46,793 research outputs found
Connected Coordination: Network Structure and Group Coordination
Networks can affect a group’s ability to solve a coordination problem. We utilize laboratory experiments to study the conditions under which groups of subjects can solve coordination games. We investigate a variety of different network structures, and we also investigate coordination games with symmetric and asymmetric payoffs. Our results show that network connections facilitate coordination in both symmetric and asymmetric games. Most significantly, we find that increases in the number of network connections encourage coordination even when payoffs are highly asymmetric. These results shed light on the conditions that may facilitate coordination in real-world networks
Evolutionary games on graphs
Game theory is one of the key paradigms behind many scientific disciplines
from biology to behavioral sciences to economics. In its evolutionary form and
especially when the interacting agents are linked in a specific social network
the underlying solution concepts and methods are very similar to those applied
in non-equilibrium statistical physics. This review gives a tutorial-type
overview of the field for physicists. The first three sections introduce the
necessary background in classical and evolutionary game theory from the basic
definitions to the most important results. The fourth section surveys the
topological complications implied by non-mean-field-type social network
structures in general. The last three sections discuss in detail the dynamic
behavior of three prominent classes of models: the Prisoner's Dilemma, the
Rock-Scissors-Paper game, and Competing Associations. The major theme of the
review is in what sense and how the graph structure of interactions can modify
and enrich the picture of long term behavioral patterns emerging in
evolutionary games.Comment: Review, final version, 133 pages, 65 figure
Game Theory Meets Network Security: A Tutorial at ACM CCS
The increasingly pervasive connectivity of today's information systems brings
up new challenges to security. Traditional security has accomplished a long way
toward protecting well-defined goals such as confidentiality, integrity,
availability, and authenticity. However, with the growing sophistication of the
attacks and the complexity of the system, the protection using traditional
methods could be cost-prohibitive. A new perspective and a new theoretical
foundation are needed to understand security from a strategic and
decision-making perspective. Game theory provides a natural framework to
capture the adversarial and defensive interactions between an attacker and a
defender. It provides a quantitative assessment of security, prediction of
security outcomes, and a mechanism design tool that can enable
security-by-design and reverse the attacker's advantage. This tutorial provides
an overview of diverse methodologies from game theory that includes games of
incomplete information, dynamic games, mechanism design theory to offer a
modern theoretic underpinning of a science of cybersecurity. The tutorial will
also discuss open problems and research challenges that the CCS community can
address and contribute with an objective to build a multidisciplinary bridge
between cybersecurity, economics, game and decision theory
Social dilemmas in an online social network: the structure and evolution of cooperation
We investigate two paradigms for studying the evolution of
cooperation--Prisoner's Dilemma and Snowdrift game in an online friendship
network obtained from a social networking site. We demonstrate that such social
network has small-world property and degree distribution has a power-law tail.
Besides, it has hierarchical organizations and exhibits disassortative mixing
pattern. We study the evolutionary version of the two types of games on it. It
is found that enhancement and sustainment of cooperative behaviors are
attributable to the underlying network topological organization. It is also
shown that cooperators can survive when confronted with the invasion of
defectors throughout the entire ranges of parameters of both games. The
evolution of cooperation on empirical networks is influenced by various network
effects in a combined manner, compared with that on model networks. Our results
can help understand the cooperative behaviors in human groups and society.Comment: 14 pages, 7 figure
Network Formation with Adaptive Agents
In this paper, a reinforcement learning version of the connections game first analysed by Jackson and Wolinsky is presented and compared with benchmark results of fully informed and rational players. Using an agent-based simulation approach, the main nding is that the pattern of reinforcement learning process is similar, but does not fully converge to the benchmark results. Before these optimal results can be discovered in a learning process, agents often get locked in a state of random switching or early lock-in.agent-based computational economics; strategic network formation; network games; reinforcement learning
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