Garcia v. Google, Inc.: The Ninth Circuit’s Refusal to Extend Copyright Protection to an Actor’s Performance, Reinforcing the Letter of Copyright Law

Copyright protection is rooted in the Intellectual Property Clause of the United States Constitution, which sets boundaries for the subject matter that can be protected by federal copyright law. The Ninth Circuit’s 2014 decision in Garcia v. Google, Inc., marked the first time a court ruled that an individual actor with a minor role in a film has a copyright interest in her own performance. In Garcia v. Google, Inc., the Ninth Circuit originally held that the actor likely had a copyright interest in the film because she was “duped into providing an artistic performance that was used in a way she never could have foreseen.” The court reasoned that Garcia established she was likely to succeed on her copyright claim due to the serious threats against her life, and the balance of the equities and public interest that were in her favor. The Ninth Circuit applied the standard for a mandatory preliminary injunction and found that Garcia, as an actor, had a copyright interest in the film because she evinced a minimal degree of creativity in her performance. The court should have only ruled that the district court abused its discretion by failing to grant Garcia’s copyright interest, if the facts and law clearly favored issuing a preliminary injunction. The court assumed Garcia was an author and created its own law to provide her — as an actor — a copyright interest in a film. Nothing about Garcia’s performance or what she demonstrated provide that the facts and the law “clearly favor her claim of a copyrightable interest” in her acting performance. The court demanded YouTube remove the film, a request that was subjected to the incorrect degree of scrutiny. The court should have applied a higher degree of scrutiny and reversed the district court’s decision only if the decision was illogical or implausible. Garcia did not clearly satisfy the requirements to claim copyright infringement, thus the district court’s decision was not illogical or implausible, and the district court did not abuse its discretion. Part I of this Note presents a background of the factual history of the case and the relevant history of copyright law. Part II focuses on the procedural history of Garcia v. Google, Inc., focusing on the Ninth Circuit’s misapplication of copyright law and the en banc court’s restoration of copyright law’s intention. Part III presents possible remedies that Garcia may have had outside of an action asserted under copyright law. The Note concludes by emphasizing that the expansion of technology could have substantial implications for copyright interests, and that such expansion may force the United States to adopt more specific laws going forward

The dilemma of the iberian proto-humanist: hermeneutic translation as presage of necromantic imitation

In the late Middle Ages, and on into the Renaissance, translation from Latin into the modern languages was often fostered in the schools and universities as a prelude or accessory to the cultivation of the art of imiieiio.' Such imitations, of course, were originally meant to be carried out in Latin, and were intended to refine the Latin style of the student (Quintero 100). With the rise of Humanism, however, it was increasingly recognized that the imitation of prestigious models in vernacular texts would also serve to elevate the status of the modern languages, and imbue them and their literary traditions with an authority nearly equivalent to that enjoyed by the Classical tradition itself. The high esteem accruing to this type of imitation was further authorized by the similar importance known to have been accorded the concept of translatío sfudií in Latin culture with respect to the Gree

Garcia v. Google, Inc.: The Ninth Circuit’s Refusal to Extend Copyright Protection to an Actor’s Performance, Reinforcing the Letter of Copyright Law

Copyright protection is rooted in the Intellectual Property Clause of the United States Constitution, which sets boundaries for the subject matter that can be protected by federal copyright law. The Ninth Circuit’s 2014 decision in Garcia v. Google, Inc., marked the first time a court ruled that an individual actor with a minor role in a film has a copyright interest in her own performance. In Garcia v. Google, Inc., the Ninth Circuit originally held that the actor likely had a copyright interest in the film because she was “duped into providing an artistic performance that was used in a way she never could have foreseen.” The court reasoned that Garcia established she was likely to succeed on her copyright claim due to the serious threats against her life, and the balance of the equities and public interest that were in her favor. The Ninth Circuit applied the standard for a mandatory preliminary injunction and found that Garcia, as an actor, had a copyright interest in the film because she evinced a minimal degree of creativity in her performance. The court should have only ruled that the district court abused its discretion by failing to grant Garcia’s copyright interest, if the facts and law clearly favored issuing a preliminary injunction. The court assumed Garcia was an author and created its own law to provide her — as an actor — a copyright interest in a film. Nothing about Garcia’s performance or what she demonstrated provide that the facts and the law “clearly favor her claim of a copyrightable interest” in her acting performance. The court demanded YouTube remove the film, a request that was subjected to the incorrect degree of scrutiny. The court should have applied a higher degree of scrutiny and reversed the district court’s decision only if the decision was illogical or implausible. Garcia did not clearly satisfy the requirements to claim copyright infringement, thus the district court’s decision was not illogical or implausible, and the district court did not abuse its discretion. Part I of this Note presents a background of the factual history of the case and the relevant history of copyright law. Part II focuses on the procedural history of Garcia v. Google, Inc., focusing on the Ninth Circuit’s misapplication of copyright law and the en banc court’s restoration of copyright law’s intention. Part III presents possible remedies that Garcia may have had outside of an action asserted under copyright law. The Note concludes by emphasizing that the expansion of technology could have substantial implications for copyright interests, and that such expansion may force the United States to adopt more specific laws going forward

Post-Franco Theatre

In the multiple realms and layers that comprise the contemporary Spanish theatrical landscape, “crisis” would seem to be the word that most often lingers in the air, as though it were a common mantra, ready to roll off the tongue of so many theatre professionals with such enormous ease, and even enthusiasm, that one is prompted to wonder whether it might indeed be a miracle that the contemporary technological revolution – coupled with perpetual quandaries concerning public and private funding for the arts – had not by now brought an end to the evolution of the oldest of live arts, or, at the very least, an end to drama as we know it