Evolutionary Stable Strategies Depending on Population Density

The concept of evolutionary stable strategies is extended to include density dependence. Dynamical stability is shown to follow for two-strategy games and for symmetric payoff matrices. It is conjectured that stability also results for general multi-strategy games

Migration Dynamics for the Ideal Free Distribution

This article verifies that the ideal free distribution (IFD) is evolutionarily stable, provided the payoff in each patch decreases with an increasing number of individuals. General frequency-dependent models of migratory dynamics that differ in the degree of animal omniscience are then developed. These models do not exclude migration at the IFD where balanced dispersal emerges. It is shown that the population distribution converges to the IFD even when animals are nonideal (i.e., they do not know the quality of all patches). In particular, the IFD emerges when animals never migrate from patches with a higher payoff to patches with a lower payoff and when some animals always migrate to the best patch. It is shown that some random migration does not necessarily lead to undermatching, provided migration occurs at the IFD. The effect of population dynamics on the IFD (and vice versa) is analyzed. Without any migration, it is shown that population dynamics alone drive the population distribution to the IFD. If animal migration tends (for each fixed population size) to the IFD, then the combined migrationpopulation dynamics evolve to the population IFD independent of the two timescales (i.e., behavioral vs. population)

On the Ranking of Bilateral Bargaining Opponents

We fix the status quo (Q) and one of the bilateral bargaining agents to examine how shifting the opponent.s ideal point (type) away from Q in a unidimensional space affects the Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solutions when opponents differ only in their ideal points. The results are similar for both solutions. As anticipated, the bargainer whose ideal point is farthest from Q prefers a opponent whose ideal is closest to her own. A similar intuitive ranking emerges for the player closest to Q when opponent\'s preferences exhibit increasing absolute risk aversion. However, if the opponent\'s preferences exhibit decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA), the player closest to Q prefers a more extreme opponent. This unintuitive result arises for opponents with DARA preferences because the farther their ideal point is from Q, the easier they are to satisfy.Game Theory; Nash bargaining problems; bargaining solutions, rankings

Ideal Free Distributions, Evolutionary Games, and Population Dynamics in Multiple-Species Environments

In this article, we develop population game theory, a theory that combines the dynamics of animal behavior with population dynamics. In particular, we study interaction and distribution of two species in a two-patch environment assuming that individuals behave adaptively (i.e., they maximize Darwinian fitness). Either the two species are competing for resources or they are in a predator-prey relationship. Using some recent advances in evolutionary game theory, we extend the classical ideal free distribution (IFD) concept for single species to two interacting species. We study population dynamical consequences of two-species IFD by comparing two systems: one where individuals cannot migrate between habitats and one where migration is possible. For single species, predator-prey interactions, and competing species, we show that these two types of behavior lead to the same population equilibria and corresponding species spatial distributions, provided interspecific competition is patch independent. However, if differences between patches are such that competition is patch dependent, then our predictions strongly depend on whether animals can migrate or not. In particular, we show that when species are settled at their equilibrium population densities in both habitats in the environment where migration between habitats is blocked, then the corresponding species spatial distribution need not be an IFD. Thus, when species are given the opportunity to migrate, they will redistribute to reach an IFD (e.g., under which the two species can completely segregate), and this redistribution will also influence species population equilibrial densities. Alternatively, we also show that when two species are distributed according to the IFD, the corresponding population equilibrium can be unstable

Measurement of entropy production rate in compressible turbulence

The rate of change of entropy $\dot S$ is measured for a system of particles floating on the surface of a fluid maintained in a turbulent steady state. The resulting coagulation of the floaters allows one to relate $\dot S$ to the velocity divergence and to the Lyapunov exponents characterizing the behavior of this system. The quantities measured from experiments and simulations are found to agree well with the theoretical predictions.Comment: 7 Pages, 4 figures, 1 tabl

Ecological theatre and the evolutionary game: how environmental and demographic factors determine payoffs in evolutionary games

In the standard approach to evolutionary games and replicator dynamics, differences in fitness can be interpreted as an excess from the mean Malthusian growth rate in the population. In the underlying reasoning, related to an analysis of "costs" and "benefits", there is a silent assumption that fitness can be described in some type of units. However, in most cases these units of measure are not explicitly specified. Then the question arises: are these theories testable? How can we measure "benefit" or "cost"? A natural language, useful for describing and justifying comparisons of strategic "cost" versus "benefits", is the terminology of demography, because the basic events that shape the outcome of natural selection are births and deaths. In this paper, we present the consequences of an explicit analysis of births and deaths in an evolutionary game theoretic framework. We will investigate different types of mortality pressures, their combinations and the possibility of trade-offs between mortality and fertility. We will show that within this new approach it is possible to model how strictly ecological factors such as density dependence and additive background fitness, which seem neutral in classical theory, can affect the outcomes of the game. We consider the example of the Hawk-Dove game, and show that when reformulated in terms of our new approach new details and new biological predictions are produced

The Role of Behavioral Dynamics in Determining the Patch Distributions of Interacting Species

The effect of the behavioral dynamics of movement on the population dynamics of interacting species in multipatch systems is studied. The behavioral dynamics of habitat choice used in a range of previous models are reviewed. There is very limited empirical evidence for distinguishing between these different models, but they differ in important ways, and many lack properties that would guarantee stability of an ideal free distribution in a single-species system. The importance of finding out more about movement dynamics in multispecies systems is shown by an analysis of the effect of movement rules on the dynamics of a particular two-species–two-patch model of competition, where the population dynamical equilibrium in the absence of movement is often not a behavioral equilibrium in the presence of adaptive movement. The population dynamics of this system are explored for several different movement rules and different parameter values, producing a variety of outcomes. Other systems of interacting species that may lack a dynamically stable distribution among patches are discussed, and it is argued that such systems are not rare. The sensitivity of community properties to individual movement behavior in this and earlier studies argues that there is a great need for empirical investigation to determine the applicability of different models of the behavioral dynamics of habitat selection