'Obsessed with goals': functions and mechanisms of teleological interpretation of actions in humans

Humans show a strong and early inclination to interpret observed behaviours of others as goal-directed actions. We identify two main epistemic functions that this ‘teleological obsession’ serves: on-line prediction and social learning. We show how teleological action interpretations can serve these functions by drawing on two kinds of inference (‘action-to-goal’ or ‘goal-to-action’), and argue that both types of teleological inference constitute inverse problems that can only be solved by further assumptions. We pinpoint the assumptions that the three currently proposed mechanisms of goal attribution (action-effect associations, simulation procedures, and teleological reasoning) imply, and contrast them with the functions they are supposed to fulfil. We argue that while action-effect associations and simulation procedures are generally well suited to serve on-line action monitoring and prediction, social learning of new means actions and artefact functions requires the inferential productivity of teleological reasoning

Oscillatory activity in the infant brain reflects object maintenance

The apparent failure of infants to understand "object permanence" by reaching for hidden objects is perhaps the most striking and debated phenomenon in cognitive development. Of particular interest is the extent to which infants perceive and remember objects in a similar way to that of adults. Here we report two findings that clarify infant object processing. The first is that 6-mo-old infants are sensitive to visual cues to occlusion, particularly gradual deletion. The second finding is that oscillatory electroencephalogram activity recorded over right temporal channels is involved in object maintenance. This effect occurs only after disappearance in a manner consistent with occlusion and the object's continued existence

The development and neural basis of referential gaze perception

Infants are sensitive to the referential information conveyed by others’ eye gaze, which could be one of the developmental foundations of theory of mind. To investigate the neural correlates of gaze–object relations, we recorded ERPs from adults and 9-month-old infants while they watched scenes containing gaze shifts either towards or away from the location of a preceding object. In adults, object-incongruent gaze shifts elicited enhanced ERP amplitudes over the occipito-temporal area (N330). In infants, a similar posterior ERP component (N290) was greater for object-incongruent gaze shifts, which suggests that by the age of 9 months infants encode referential information of gaze in a similar way to adults. In addition, in infants we observed an early frontal ERP component (anterior N200), which showed higher amplitude in response to the perception of object-congruent gaze shifts. This component may reflect fast-track processing of socially relevant information, such as the detection of communicative or informative situations, and could form a developmental foundation for attention sharing, social learning and theory of mind

Do 18-month-olds really attribute mental states to others? A critical test

In the research reported here, we investigated whether 18-month-olds would use their own past experience of visual access to attribute perception and consequent beliefs to other people. Infants in this study wore either opaque blindfolds (opaque condition) or trick blindfolds that looked opaque but were actually transparent (trick condition). Then both groups of infants observed an actor wearing one of the same blindfolds that they themselves had experienced, while a puppet removed an object from its location. Anticipatory eye movements revealed that infants who had experienced opaque blindfolds expected the actor to behave in accordance with a false belief about the object's location, but that infants who had experienced trick blindfolds did not exhibit that expectation. Our results suggest that 18-month-olds used self-experience with the blindfolds to assess the actor's visual access and to update her belief state accordingly. These data constitute compelling evidence that 18-month-olds infer perceptual access and appreciate its causal role in altering the epistemic states of other people

Action anticipation through attribution of false belief by 2 year olds

Two-year-olds engage in many behaviors that ostensibly require the attribution of mental states to other individuals. Yet the overwhelming consensus has been that children of this age are unable to attribute false beliefs. In the current study, we used an eyetracker to record infants' looking behavior while they watched actions on a computer monitor. Our data demonstrate that 25-month-old infants correctly anticipate an actor's actions when these actions can be predicted only by attributing a false belief to the actor

Infants learn enduring functions of novel tools from action demonstrations

According to recent theoretical proposals, one function of infant goal attribution is to support early social learning of artifact functions from instrumental actions, and one function of infant sensitivity to communication is to support early acquisition of generic knowledge about enduring, kind-relevant properties of the referents. The current study tested two hypotheses, derived from these proposals, about the conditions that facilitate the acquisition of enduring functions for novel tools during human infancy. Using a violation-of-expectation paradigm, we show that 13.5-month-old infants encode arbitrary end states of action sequences in relation to the novel tools employed to bring them about. These mappings are not formed if the same end states of action sequences cannot be interpreted as action goals. Moreover, the tool–goal mappings acquired from infant-directed communicative demonstrations are more resilient to counterevidence than those acquired from non-infant-directed presentations and, thus, show similarities to generic representations rather than episodic ones. These findings suggest that the acquisition of tool functions during infancy is guided by both teleological action interpretation mechanisms and the expectation that communicative demonstrations reveal enduring dispositional properties of tools

Toddlers favor communicatively presented information over statistical reliability in learning about artifacts

Observed associations between events can be validated by statistical information of reliability or by testament of communicative sources. We tested whether toddlers learn from their own observation of efficiency, assessed by statistical information on reliability of interventions, or from communicatively presented demonstration, when these two potential types of evidence of validity of interventions on a novel artifact are contrasted with each other. Eighteen-month-old infants observed two adults, one operating the artifact by a method that was more efficient (2/3 probability of success) than that of the other (1/3 probability of success). Compared to the Baseline condition, in which communicative signals were not employed, infants tended to choose the less reliable method to operate the artifact when this method was demonstrated in a communicative manner in the Experimental condition. This finding demonstrates that, in certain circumstances, communicative sanctioning of reliability may override statistical evidence for young learners. Such a bias can serve fast and efficient transmission of knowledge between generations

Beyond rational imitation: learning arbitrary means actions from communicative demonstrations

The principle of rationality has been invoked to explain that infants expect agents to perform the most efficient means action to attain a goal. It has also been demonstrated that infants take into account the efficiency of observed actions to achieve a goal outcome when deciding whether to reenact a specific behavior or not. It is puzzling, however, that they also tend to imitate an apparently suboptimal unfamiliar action even when they can bring about the same outcome more efficiently by applying a more rational action alternative available to them. We propose that this apparently paradoxical behavior is explained by infants’ interpretation of action demonstrations as communicative manifestations of novel and culturally relevant means actions to be acquired, and we present empirical evidence supporting this proposal. In Experiment 1, we found that 14-month-olds reenacted novel arbitrary means actions only following a communicative demonstration. Experiment 2 showed that infants’ inclination to reproduce communicatively manifested novel actions is restricted to behaviors they can construe as goal-directed instrumental acts. The study also provides evidence that infants’ reenactment of the demonstrated novel actions reflects epistemic motives rather than purely social motives. We argue that ostensive communication enables infants to represent the teleological structure of novel actions even when the causal relations between means and end are cognitively opaque and apparently violate the efficiency expectation derived from the principle of rationality. This new account of imitative learning of novel means shows how the teleological stance and natural pedagogy—two separate cognitive adaptations to interpret instrumental versus communicative actions—are integrated as a system for learning socially constituted instrumental knowledge in humans

Absolute protein quantification using fluorescence measurements with FPCountR

This paper presents a generalisable method for the calibration of fluorescence readings on microplate readers, in order to convert arbitrary fluorescence units into absolute units. FPCountR relies on the generation of bespoke fluorescent protein (FP) calibrants, assays to determine protein concentration and activity, and a corresponding analytical workflow. We systematically characterise the assay protocols for accuracy, sensitivity and simplicity, and describe an ‘ECmax’ assay that outperforms the others and even enables accurate calibration without requiring the purification of FPs. To obtain cellular protein concentrations, we consider methods for the conversion of optical density to either cell counts or alternatively to cell volumes, as well as examining how cells can interfere with protein counting via fluorescence quenching, which we quantify and correct for the first time. Calibration across different instruments, disparate filter sets and mismatched gains is demonstrated to yield equivalent results. It also reveals that mCherry absorption at 600 nm does not confound cell density measurements unless expressed to over 100,000 proteins per cell. FPCountR is presented as pair of open access tools (protocol and R package) to enable the community to use this method, and ultimately to facilitate the quantitative characterisation of synthetic microbial circuits

Ostensive signals support learning from novel attention cues during infancy

Social attention cues (e.g., head turning, gaze direction) highlight which events young infants should attend to in a busy environment and, recently, have been shown to shape infants' likelihood of learning about objects and events. Although studies have documented which social cues guide attention and learning during early infancy, few have investigated how infants learn to learn from attention cues. Ostensive signals, such as a face addressing the infant, often precede social attention cues. Therefore, it is possible that infants can use ostensive signals to learn from other novel attention cues. In this training study, 8-month-olds were cued to the location of an event by a novel non-social attention cue (i.e., flashing square) that was preceded by an ostensive signal (i.e., a face addressing the infant). At test, infants predicted the appearance of specific multimodal events cued by the flashing squares, which were previously shown to guide attention to but not inform specific predictions about the multimodal events (Wu and Kirkham, 2010). Importantly, during the generalization phase, the attention cue continued to guide learning of these events in the absence of the ostensive signal. Subsequent experiments showed that learning was less successful when the ostensive signal was absent even if an interesting but non-ostensive social stimulus preceded the same cued events