934 research outputs found

    Spatial heterogeneity promotes coexistence of rock-paper-scissor metacommunities

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    The rock-paper-scissor game -- which is characterized by three strategies R,P,S, satisfying the non-transitive relations S excludes P, P excludes R, and R excludes S -- serves as a simple prototype for studying more complex non-transitive systems. For well-mixed systems where interactions result in fitness reductions of the losers exceeding fitness gains of the winners, classical theory predicts that two strategies go extinct. The effects of spatial heterogeneity and dispersal rates on this outcome are analyzed using a general framework for evolutionary games in patchy landscapes. The analysis reveals that coexistence is determined by the rates at which dominant strategies invade a landscape occupied by the subordinate strategy (e.g. rock invades a landscape occupied by scissors) and the rates at which subordinate strategies get excluded in a landscape occupied by the dominant strategy (e.g. scissor gets excluded in a landscape occupied by rock). These invasion and exclusion rates correspond to eigenvalues of the linearized dynamics near single strategy equilibria. Coexistence occurs when the product of the invasion rates exceeds the product of the exclusion rates. Provided there is sufficient spatial variation in payoffs, the analysis identifies a critical dispersal rate dd^* required for regional persistence. For dispersal rates below dd^*, the product of the invasion rates exceed the product of the exclusion rates and the rock-paper-scissor metacommunities persist regionally despite being extinction prone locally. For dispersal rates above dd^*, the product of the exclusion rates exceed the product of the invasion rates and the strategies are extinction prone. These results highlight the delicate interplay between spatial heterogeneity and dispersal in mediating long-term outcomes for evolutionary games.Comment: 31pages, 5 figure

    Data based identification and prediction of nonlinear and complex dynamical systems

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    We thank Dr. R. Yang (formerly at ASU), Dr. R.-Q. Su (formerly at ASU), and Mr. Zhesi Shen for their contributions to a number of original papers on which this Review is partly based. This work was supported by ARO under Grant No. W911NF-14-1-0504. W.-X. Wang was also supported by NSFC under Grants No. 61573064 and No. 61074116, as well as by the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities, Beijing Nova Programme.Peer reviewedPostprin

    Coevolutionary dynamics of a variant of the cyclic Lotka-Volterra model with three-agent interactions

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    We study a variant of the cyclic Lotka-Volterra model with three-agent interactions. Inspired by a multiplayer variation of the Rock-Paper-Scissors game, the model describes an ideal ecosystem in which cyclic competition among three species develops through cooperative predation. Its rate equations in a well-mixed environment display a degenerate Hopf bifurcation, occurring as reactions involving two predators plus one prey have the same rate as reactions involving two preys plus one predator. We estimate the magnitude of the stochastic noise at the bifurcation point, where finite size effects turn neutrally stable orbits into erratically diverging trajectories. In particular, we compare analytic predictions for the extinction probability, derived in the Fokker-Planck approximation, with numerical simulations based on the Gillespie stochastic algorithm. We then extend the analysis of the phase portrait to heterogeneous rates. In a well-mixed environment, we observe a continuum of degenerate Hopf bifurcations, generalizing the above one. Neutral stability ensues from a complex equilibrium between different reactions. Remarkably, on a two-dimensional lattice, all bifurcations disappear as a consequence of the spatial locality of the interactions. In the second part of the paper, we investigate the effects of mobility in a lattice metapopulation model with patches hosting several agents. We find that strategies propagate along the arms of rotating spirals, as they usually do in models of cyclic dominance. We observe propagation instabilities in the regime of large wavelengths. We also examine three-agent interactions inducing nonlinear diffusion.Comment: 22 pages, 13 figures. v2: version accepted for publication in EPJ

    Design and Construction of Zana Robot for Modeling Human Player in Rock-paper-scissors Game using Multilayer Perceptron, Radial basis Functions and Markov Algorithms

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    In this paper, the implementation of artificial neural networks (multilayer perceptron [MLP] and radial base functions [RBF]) and the upgraded Markov chain model have been studied and performed to identify the human behavior patterns during rock, paper, and scissors game. The main motivation of this research is the design and construction of an intelligent robot with the ability to defeat a human opponent. MATLAB software has been used to implement intelligent algorithms. After implementing the algorithms, their effectiveness in detecting human behavior pattern has been investigated. To ensure the ideal performance of the implemented model, each player played with the desired algorithms in three different stages. The results showed that the percentage of winning computer with MLP and RBF neural networks and upgraded Markov model, on average in men and women is 59%, 76.66%, and 75%, respectively. Obtained results clearly indicate a very good performance of the RBF neural network and the upgraded Markov model in the mental modeling of the human opponent in the game of rock, paper, and scissors. In the end, the designed game has been employed in both hardware and software which include the Zana intelligent robot and a digital version with a graphical user interface design on the stand. To the best knowledge of the authors, the precision of novel presented method for determining human behavior patterns was the highest precision among all of the previous studies

    Cyclic game dynamics driven by iterated reasoning

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    Recent theories from complexity science argue that complex dynamics are ubiquitous in social and economic systems. These claims emerge from the analysis of individually simple agents whose collective behavior is surprisingly complicated. However, economists have argued that iterated reasoning--what you think I think you think--will suppress complex dynamics by stabilizing or accelerating convergence to Nash equilibrium. We report stable and efficient periodic behavior in human groups playing the Mod Game, a multi-player game similar to Rock-Paper-Scissors. The game rewards subjects for thinking exactly one step ahead of others in their group. Groups that play this game exhibit cycles that are inconsistent with any fixed-point solution concept. These cycles are driven by a "hopping" behavior that is consistent with other accounts of iterated reasoning: agents are constrained to about two steps of iterated reasoning and learn an additional one-half step with each session. If higher-order reasoning can be complicit in complex emergent dynamics, then cyclic and chaotic patterns may be endogenous features of real-world social and economic systems.Comment: 8 pages, 4 figures, and supplementary informatio

    Evolutionary games on graphs

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    Game theory is one of the key paradigms behind many scientific disciplines from biology to behavioral sciences to economics. In its evolutionary form and especially when the interacting agents are linked in a specific social network the underlying solution concepts and methods are very similar to those applied in non-equilibrium statistical physics. This review gives a tutorial-type overview of the field for physicists. The first three sections introduce the necessary background in classical and evolutionary game theory from the basic definitions to the most important results. The fourth section surveys the topological complications implied by non-mean-field-type social network structures in general. The last three sections discuss in detail the dynamic behavior of three prominent classes of models: the Prisoner's Dilemma, the Rock-Scissors-Paper game, and Competing Associations. The major theme of the review is in what sense and how the graph structure of interactions can modify and enrich the picture of long term behavioral patterns emerging in evolutionary games.Comment: Review, final version, 133 pages, 65 figure
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