A Spatial Agent-Based Model of N-Person Prisoner's Dilemma Cooperation in a Socio-Geographic Community

The purpose of this paper is to present a spatial agent-based model of N-person prisoner's dilemma that is designed to simulate the collective communication and cooperation within a socio-geographic community. Based on a tight coupling of REPAST and a vector Geographic Information System, the model simulates the emergence of cooperation from the mobility behaviors and interaction strategies of citizen agents. To approximate human behavior, the agents are set as stochastic learning automata with Pavlovian personalities and attitudes. A review of the theory of the standard prisoner's dilemma, the iterated prisoner's dilemma, and the N-person prisoner's dilemma is given as well as an overview of the generic architecture of the agent-based model. The capabilities of the spatial N-person prisoner's dilemma component are demonstrated with several scenario simulation runs for varied initial cooperation percentages and mobility dynamics. Experimental results revealed that agent mobility and context preservation bring qualitatively different effects to the evolution of cooperative behavior in an analyzed spatial environment.Agent Based Modeling, Cooperation, Prisoners Dilemma, Spatial Interaction Model, Spatially Structured Social Dilemma, Geographic Information Systems

Solving Two-Person Zero-Sum Stochastic Games With Incomplete Information Using Learning Automata With Artificial Barriers

Learning automata (LA) with artificially absorbing barriers was a completely new horizon of research in the 1980s (Oommen, 1986). These new machines yielded properties that were previously unknown. More recently, absorbing barriers have been introduced in continuous estimator algorithms so that the proofs could follow a martingale property, as opposed to monotonicity (Zhang et al., 2014), (Zhang et al., 2015). However, the applications of LA with artificial barriers are almost nonexistent. In that regard, this article is pioneering in that it provides effective and accurate solutions to an extremely complex application domain, namely that of solving two-person zero-sum stochastic games that are provided with incomplete information. LA have been previously used (Sastry et al., 1994) to design algorithms capable of converging to the game's Nash equilibrium under limited information. Those algorithms have focused on the case where the saddle point of the game exists in a pure strategy. However, the majority of the LA algorithms used for games are absorbing in the probability simplex space, and thus, they converge to an exclusive choice of a single action. These LA are thus unable to converge to other mixed Nash equilibria when the game possesses no saddle point for a pure strategy. The pioneering contribution of this article is that we propose an LA solution that is able to converge to an optimal mixed Nash equilibrium even though there may be no saddle point when a pure strategy is invoked. The scheme, being of the linear reward-inaction ( $L_{R-I}$ ) paradigm, is in and of itself, absorbing. However, by incorporating artificial barriers, we prevent it from being ``stuck'' or getting absorbed in pure strategies. Unlike the linear reward-εpenalty ( $L_{R-ε P}$ ) scheme proposed by Lakshmivarahan and Narendra almost four decades ago, our new scheme achieves the same goal with much less parameter tuning and in a more elegant manner. This article includes the nontrial proofs of the theoretical results characterizing our scheme and also contains experimental verification that confirms our theoretical findings.acceptedVersio

Evolutionary games on graphs

Game theory is one of the key paradigms behind many scientific disciplines from biology to behavioral sciences to economics. In its evolutionary form and especially when the interacting agents are linked in a specific social network the underlying solution concepts and methods are very similar to those applied in non-equilibrium statistical physics. This review gives a tutorial-type overview of the field for physicists. The first three sections introduce the necessary background in classical and evolutionary game theory from the basic definitions to the most important results. The fourth section surveys the topological complications implied by non-mean-field-type social network structures in general. The last three sections discuss in detail the dynamic behavior of three prominent classes of models: the Prisoner's Dilemma, the Rock-Scissors-Paper game, and Competing Associations. The major theme of the review is in what sense and how the graph structure of interactions can modify and enrich the picture of long term behavioral patterns emerging in evolutionary games.Comment: Review, final version, 133 pages, 65 figure

Organization, learning and cooperation.

This paper models the organization of the firm as a type of artificial neural network in a duopoly setting. The firm plays a repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma type game, and must also learn to map environmental signals to demand parameters and to its rival’s willingness to cooperate. We study the prospects for cooperation given the need for the firm to learn the environment and its rival’s output. We show how profit and cooperation rates are affected by the sizes of both firms, their willingness to cooperate, and by environmental complexity. In addition, we investigate equilibrium firm size and cooperation rates.Artificial neural networks;Prisoner’s Dilemma;Cooperation;Firm learning;

Graph dynamics : learning and representation

Thesis (S.M.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, School of Architecture and Planning, Program in Media Arts and Sciences, 2006.Includes bibliographical references (p. 58-60).Graphs are often used in artificial intelligence as means for symbolic knowledge representation. A graph is nothing more than a collection of symbols connected to each other in some fashion. For example, in computer vision a graph with five nodes and some edges can represent a table - where nodes correspond to particular shape descriptors for legs and a top, and edges to particular spatial relations. As a framework for representation, graphs invite us to simplify and view the world as objects of pure structure whose properties are fixed in time, while the phenomena they are supposed to model are actually often changing. A node alone cannot represent a table leg, for example, because a table leg is not one structure (it can have many different shapes, colors, or it can be seen in many different settings, lighting conditions, etc.) Theories of knowledge representation have in general concentrated on the stability of symbols - on the fact that people often use properties that remain unchanged across different contexts to represent an object (in vision, these properties are called invariants). However, on closer inspection, objects are variable as well as stable. How are we to understand such problems? How is that assembling a large collection of changing components into a system results in something that is an altogether stable collection of parts?(cont.) The work here presents one approach that we came to encompass by the phrase "graph dynamics". Roughly speaking, dynamical systems are systems with states that evolve over time according to some lawful "motion". In graph dynamics, states are graphical structures, corresponding to different hypothesis for representation, and motion is the correction or repair of an antecedent structure. The adapted structure is an end product on a path of test and repair. In this way, a graph is not an exact record of the environment but a malleable construct that is gradually tightened to fit the form it is to reproduce. In particular, we explore the concept of attractors for the graph dynamical system. In dynamical systems theory, attractor states are states into which the system settles with the passage of time, and in graph dynamics they correspond to graphical states with many repairs (states that can cope with many different contingencies). In parallel with introducing the basic mathematical framework for graph dynamics, we define a game for its control, its attractor states and a method to find the attractors. From these insights, we work out two new algorithms, one for Bayesian network discovery and one for active learning, which in combination we use to undertake the object recognition problem in computer vision. To conclude, we report competitive results in standard and custom-made object recognition datasets.by Andre Figueiredo Ribeiro.S.M

Organization, Learning and Cooperation

We model the organization of the firm as a type of artificial neural network in a duopoly framework. The firm plays a repeated Prisoner's Dilemma type game, but also must learn to map environmental signals to demand parameters. We study the prospects for cooperation given the need for the firm to learn the environment and its rival's output. We show how a firm's profit and cooperation rates are affected by its size, its rival's size and willingness to cooperate and environmental complexity.Artificial Neural Networks, Cooperation, Firm Learning

Game theory

game theory