Geophysical Observations of Taliks Below Drained Lake Basins on the Arctic Coastal Plain of Alaska

Lakes and drained lake basins (DLBs) together cover up to ∼80% of the western Arctic Coastal Plain of Alaska. The formation and drainage of lakes in this continuous permafrost region drive spatial and temporal landscape dynamics. Postdrainage processes including vegetation succession and permafrost aggradation have implications for hydrology, carbon cycling, and landscape evolution. Here, we used surface nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR) and transient electromagnetic (TEM) measurements in conjunction with thermal modeling to investigate permafrost aggradation beneath eight DLBs on the western Arctic Coastal Plain of Alaska. We also surveyed two primary surface sites that served as nonlake affected control sites. Approximate timing of lake drainage was estimated based on historical aerial imagery. We interpreted the presence of taliks based on either unfrozen water estimated with surface NMR and/or TEM resistivities in DLBs compared to measurements on primary surface sites and borehole resistivity logs. Our results show evidence of taliks below several DLBs that drained before and after 1949 (oldest imagery). We observed depths to the top of taliks between 9 and 45 m. Thermal modeling and geophysical observations agree about the presence and extent of taliks at sites that drained after 1949. Lake drainage events will likely become more frequent in the future due to climate change and our modeling results suggest that warmer and wetter conditions will limit permafrost aggradation in DLBs. Our observations provide useful information to predict future evolution of permafrost in DLBs and its implications for the water and carbon cycles in the Arctic

Embedding workplace collaboration: good faith bargaining

This paper argues that Australia needs greater clarity on how good faith bargaining should be approached and that we need an Australian model of good faith bargaining that meets our current needs and imperatives. It is the second in the series of BCA discussion papers on how to improve workplace collaboration under the new Fair Work Act. The paper comprises a paper written by Professor Breen Creighton together with an executive summary by the BCA

Protected Industrial Action Ballots: An Empirical Overview

Workplace relations in Australia, including requirements relating to the use of industrial action in the context of enterprise bargaining, are governed by the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (FW Act). Legally protected industrial action by employees and their bargaining representatives can lawfully be taken only in the context of, and is conditional upon, approval through a secret ballot of the employees to whom the proposed agreement is to apply. Conducting such a ballot is itself conditional upon first obtaining a protected action ballot order (PABO) from the Fair Work Commission (FWC). Whilst there is a relatively large body of published industrial relations research exploring both the frequency, and the impact, of strike action, there is significantly less published material on the regulation of decisions relating to industrial action by workers and their trade unions. This paper provides a preliminary report on a research project which is intended to help fill this gap in the literature. Drawing on data resulting from an analysis of every PABO application made to the FWC during the reference period, the article describes the PABO process in practice. This, in turn, facilitates understanding of the regulatory contribution made by the provisions and raises significant questions over whether the administrative burden is justified by the outcomes achieved

Pre-strike ballots and enterprise bargaining dynamics: An empirical analysis

Under the model of enterprise bargaining enshrined in the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), the primary mechanism for employees to exercise industrial power during negotiations in respect of future wages and conditions is protected industrial action. Access to protected industrial action is contingent upon the employees and their bargaining representatives having complied with a series of statutory prerequisites. The most significant of these is the requirement to hold a pre-strike ballot of the relevant employees to authorise the proposed action. Without approval in a ballot, any industrial action undertaken will be unprotected, leaving the union open to liability under common law and statute, and its members potentially subject to dismissal from employment. This article explores the effect of pre-strike ballots on union decision-making and enterprise bargaining. Drawing on statistical analysis of a cross section of protected industrial action ballot applications made to the Fair Work Commission over a period of 12 months, and grounded theory analysis of interviews with ballot applicants, employer respondents and key stakeholders.</p

The Role of the ‘Genuinely Try to Reach Agreement’ Requirement in the Protected Industrial Action Regime under the Fair Work Act 2009

The requirement genuinely to try to reach an agreement (GTRA) is one of a number of criteria that employees must satisfy before they can take protected industrial action in the course of enterprise negotiations under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth). It is tested before the FWC in the process of making a Protected Industrial Action Ballot Order (PABO), and such an order cannot be made unless the FWC is satisfied that the requirement has been complied with. While there is a well-developed jurisprudence on the meaning of GTRA, there have been no attempts to study how the requirement operates in practice. To address this gap in the literature, this article draws on qualitative and quantitative analysis of PABO applications, and interviews with stakeholders including unions, employers and members of the Fair Work Commission. The analysis of this data demonstrates that the success rate of PABO applications is very high, with few PABO applications being contested by employers and even fewer being rejected by the FWC on the basis that the application has failed to meet the GTRA requirement. However, while few PABO applications are denied on this ground, the empirical findings also suggest that the GTRA requirement plays a signalling role in the enterprise bargaining regime, helping to establish accepted norms of conduct by trade union bargaining representatives seeking to take protected industrial action

Strike Ballots, Democracy, and Law

The purpose of the research upon which this book is based was empirically to investigate whether the ballot requirements in the Fair Work Act do indeed impose a significant obstacle to the taking of industrial action, and whether those provisions are indeed impelled by a legitimate ‘democratic imperative’. The book starts from the proposition that virtually all national legal systems, and international law, recognise the right to strike as a fundamental human right. It acknowledges, however, that in no case is this recognition without qualification. Amongst the most common qualifications is a requirement that to be lawful strike action must first be approved by a ballot of workers concerned. Often, these requirements are said to be necessary to protect the democratic rights of the workers concerned: this is the so-called ‘democratic imperative’. In order to evaluate the true purpose and effect of ballot requirements the book draws upon the detailed empirical study of the operation of the Australian legislative provisions noted above; a comparative analysis of law and practice in a broad range of countries, with special reference to Canada, South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States; and the jurisprudence of the supervisory bodies of the International Labour Organisation. It finds that in many instances ballot requirements - especially those relating to quorum - are more concerned with curtailing strike activity than with constructively responding to the democratic imperative. Frequently, they also proceed from a distorted perception of what ‘democracy’ could and should entail in an industrial context. Paradoxically, the study also finds that in some contexts ballot requirements can provide additional bargaining leverage for unions. Overall, however, the study confirms our hypothesis that the principal purpose of ballot requirements - especially in Australia and the United Kingdom - is to curtail strike activity rather than to vindicate the democratic imperative, other than on the basis of a highly attenuated reading of that term. We believe that the end-result constitutes an important study of the practical operation of a complex set of legal rules, and one which exposes the dichotomy between the ostensible and real objectives underpinning the adoption of those rules. It also furnishes a worked example of multi-methods empirical, comparative and doctrinal legal research in law, which we hope will inspire similar approaches to other areas of labour law.</p