The cerebellum and motor dysfunction in neuropsychiatric disorders

The cerebellum is densely interconnected with sensory-motor areas of the cerebral cortex, and in man, the great expansion of the association areas of cerebral cortex is also paralleled by an expansion of the lateral cerebellar hemispheres. It is therefore likely that these circuits contribute to non-motor cognitive functions, but this is still a controversial issue. One approach is to examine evidence from neuropsychiatric disorders of cerebellar involvement. In this review, we narrow this search to test whether there is evidence of motor dysfunction associated with neuropsychiatric disorders consistent with disruption of cerebellar motor function. While we do find such evidence, especially in autism, schizophrenia and dyslexia, we caution that the restricted set of motor symptoms does not suggest global cerebellar dysfunction. Moreover, these symptoms may also reflect involvement of other, extra-cerebellar circuits and detailed examination of specific sub groups of individuals within each disorder may help to relate such motor symptoms to cerebellar morphology

Enactivism, other minds, and mental disorders

Although enactive approaches to cognition vary in terms of their character and scope, all endorse several core claims. The first is that cognition is tied to action. The second is that cognition is composed of more than just in-the-head processes; cognitive activities are externalized via features of our embodiment and in our ecological dealings with the people and things around us. I appeal to these two enactive claims to consider a view called “direct social perception” : the idea that we can sometimes perceive features of other minds directly in the character of their embodiment and environmental interactions. I argue that if DSP is true, we can probably also perceive certain features of mental disorders as well. I draw upon the developmental psychologist Daniel Stern’s notion of “forms of vitality”—largely overlooked in these debates—to develop this idea, and I use autism as a case study. I argue further that an enactive approach to DSP can clarify some ways we play a regulative role in shaping the temporal and phenomenal character of the disorder in question, and it may therefore have practical significance for both the clinical and therapeutic encounter

Magnetoencephalography as a tool in psychiatric research: current status and perspective

The application of neuroimaging to provide mechanistic insights into circuit dysfunctions in major psychiatric conditions and the development of biomarkers are core challenges in current psychiatric research. In this review, we propose that recent technological and analytic advances in Magnetoencephalography (MEG), a technique which allows the measurement of neuronal events directly and non-invasively with millisecond resolution, provides novel opportunities to address these fundamental questions. Because of its potential in delineating normal and abnormal brain dynamics, we propose that MEG provides a crucial tool to advance our understanding of pathophysiological mechanisms of major neuropsychiatric conditions, such as Schizophrenia, Autism Spectrum Disorders, and the dementias. In our paper, we summarize the mechanisms underlying the generation of MEG signals and the tools available to reconstruct generators and underlying networks using advanced source-reconstruction techniques. We then survey recent studies that have utilized MEG to examine aberrant rhythmic activity in neuropsychiatric disorders. This is followed by links with preclinical research, which have highlighted possible neurobiological mechanisms, such as disturbances in excitation/inhibition parameters, which could account for measured changes in neural oscillations. In the final section of the paper, challenges as well as novel methodological developments are discussed which could pave the way for a widespread application of MEG in translational research with the aim of developing biomarkers for early detection and diagnosis

Disturbances in the spontaneous attribution of social meaning in schizophrenia

Background. Schizophrenia patients show disturbances on a range of tasks that assess mentalizing or 'Theory of Mind' (ToM). However, these tasks are often developmentally inappropriate, make large demands on verbal abilities and explicit problem-solving skills, and involve after-the-fact reflection as opposed to spontaneous mentalizing. Method. To address these limitations, 55 clinically stable schizophrenia out-patients and 44 healthy controls completed a validated Animations Task designed to assess spontaneous attributions of social meaning to ambiguous abstract visual stimuli. In this paradigm, 12 animations depict two geometric shapes' interacting' with each other in three conditions: (1) ToM interactions that elicit attributions of mental states to the agents, (2) Goal-Directed (GO) interactions that elicit attributions of simple actions, and (3) Random scenes in which no interaction occurs. Verbal descriptions of each animation are rated for the degree of Intentionality attributed to the agents and for accuracy. Results. Patients had lower Intentionality ratings than controls for ToM and GO scenes but the groups did not significantly differ for Random scenes. The descriptions of the patients less closely matched the situations intended by the developers of the task. Within the schizophrenia group, performance on the Animations Task showed minimal associations with clinical symptoms. Conclusions. Patients demonstrated disturbances in the spontaneous attribution of mental states to abstract visual stimuli that normally evoke such attributions. Hence, in addition to previously established impairment on mentalizing tasks that require logical inferences about others' mental states, individuals with schizophrenia show disturbances in implicit aspects of mentalizing

Neurobiology of dyslexia : A reinterpretation of the data

Theories of developmental dyslexia differ on how to best interpret the great variety of symptoms (linguistic, sensory, motor) observed in dyslexic individuals. One approach views dyslexia as a specific phonological deficit, which sometimes co-occurs with a more general sensorimotor syndrome. The present review of the neurobiology of dyslexia shows that neurobiological data are indeed consistent with this view, explaining both how a specific phonological deficit might arise, and why a sensorimotor syndrome should be significantly associated with it. This new conceptualisation of the aetiology of dyslexia may generalise to other neuro-developmental disorders, and may further explain heterogeneity within each disorder and co-morbidity between disorders

From early markers to neuro-developmental mechanisms of autism

A fast growing field, the study of infants at risk because of having an older sibling with autism (i.e. infant sibs) aims to identify the earliest signs of this disorder, which would allow for earlier diagnosis and intervention. More importantly, we argue, these studies offer the opportunity to validate existing neuro-developmental models of autism against experimental evidence. Although autism is mainly seen as a disorder of social interaction and communication, emerging early markers do not exclusively reflect impairments of the “social brain”. Evidence for atypical development of sensory and attentional systems highlight the need to move away from localized deficits to models suggesting brain-wide involvement in autism pathology. We discuss the implications infant sibs findings have for future work into the biology of autism and the development of interventions

Imitation, mirror neurons and autism

Various deficits in the cognitive functioning of people with autism have been documented in recent years but these provide only partial explanations for the condition. We focus instead on an imitative disturbance involving difficulties both in copying actions and in inhibiting more stereotyped mimicking, such as echolalia. A candidate for the neural basis of this disturbance may be found in a recently discovered class of neurons in frontal cortex, 'mirror neurons' (MNs). These neurons show activity in relation both to specific actions performed by self and matching actions performed by others, providing a potential bridge between minds. MN systems exist in primates without imitative and ‘theory of mind’ abilities and we suggest that in order for them to have become utilized to perform social cognitive functions, sophisticated cortical neuronal systems have evolved in which MNs function as key elements. Early developmental failures of MN systems are likely to result in a consequent cascade of developmental impairments characterised by the clinical syndrome of autism