Trans-saccadic priming in hemianopia: sighted-field sensitivity is boosted by a blind-field prime

We experience visual stability despite shifts of the visual array across the retina produced by eye movements. A process known as remapping is thought to keep track of the spatial locations of objects as they move on the retina. We explored remapping in damaged visual cortex by presenting a stimulus in the blind field of two patients with hemianopia. When they executed a saccadic eye movement that would bring the stimulated location into the sighted field, reported awareness of the stimulus increased, even though the stimulus was removed before the saccade began and so never actually fell in the sighted field. Moreover, when a location was primed by a blind-field stimulus and then brought into the sighted field by a saccade, detection sensitivity for near-threshold targets appearing at this location increased dramatically. The results demonstrate that brain areas supporting conscious vision are not necessary for remapping, and suggest visual stability is maintained for salient objects even when they are not consciously perceived

Visual consciousness: the binocular rivalry explosion

A new behavioural technique solves a long-standing puzzle of binocular suppression, demonstrating that adapting reciprocal inhibition governs visual sensitivity, and raising key questions about visual awareness

Seeing without Seeing? Degraded Conscious Vision in a Blindsight Patient

Blindsight patients, whose primary visual cortex is lesioned, exhibit preserved ability to discriminate visual stimuli presented in their “blind” field, yet report no visual awareness hereof. Blindsight is generally studied in experimental investigations of single patients, as very few patients have been given this “diagnosis”. In our single case study of patient GR, we ask whether blindsight is best described as unconscious vision, or rather as conscious, yet severely degraded vision. In experiment 1 and 2, we successfully replicate the typical findings of previous studies on blindsight. The third experiment, however, suggests that GR's ability to discriminate amongst visual stimuli does not reflect unconscious vision, but rather degraded, yet conscious vision. As our finding results from using a method for obtaining subjective reports that has not previously used in blindsight studies (but validated in studies of healthy subjects and other patients with brain injury), our results call for a reconsideration of blindsight, and, arguably also of many previous studies of unconscious perception in healthy subjects

Progressive cortical visual failure associated with occipital calcification and coeliac disease with relative preservation of the dorsal ‘action’ pathway

We describe the first reported case of a patient with coeliac disease and cerebral occipital calcification who shows a progressive and seemingly selective failure to recognize visual stimuli. This decline was tracked over a study period of 22 years and occurred in the absence of primary sensory or widespread intellectual impairment. Subsequent tests revealed that although the patient was unable to use shape and contour information to visually identify objects, she was nevertheless able to use this information to reach, grasp and manipulate objects under central, immediate vision. This preservation of visuo-motor control was echoed in her day-to-day ability to navigate and live at home independently. We conclude that occipital calcification following coeliac disease can lead to prominent higher visual failure that, under prescribed viewing conditions, is consistent with separable mechanisms for visual perception and action control

The coupling of vision with locomotion in cortical blindness

© 2014 Elsevier B.V.. Maintaining or modifying the speed and direction of locomotion requires the coupling of the locomotion with the retinal optic flow that it generates. It is shown that this essential behavioral capability, which requires on-line neural control, is preserved in the cortically blind hemifield of a hemianope. In experiments, optic flow stimuli were presented to either the normal or blind hemifield while the patient was walking on a treadmill. Little difference was found between the hemifields with respect to the coupling (i.e. co-dependency) of optic flow detection with locomotion. Even in the cortically blind hemifield, faster walking resulted in the perceptual slowing of detected optic flow, and self-selected locomotion speeds demonstrated behavioral discrimination between different optic flow speeds. The results indicate that the processing of optic flow, and thereby on-line visuo-locomotor coupling, can take place along neural pathways that function without processing in Area V1, and thus in the absence of conscious intervention. These and earlier findings suggest that optic flow and object motion are processed in parallel along with correlated non-visual locomotion signals. Extrastriate interactions may be responsible for discounting the optical effects of locomotion on the perceived direction of object motion, and maintaining visually guided self-motion

Does delay impair localisation in blindsight?

Peer reviewedPublisher PD

Introspective physicalism as an approach to the science of consciousness

Most ‘theories of consciousness’ are based on vague speculations about the properties of conscious experience. We aim to provide a more solid basis for a science of consciousness. We argue that a theory of consciousness should provide an account of the very processes that allow us to acquire and use information about our own mental states – the processes underlying introspection. This can be achieved through the construction of information processing models that can account for ‘Type-C’ processes. Type-C processes can be specified experimentally by identifying paradigms in which awareness of the stimulus is necessary for an intentional action. The Shallice (1988b) framework is put forward as providing an initial account of Type-C processes, which can relate perceptual consciousness to consciously performed actions. Further, we suggest that this framework may be refined through the investigation of the functions of prefrontal cortex. The formulation of our approach requires us to consider fundamental conceptual and methodological issues associated with consciousness. The most significant of these issues concerns the scientific use of introspective evidence. We outline and justify a conservative methodological approach to the use of introspective evidence, with attention to the difficulties historically associated with its use in psychology