. Leading multinationals such as Google, Apple, IBM, Facebook and Microsoft place a very high value on these abilities when selecting candidates for posts in their companies. In this communication we present some preliminary results of an analysis of the interaction between two optional subjects in the Computer Science Degree course: Programming Contests (PC) and Graphs, Models and Applications (GMA). The results of this analysis enabled us to make changes to some of the contents in GMA in order to better prepare the students to deal with the challenges they have to face in programming contests.This project was funded by the Vicerrectorado de Estudios y Calidad Academica of the Universitat Politecnica de Valencia. PIME-B08: Modelos de la Teoria de Grafos aplicados a problemas de competiciones de programacion.Jordan-Lluch, C.; Gomez, J.; Conejero, JA. (2017). An Analysis of the Influence of Graph Theory When Preparing for Programming Contests. Mathematics. 5(1):1-11. doi:10.3390/math5010008S1115

A Two-Player Game of Life

We present a new extension of Conway's game of life for two players, which we call p2life. P2life allows one of two types of token, black or white, to inhabit a cell, and adds competitive elements into the birth and survival rules of the original game. We solve the mean-field equation for p2life and determine by simulation that the asymptotic density of p2life approaches 0.0362.Comment: 7 pages, 3 figure

Electromagnetic superconductivity of vacuum induced by strong magnetic field: numerical evidence in lattice gauge theory

Using numerical simulations of quenched SU(2) gauge theory we demonstrate that an external magnetic field leads to spontaneous generation of quark condensates with quantum numbers of electrically charged rho mesons if the strength of the magnetic field exceeds the critical value eBc = 0.927(77) GeV^2 or Bc =(1.56 \pm 0.13) 10^{16} Tesla. The condensation of the charged rho mesons in strong magnetic field is a key feature of the magnetic-field-induced electromagnetic superconductivity of the vacuum.Comment: 14 pages, 5 figures, 2 tables, elsarticle style; continuum limit is analyzed, best fit parameters are presented in Table 2, published versio

Quantum Games

In these lecture notes we investigate the implications of the identification of strategies with quantum operations in game theory beyond the results presented in [J. Eisert, M. Wilkens, and M. Lewenstein, Phys. Rev. Lett. 83, 3077 (1999)]. After introducing a general framework, we study quantum games with a classical analogue in order to flesh out the peculiarities of game theoretical settings in the quantum domain. Special emphasis is given to a detailed investigation of different sets of quantum strategies.Comment: 13 pages (LaTeX), 3 figure

Emotional Strategies as Catalysts for Cooperation in Signed Networks

The evolution of unconditional cooperation is one of the fundamental problems in science. A new solution is proposed to solve this puzzle. We treat this issue with an evolutionary model in which agents play the Prisoner's Dilemma on signed networks. The topology is allowed to co-evolve with relational signs as well as with agent strategies. We introduce a strategy that is conditional on the emotional content embedded in network signs. We show that this strategy acts as a catalyst and creates favorable conditions for the spread of unconditional cooperation. In line with the literature, we found evidence that the evolution of cooperation most likely occurs in networks with relatively high chances of rewiring and with low likelihood of strategy adoption. While a low likelihood of rewiring enhances cooperation, a very high likelihood seems to limit its diffusion. Furthermore, unlike in non-signed networks, cooperation becomes more prevalent in denser topologies.Comment: 24 pages, Accepted for publication in Advances in Complex System

Hawks and Doves on Small-World Networks

We explore the Hawk-Dove game on networks with topologies ranging from regular lattices to random graphs with small-world networks in between. This is done by means of computer simulations using several update rules for the population evolutionary dynamics. We find the overall result that cooperation is sometimes inhibited and sometimes enhanced in those network structures, with respect to the mixing population case. The differences are due to different update rules and depend on the gain-to-cost ratio. We analyse and qualitatively explain this behavior by using local topological arguments.Comment: 12 pages, 8 figure

Beyond foraging: behavioral science and the future of institutional economics

Institutions affect economic outcomes, but variation in them cannot be directly linked to environmental factors such as geography, climate, or technological availabilities. Game theoretic approaches, based as they typically are on foraging only assumptions, do not provide an adequate foundation for understanding the intervening role of politics and ideology; nor does the view that culture and institutions are entirely socially constructed. Understanding what institutions are and how they influence behavior requires an approach that is in part biological, focusing on cognitive and behavioral adaptations for social interaction favored in the past by group selection. These adaptations, along with their effects on canalizing social learning, help to explain uniformities in political and social order, and are the bedrock upon which we build cultural and institutional variability

Evolutionary Games on Networks and Payoff Invariance Under Replicator Dynamics

The commonly used accumulated payoff scheme is not invariant with respect to shifts of payoff values when applied locally in degree-inhomogeneous population structures. We propose a suitably modified payoff scheme and we show both formally and by numerical simulation, that it leaves the replicator dynamics invariant with respect to affine transformations of the game payoff matrix. We then show empirically that, using the modified payoff scheme, an interesting amount of cooperation can be reached in three paradigmatic non-cooperative two-person games in populations that are structured according to graphs that have a marked degree inhomogeneity, similar to actual graphs found in society. The three games are the Prisoner's Dilemma, the Hawks-Doves and the Stag-Hunt. This confirms previous important observations that, under certain conditions, cooperation may emerge in such network-structured populations, even though standard replicator dynamics for mixing populations prescribes equilibria in which cooperation is totally absent in the Prisoner's Dilemma, and it is less widespread in the other two games.Comment: 20 pages, 8 figures; to appear on BioSystem

Random mobility and spatial structure often enhance cooperation

The effects of an unconditional move rule in the spatial Prisoner's Dilemma, Snowdrift and Stag Hunt games are studied. Spatial structure by itself is known to modify the outcome of many games when compared with a randomly mixed population, sometimes promoting, sometimes inhibiting cooperation. Here we show that random dilution and mobility may suppress the inhibiting factors of the spatial structure in the Snowdrift game, while enhancing the already larger cooperation found in the Prisoner's dilemma and Stag Hunt games.Comment: Submitted to J. Theor. Bio