Leak localization in water distribution networks using pressure and data-driven classifier approach

Leaks in water distribution networks (WDNs) are one of the main reasons for water loss during fluid transportation. Considering the worldwide problem of water scarcity, added to the challenges that a growing population brings, minimizing water losses through leak detection and localization, timely and efficiently using advanced techniques is an urgent humanitarian need. There are numerous methods being used to localize water leaks in WDNs through constructing hydraulic models or analyzing flow/pressure deviations between the observed data and the estimated values. However, from the application perspective, it is very practical to implement an approach which does not rely too much on measurements and complex models with reasonable computation demand. Under this context, this paper presents a novel method for leak localization which uses a data-driven approach based on limit pressure measurements in WDNs with two stages included: (1) Two different machine learning classifiers based on linear discriminant analysis (LDA) and neural networks (NNET) are developed to determine the probabilities of each node having a leak inside a WDN; (2) Bayesian temporal reasoning is applied afterwards to rescale the probabilities of each possible leak location at each time step after a leak is detected, with the aim of improving the localization accuracy. As an initial illustration, the hypothetical benchmark Hanoi district metered area (DMA) is used as the case study to test the performance of the proposed approach. Using the fitting accuracy and average topological distance (ATD) as performance indicators, the preliminary results reaches more than 80% accuracy in the best cases.Peer ReviewedPostprint (published version

Evolving Dendritic Morphologies Highlight the Impact of Structured Synaptic Inputs on Neuronal Performance

Acknowledgements I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Dr. Rene te Boekhorst for his valued support and guidance extended to me.Postprin

Coevolutionary games - a mini review

Prevalence of cooperation within groups of selfish individuals is puzzling in that it contradicts with the basic premise of natural selection. Favoring players with higher fitness, the latter is key for understanding the challenges faced by cooperators when competing with defectors. Evolutionary game theory provides a competent theoretical framework for addressing the subtleties of cooperation in such situations, which are known as social dilemmas. Recent advances point towards the fact that the evolution of strategies alone may be insufficient to fully exploit the benefits offered by cooperative behavior. Indeed, while spatial structure and heterogeneity, for example, have been recognized as potent promoters of cooperation, coevolutionary rules can extend the potentials of such entities further, and even more importantly, lead to the understanding of their emergence. The introduction of coevolutionary rules to evolutionary games implies, that besides the evolution of strategies, another property may simultaneously be subject to evolution as well. Coevolutionary rules may affect the interaction network, the reproduction capability of players, their reputation, mobility or age. Here we review recent works on evolutionary games incorporating coevolutionary rules, as well as give a didactic description of potential pitfalls and misconceptions associated with the subject. In addition, we briefly outline directions for future research that we feel are promising, thereby particularly focusing on dynamical effects of coevolutionary rules on the evolution of cooperation, which are still widely open to research and thus hold promise of exciting new discoveries.Comment: 24 two-column pages, 10 figures; accepted for publication in BioSystem

Evolutionary games on graphs

Game theory is one of the key paradigms behind many scientific disciplines from biology to behavioral sciences to economics. In its evolutionary form and especially when the interacting agents are linked in a specific social network the underlying solution concepts and methods are very similar to those applied in non-equilibrium statistical physics. This review gives a tutorial-type overview of the field for physicists. The first three sections introduce the necessary background in classical and evolutionary game theory from the basic definitions to the most important results. The fourth section surveys the topological complications implied by non-mean-field-type social network structures in general. The last three sections discuss in detail the dynamic behavior of three prominent classes of models: the Prisoner's Dilemma, the Rock-Scissors-Paper game, and Competing Associations. The major theme of the review is in what sense and how the graph structure of interactions can modify and enrich the picture of long term behavioral patterns emerging in evolutionary games.Comment: Review, final version, 133 pages, 65 figure