Simpler for evolution: Secondary representation in apes, children, and ancestors

Great apes show behavioural evidence for secondary representation similar to that of children of about two years of age. However, there is no convincing evidence for metarepresentation in apes. A good evolutionary interpretation should be parsimonious and must bring developmental and comparative data in accord. I propose a model based on the work of Perner (1991) and close by pointing out a logical flaw in Heyes’ second proposed experiment

The Rise of the Metamind

Introduction: Every culture and epoch has had its ideas about the nature of mind and existence. We can reflect upon ourselves, upon others, and upon the world. Do animals do that too? Do they sit around and think that they are because they can think? Are they to be considered mindless if they do not reflect? How did our ability to think beyond the immediately present evolve? The self-awareness implied by 'cogito ergo sum', or 'I think, therefore I am', demands a reflective level of thinking that develops by about age four in children. Only then, recent research suggests, do children begin to reflect on their own mental states. It would be quite difficult, however, to convince people that younger children are mindless - mind can surely exist without being able to reflect upon its own existence. One can know, regardless of whether one knows that one knows. This means that the Cartesian assumption that the mind is necessarily transparent to the self is flawed (cf. Wimmer and Hartl 1991; Gopnik 1993). Instead, the reflective mind, or what I want to call the metamind, seems to depend on mental computations that gradually develop over the first four years of life and that have evolved over the last five million years of human evolution

Reinterpreting the Mentality of Apes

This chapter reviews the evidence for theory of mind in great apes and evaluates Povinelli's so-called 'reinterpretation hypothesis'. Introduction As a soccer player, one of us was often confronted with the challenging dilemma of taking penalty kicks. Up to about age 13 I (T.S.) could quite reliably convert the shot by simply peeking briefly to one corner of the goal, running up and then casually placing the ball in the other corner. I relied not on the accuracy or velocity of my shot, but almost entirely on fooling the keeper that I intended to shoot in the opposite direction. But then some clever keepers picked up on this simplest of tricks and tried to thwart my attempt by jumping in the opposite corner to the one I looked to. Some even tried to turn the tables by offering one side (moving closer to the other post). The battle became increasingly more challenging as I was sizing up the keeper's ability to read my intentions and do the opposite of what I thought he thought. For example, I pretend to place it right, but I think that he thinks I am only pretending to place it right - so I may chose to place it right after all. This is 'theory of mind' in action. Most theory-of-mind research uses verbal paradigms to assess children's reasoning about the mind. As the above example illustrates, however, theory of mind manifests in our non-verbal actions. Naturally, investigations into potential theory of mind in non-human animals must rely on such non-verbal performances. Whether our closest animal relatives share such manifestations of theory of mind has been a topic of much research and discussion in recent years. But identification of an unequivocal behavioural indicator for mind-reading has proved frustratingly difficult..

Curriculum Lags Technology

As we approach the 21st century, no one disputes computers/computer-based technology is here to stay. With the evolution of more affordable technology, business and education have increased investment in computers. Corporate environments have completely altered their daily work environment as a result. The implications produce an overwhelming challenge to our school system. The critical question, then, is how do we best prepare our children for such a technologically advanced environment? There are many theories and ideas on how this task should be accomplished

Enacting Productive Dialogue: Addressing the Challenge that Non-Human Cognition Poses to Collaborations Between Enactivism and Heideggerian Phenomenology

This chapter uses one particular proposal for interdisciplinary collaboration – in this case, between early Heideggerian phenomenology and enactivist cognitive science – as an example of how such partnerships may confront and negotiate tensions between the perspectives they bring together. The discussion begins by summarising some of the intersections that render Heideggerian and enactivist thought promising interlocutors for each other. It then moves on to explore how Heideggerian enactivism could respond to the challenge of reconciling the significant differences in the ways that each discourse seeks to apply the structures it claims to uncover

The emergence of episodic foresight and its consequences

Imagining future events and adjusting current behavior accordingly is a hallmark of human cognition. The development of such episodic foresight is attracting increasing research attention. In this article, I review a selection of recent work on the emergence of episodic foresight and its role in different domains, including learning, deliberate practice, affective forecasting, intertemporal choices, and anxiety. Studies suggest that during the preschool years, children begin to consider future scenarios, enabling them to plan, prepare, and shape their future, but many other consequences, such as the role of developing foresight in anticipating hazards, remain unexamined. The potential predictive effects of early individual differences in episodic foresight on later cognitive capacities and developmental outcomes deserve closer scrutiny

The evolution of foresight: What is mental time travel and is it unique to humans?

In a dynamic world, mechanisms allowing prediction of future situations can provide a selective advantage. We suggest that memory systems differ in the degree of flexibility they offer for anticipatory behavior and put forward a corresponding taxonomy of prospection. The adaptive advantage of any memory system can only lie in what it contributes for future survival. The most flexible is episodic memory, which we suggest is part of a more general faculty of mental time travel that allows us not only to go back in time, but also to foresee, plan, and shape virtually any specific future event. We review comparative studies and find that, in spite of increased research in the area, there is as yet no convincing evidence for mental time travel in nonhuman animals. We submit that mental time travel is not an encapsulated cognitive system, but instead comprises several subsidiary mechanisms. A theater metaphor serves as an analogy for the kind of mechanisms required for effective mental time travel. We propose that future research should consider these mechanisms in addition to direct evidence of future-directed action. We maintain that the emergence of mental time travel in evolution was a crucial step towards our current success

Decreased mental time travel to the past correlates with default-mode network disintegration under lysergic acid diethylamide

This paper reports on the effects of LSD on mental time travel during spontaneous mentation. Twenty healthy volunteers participated in a placebo-controlled crossover study, incorporating intravenous administration of LSD (75 μg) and placebo (saline) prior to functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Six independent, blind judges analysed mentation reports acquired during structured interviews performed shortly after the functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) scans (approximately 2.5 h post-administration). Within each report, specific linguistic references to mental spaces for the past, present and future were identified. Results revealed significantly fewer mental spaces for the past under LSD and this effect correlated with the general intensity of the drug’s subjective effects. No differences in the number of mental spaces for the present or future were observed. Consistent with the previously proposed role of the default-mode network (DMN) in autobiographical memory recollection and ruminative thought, decreased resting-state functional connectivity (RSFC) within the DMN correlated with decreased mental time travel to the past. These results are discussed in relation to potential therapeutic applications of LSD and related psychedelics, e.g. in the treatment of depression, for which excessive reflection on one’s past, likely mediated by DMN functioning, is symptomatic

How do episodic memory and semantic memory contribute to episodic foresight in young children?

Humans are able to transcend the present and mentally travel to another time, place, or perspective. Mentally projecting ourselves backwards (i.e., episodic memory) or forwards (i.e., episodic foresight) in time are crucial characteristics of the human memory system. Indeed, over the past few years, episodic memory has been argued to be involved both in our capacity to retrieve our personal past experiences and in our ability to imagine and foresee future scenarios. However, recent theory and findings suggest that semantic memory also plays a significant role in imagining future scenarios. We draw on Tulving’s definition of episodic and semantic memory to provide a critical analysis of their role in episodic foresight tasks described in the developmental literature. We conclude by suggesting future directions of research that could further our understanding of how both episodic memory and semantic memory are intimately connected to episodic foresight