Computing large market equilibria using abstractions

Computing market equilibria is an important practical problem for market design (e.g. fair division, item allocation). However, computing equilibria requires large amounts of information (e.g. all valuations for all buyers for all items) and compute power. We consider ameliorating these issues by applying a method used for solving complex games: constructing a coarsened abstraction of a given market, solving for the equilibrium in the abstraction, and lifting the prices and allocations back to the original market. We show how to bound important quantities such as regret, envy, Nash social welfare, Pareto optimality, and maximin share when the abstracted prices and allocations are used in place of the real equilibrium. We then study two abstraction methods of interest for practitioners: 1) filling in unknown valuations using techniques from matrix completion, 2) reducing the problem size by aggregating groups of buyers/items into smaller numbers of representative buyers/items and solving for equilibrium in this coarsened market. We find that in real data allocations/prices that are relatively close to equilibria can be computed from even very coarse abstractions

Knowledge, learning, networks and performance of firms in knowledge-based economies

The paper examines the issue of knowledge as a public good, and, therefore, the question of open knowledge. Moreover, it analyses the crucial relationship between knowledge and learning and, more specifically, the relationship between technological knowledge, learning and the environment. Thus the construct of absorptive capacity is investigated and the related dynamic capability approach is also considered. Finally, the paper looks at the networks and investigate the rationale of networking. Therefore, in this context, the paper discusses the issue of competition/collaboration duality, since alliance is also a complex phenomenon, where collaborative behaviours and competitive relations coexist; a more eclectic view is, thus, offered on this issue with the aim to provide a new theoretical framework of inter-firm relations.Firms; Knowledge; Learning; Networks

Evolutionary games on graphs

Game theory is one of the key paradigms behind many scientific disciplines from biology to behavioral sciences to economics. In its evolutionary form and especially when the interacting agents are linked in a specific social network the underlying solution concepts and methods are very similar to those applied in non-equilibrium statistical physics. This review gives a tutorial-type overview of the field for physicists. The first three sections introduce the necessary background in classical and evolutionary game theory from the basic definitions to the most important results. The fourth section surveys the topological complications implied by non-mean-field-type social network structures in general. The last three sections discuss in detail the dynamic behavior of three prominent classes of models: the Prisoner's Dilemma, the Rock-Scissors-Paper game, and Competing Associations. The major theme of the review is in what sense and how the graph structure of interactions can modify and enrich the picture of long term behavioral patterns emerging in evolutionary games.Comment: Review, final version, 133 pages, 65 figure

Selection theorem for systems with inheritance

The problem of finite-dimensional asymptotics of infinite-dimensional dynamic systems is studied. A non-linear kinetic system with conservation of supports for distributions has generically finite-dimensional asymptotics. Such systems are apparent in many areas of biology, physics (the theory of parametric wave interaction), chemistry and economics. This conservation of support has a biological interpretation: inheritance. The finite-dimensional asymptotics demonstrates effects of "natural" selection. Estimations of the asymptotic dimension are presented. After some initial time, solution of a kinetic equation with conservation of support becomes a finite set of narrow peaks that become increasingly narrow over time and move increasingly slowly. It is possible that these peaks do not tend to fixed positions, and the path covered tends to infinity as t goes to infinity. The drift equations for peak motion are obtained. Various types of distribution stability are studied: internal stability (stability with respect to perturbations that do not extend the support), external stability or uninvadability (stability with respect to strongly small perturbations that extend the support), and stable realizability (stability with respect to small shifts and extensions of the density peaks). Models of self-synchronization of cell division are studied, as an example of selection in systems with additional symmetry. Appropriate construction of the notion of typicalness in infinite-dimensional space is discussed, and the notion of "completely thin" sets is introduced. Key words: Dynamics; Attractor; Evolution; Entropy; Natural selectionComment: 46 pages, the final journal versio

Group-Oriented Values, Rules and Cooperation

collectivism, cooperation, economic development, game theory, individualism, institutions, conflicts