Social daydreaming and adjustment: an experience-sampling study of socio-emotional adaptation during a life transition

Estimates suggest that up to half of waking life is spent daydreaming; that is, engaged in thought that is independent of, and unrelated to, one’s current task. Emerging research indicates that daydreams are predominately social suggesting that daydreams may serve socio-emotional functions. Here we explore the functional role of social daydreaming for socio-emotional adjustment during an important and stressful life transition (the transition to university) using experience-sampling with 103 participants over 28 days. Over time, social daydreams increased in their positive characteristics and positive emotional outcomes; specifically, participants reported that their daydreams made them feel more socially connected and less lonely, and that the content of their daydreams became less fanciful and involved higher quality relationships. These characteristics then predicted less loneliness at the end of the study, which, in turn was associated with greater social adaptation to university. Feelings of connection resulting from social daydreams were also associated with less emotional inertia in participants who reported being less socially adapted to university. Findings indicate that social daydreaming is functional for promoting socio-emotional adjustment to an important life event. We highlight the need to consider the social content of stimulus-independent cognitions, their characteristics, and patterns of change, to specify how social thoughts enable socio-emotional adaptation

Effects of Aversive Stimuli on Prospective Memory. An Event-Related fMRI Study

Prospective memory (PM) describes the ability to execute a previously planned action at the appropriate point in time. Although behavioral studies clearly showed that prospective memory performance is affected by the emotional significance attributed to the intended action, no study so far investigated the brain mechanisms subserving the modulatory effect of emotional salience on PM performance. The general aim of the present study was to explore brain regions involved in prospective memory processes when PM cues are associated with emotional stimuli. In particular, based on the hypothesised critical role of the prefrontal cortex in prospective memory in the presence of emotionally salient stimuli, we expected a stronger involvement of aPFC when the retrieval and execution of the intended action is cued by an aversive stimulus. To this aim BOLD responses of PM trials cued by aversive facial expressions were compared to PM trials cued by neutral facial expressions. Whole brain analysis showed that PM task cued by aversive stimuli is differentially associated with activity in the right lateral prefrontal area (BA 10) and in the left caudate nucleus. Moreover a temporal shift between the response of the caudate nucleus that preceded that of aPFC was observed. These findings suggest that the caudate nucleus might provide an early analysis of the affective properties of the stimuli, whereas the anterior lateral prefrontal cortex (BA10) would be involved in a slower and more deliberative analysis to guide goal-directed behaviour

Mind wandering and task-focused attention: ERP correlates

Previous studies looking at how Mind Wandering (MW) impacts performance in distinct Focused Attention (FA) systems, using the Attention Network Task (ANT), showed that the presence of pure MW thoughts did not impact the overall performance of ANT (alert, orienting and conflict) performance. However, it still remains unclear if the lack of interference of MW in the ANT, reported at the behavioral level, has a neurophysiological correspondence. We hypothesize that a distinct cortical processing may be required to meet attentional demands during MW. The objective of the present study was to test if, given similar levels of ANT performance, individuals predominantly focusing on MW or FA show distinct cortical processing. Thirty-three healthy participants underwent an EEG high-density acquisition while they were performing the ANT. MW was assessed following the ANT using an adapted version of the Resting State Questionnaire (ReSQ). The following ERP's were analyzed: pN1, pP1, P1, N1, pN, and P3. At the behavioral level, participants were slower and less accurate when responding to incongruent than to congruent targets (conflict effect), benefiting from the presentation of the double (alerting effect) and spatial (orienting effect) cues. Consistent with the behavioral data, ERP's waves were discriminative of distinct attentional effects. However, these results remained true irrespective of the MW condition, suggesting that MW imposed no additional cortical demand in alert, orienting, and conflict attention tasks.Acknowledgements Óscar F. Gonçalves was funded by the Brazilian National Counsel for Scientific and Technological Development (CNPq) as a Special Visiting Researcher of the Science Without Borders program (401143/2014-7). Paulo S Boggio was funded by a CNPq researcher fellowship (311641/2015-6). Olivia Morgan Lapenta and Tatiana Conde were supported by two postdoctoral grants from CNPq (150249/2017-9 and 152358/2016-1). Sandra Carvalho was funded by the Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology (FCT) with the grant IF/00091/2015. Gabriel Rêgo was supported by a PhD grant from Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP-2015/18713-9). This work was partially supported by FEDER funds through the Programa Operacional Factores de Competitividade – COMPETE and by national funds through FCT – Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (P2020-PTDC/MHC-PCN/3950/2014).info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio

An fMRI investigation of the relationship between future imagination and cognitive flexibility

While future imagination is largely considered to be a cognitive process grounded in default mode network activity, studies have shown that future imagination recruits regions in both default mode and frontoparietal control networks. In addition, it has recently been shown that the ability to imagine the future is associated with cognitive flexibility, and that tasks requiring cognitive flexibility result in increased coupling of the default mode network with frontoparietal control and salience networks. In the current study, we investigated the neural correlates underlying the association between cognitive flexibility and future imagination in two ways. First, we experimentally varied the degree of cognitive flexibility required during future imagination by manipulating the disparateness of episodic details contributing to imagined events. To this end, participants generated episodic details (persons, locations, objects) within three social spheres; during fMRI scanning they were presented with sets of three episodic details all taken from the same social sphere (Congruent condition) or different social spheres (Incongruent condition) and required to imagine a future event involving the three details. We predicted that, relative to the Congruent condition, future simulation in the Incongruent condition would be associated with increased activity in regions of the default mode, frontoparietal and salience networks. Second, we hypothesized that individual differences in cognitive flexibility, as measured by performance on the Alternate Uses Task, would correspond to individual differences in the brain regions recruited during future imagination. A task partial least squares (PLS) analysis showed that the Incongruent condition resulted in an increase in activity in regions in salience networks (e.g. the insula) but, contrary to our prediction, reduced activity in many regions of the default mode network (including the hippocampus). A subsequent functional connectivity (within-subject seed PLS) analysis showed that the insula exhibited increased coupling with default mode regions during the Incongruent condition. Finally, a behavioral PLS analysis showed that individual differences in cognitive flexibility were associated with differences in activity in a number of regions from frontoparietal, salience and default-mode networks during both future imagination conditions, further highlighting that the cognitive flexibility underlying future imagination is grounded in the complex interaction of regions in these networks

Neuroimaging the consciousness of self: Review, and conceptual-methodological framework

We review neuroimaging research investigating self-referential processing (SRP), that is, how we respond to stimuli that reference ourselves, prefaced by a lexical-thematic analysis of words indicative of “self-feelings”. We consider SRP as occurring verbally (V-SRP) and non-verbally (NV-SRP), both in the controlled, “top-down” form of introspective and interoceptive tasks, respectively, as well as in the “bottom-up” spontaneous or automatic form of “mind wandering” and “body wandering” that occurs during resting state. Our review leads us to outline a conceptual and methodological framework for future SRP research that we briefly apply toward understanding certain psychological and neurological disorders symptomatically associated with abnormal SRP. Our discussion is partly guided by William James’ original writings on the consciousness of self

“I” and “Me”: The Self in the Context of Consciousness

James (1890) distinguished two understandings of the self, the self as “Me” and the self as “I”. This distinction has recently regained popularity in cognitive science, especially in the context of experimental studies on the underpinnings of the phenomenal self. The goal of this paper is to take a step back from cognitive science and attempt to precisely distinguish between “Me” and “I” in the context of consciousness. This distinction was originally based on the idea that the former (“Me”) corresponds to the self as an object of experience (self as object), while the latter (“I”) reflects the self as a subject of experience (self as subject). I will argue that in most of the cases (arguably all) this distinction maps onto the distinction between the phenomenal self (reflecting self-related content of consciousness) and the metaphysical self (representing the problem of subjectivity of all conscious experience), and as such these two issues should be investigated separately using fundamentally different methodologies. Moreover, by referring to Metzinger’s (2018) theory of phenomenal self-models, I will argue that what is usually investigated as the phenomenal-“I” [following understanding of self-as-subject introduced by Wittgenstein (1958)] can be interpreted as object, rather than subject of experience, and as such can be understood as an element of the hierarchical structure of the phenomenal self-model. This understanding relates to recent predictive coding and free energy theories of the self and bodily self discussed in cognitive neuroscience and philosophy