MULTI-ISSUE BARGAINING UNDER BUDGET-CONSTRAINTS

We analyze a multi-issue bargaining model where the joint production of public goods is budget-constrained. The players must decide the part of the budget that is dedicated to produce any public good. We model the decision process as an alternating offer bargaining game with random proposers. The utilities of the players are assumed separable in any public issue. We show that multiple sophisticated outcomes are (generically) attained when a complete agreement is required for a subset of public projects to be implemented, either if the players bargain globally over the sizes of different public goods or sequentially through partial agreements. However, when public projects are immediately implemented after partial agreements, then uniqueness (which is a necessary condition for efficiency) is generically achieved.Multilateral bargaining, Sophisticated equilibrium, Issue-by-issue bargaining

Firms' operational costs, market entry and growth

The industrial organizational literature identifies operational costs as being an important determinant of industry evolution over time; however, it also shows that they can be endogenous and time-dependent. In this paper, we analyze the effects of endogenous and time-dependent operational costs on economic activity and, hence, on economic growth. We show that the particular nature of these costs determines the way in which the overall number of firms grows, which ultimately determines the pattern of economic growth. Our analysis differs from other approaches in that (i) a new firm is associated with the creation of a new product in such a way that a planned expenditure of resources is required (e.g. R&D), and (ii) an accumulation law for the growth of the number of firms is assumed. Hence, we show that growth can occur endogenously in an economy without any specific growth generating sector

Adherence to treatment in allergic rhinitis using mobile technology. The MASK Study

Background: Mobile technology may help to better understand the adherence to treatment. MASK-rhinitis (Mobile Airways Sentinel NetworK for allergic rhinitis) is a patient-centred ICT system. A mobile phone app (the Allergy Diary) central to MASK is available in 22 countries. Objectives: To assess the adherence to treatment in allergic rhinitis patients using the Allergy Diary App. Methods: An observational cross-sectional study was carried out on all users who filled in the Allergy Diary from 1 January 2016 to 1 August 2017. Secondary adherence was assessed by using the modified Medication Possession Ratio (MPR) and the Proportion of days covered (PDC) approach. Results: A total of 12143 users were registered. A total of 6949 users reported at least one VAS data recording. Among them, 1887 users reported >= 7 VAS data. About 1195 subjects were included in the analysis of adherence. One hundred and thirty-six (11.28%) users were adherent (MPR >= 70% and PDC = 70% and PDC = 1.50) and 176 (14.60%) were switchers. On the other hand, 832 (69.05%) users were non-adherent to medications (MPR Conclusion and clinical relevance: Adherence to treatment is low. The relative efficacy of continuous vs on-demand treatment for allergic rhinitis symptoms is still a matter of debate. This study shows an approach for measuring retrospective adherence based on a mobile app. This also represents a novel approach for analysing medication-taking behaviour in a real-world setting.Peer reviewe

Allergic Rhinitis and its Impact on Asthma (ARIA) Phase 4 (2018) : Change management in allergic rhinitis and asthma multimorbidity using mobile technology

Allergic Rhinitis and its Impact on Asthma (ARIA) has evolved from a guideline by using the best approach to integrated care pathways using mobile technology in patients with allergic rhinitis (AR) and asthma multimorbidity. The proposed next phase of ARIA is change management, with the aim of providing an active and healthy life to patients with rhinitis and to those with asthma multimorbidity across the lifecycle irrespective of their sex or socioeconomic status to reduce health and social inequities incurred by the disease. ARIA has followed the 8-step model of Kotter to assess and implement the effect of rhinitis on asthma multimorbidity and to propose multimorbid guidelines. A second change management strategy is proposed by ARIA Phase 4 to increase self-medication and shared decision making in rhinitis and asthma multimorbidity. An innovation of ARIA has been the development and validation of information technology evidence-based tools (Mobile Airways Sentinel Network [MASK]) that can inform patient decisions on the basis of a self-care plan proposed by the health care professional.Peer reviewe

Union power, minimum wage legislation endogenous labor supplies and production

The objective of this work is to study the impact of the unions' bargaining power on production and wages. We present a model where a competitive final good is produced through two substitutable intermediate goods, one produced by unskilled labor and the other by skilled labor. Potential workers decide at their cost to become skilled or unskilled and, thus, labor supplies are determined endogenously. We find that the reallocation of the labor supplies due to changes in the unskilled (or skilled) unions¿ bargaining power may have a positive impact on the final goods production. At the same time, total labor earnings increase with the unskilled unions¿ bargaining power if the final goods production increases too. We also show that the minimum wage legislation has efects similar to an increase in the bargaining power of the unskilled unions.L'objectiu d'aquest treball és estudiar l'impacte del poder negociador de les unions sobre la producció i salaris. Presentem un model on un final competitiu és produït per dos béns intermedis substituible, un produït pel treball inexpert(no qualificat) i altre pel treball expert

The Unemployment Benefit System: a Redistributive or an Insurance Institution?

[eng] In this paper we analyze how the composition of labor taxation affects unemployment in a unionized economy with capital accumulation and an unemployment benefit system. We show that if the unemployment benefit system is gross Bismarckian then the unemployment rate is reduced if wage taxes are decreased (and thus payroll taxes are increased). However, if the unemployment benefit system is net Bismarckian then the unemployment rate does not depend on how the system is financed. Besides, in a Beveridgean system the labor tax composition does not affect the unemployment rate if and only if the unemployed do not pay taxes and the employed pay a constant marginal tax rate. We also analyze when an unemployment benefit budget-balanced rule makes the economy to have a hysteresis process

Cost-Based Models of Economic Growth

In this paper we highlight the importance of the operational costs in explaining economic growth and analyze how the industrial structure affects the growth rate of the economy. If there is monopolistic competition only in an intermediate goods sector, then production growth coincides with consumption growth. Moreover, the pattern of growth depends on the particular form of the operational cost. If the monopolistically competitive sector is the final goods sector, then per capita production is constant but per capita effective consumption or welfare grows. Finally, we modify again the industrial structure of the economy and show an economy with two different growth speeds, one for production and another for effective consumption. Thus, both the operational cost and the particular structure of the sector that produces the final goods determines ultimately the pattern of growth.- En aquest article, es fa èmfasi en la importància dels costos operacionals en explicar el creixement econòmic i s'analitza com l¿estructura industrial afecta la taxa de creixement de l'economia. Si només hi ha competència monopolística en sectors de béns intermedis, aleshores el creixement de la producció coincideix amb el creixement del consum. A més, l'esquema de creixement, endogen o semi-endogen, depèn de la forma particular del cost operacional. Si el sector on es produeix la competència monopolística és la de béns finals, aleshores la producció per càpita és constant però el consum per càpita efectiu o benestar creix. Finalment, si es modifica un altre cop l'estructura industrial de l'economia, es té una economia amb dos velocitats de creixement diferents, una per la producció i l'altre pel consum efectiu. Es conclou doncs que tant els costos operacionals com l'estructura particular del sector que produeix els béns finals determinen en últim terme l'esquema de creixement

Multi-issue bargaining under budget-constraints

We analyze a multi-issue bargaining model where the joint production of public goods is budget-constrained. The players must decide the part of the budget that is dedicated to produce any public good. We model the decision process as an alternating offer bargaining game with random proposers. The utilities of the players are assumed separable in any public issue. We show that multiple sophisticated outcomes are (generically) attained when a complete agreement is required for a subset of public projects to be implemented, either if the players bargain globally over the sizes of different public goods or sequentially through partial agreements. However, when public projects are immediately implemented after partial agreements, then uniqueness (which is a necessary condition for efficiency) is generically achieved

Bargaining and Strategic Demand Commitment

Demands, Multilateral bargaining, Quota games, Strategic demand commitment,