Unawareness for motor impairment and distorted perception of task difficulty

Objective: Anosognosia for motor impairment is a complex syndrome that can manifest itself under different forms, guiding patients’ behaviour and task decisions. However, current diagnostic tools tend to evaluate only more explicit aspects of anosognosia (asking the patients about their motor abilities) and fail to address more subtle features of awareness. We have developed a new assessment measure, the ECT (Errand Choice Test), where patients are asked to judge task difficulty rather than estimate their own impairment. Method: We assessed awareness in a group of 73 unilateral left- and right-brain damaged (30 LBD and 43 RBD, respectively) patients by means of the VATAm, which explicitly requires them to evaluate their own motor abilities, and the ECT. A control group of 65 healthy volunteers was asked to perform the ECT under two conditions: Current condition (i.e. using both hands) and Simulated conditions (i.e. simulating hemiplegia). Results: 27% of the patients showed different performance on the VATAm and ECT, 21% of the patients showing lack of awareness only on VATAm and 6% only on ECT. Moreover, despite the ECT identified a higher frequency of anosognosia after RBD (33.3%) than LBD (27.6%), this hemispheric asymmetry was not significant. Remarkably, anosognosic patients performed very similarly to controls in the ‘current condition’, suggesting that anosognosic patients’ ability to perceive the complexity of each task per se is not altered. Conclusion: Different methods may be able to tackle different aspects of awareness and the ECT proved to be able to detect less evident forms of awareness

The affective modulation of motor awareness in anosognosia for hemiplegia : Behavioural and lesion evidence

© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).The possible role of emotion in anosognosia for hemiplegia (i.e., denial of motor deficits contralateral to a brain lesion), has long been debated between psychodynamic and neurocognitive theories. However, there are only a handful of case studies focussing on this topic, and the precise role of emotion in anosognosia for hemiplegia requires empirical investigation. In the present study, we aimed to investigate how negative and positive emotions influence motor awareness in anosognosia. Positive and negative emotions were induced under carefully-controlled experimental conditions in right-hemisphere stroke patients with anosognosia for hemiplegia (n = 11) and controls with clinically normal awareness (n = 10). Only the negative, emotion induction condition resulted in a significant improvement of motor awareness in anosognosic patients compared to controls; the positive emotion induction did not. Using lesion overlay and voxel-based lesion-symptom mapping approaches, we also investigated the brain lesions associated with the diagnosis of anosognosia, as well as with performance on the experimental task. Anatomical areas that are commonly damaged in AHP included the right-hemisphere motor and sensory cortices, the inferior frontal cortex, and the insula. Additionally, the insula, putamen and anterior periventricular white matter were associated with less awareness change following the negative emotion induction. This study suggests that motor unawareness and the observed lack of negative emotions about one's disabilities cannot be adequately explained by either purely motivational or neurocognitive accounts. Instead, we propose an integrative account in which insular and striatal lesions result in weak interoceptive and motivational signals. These deficits lead to faulty inferences about the self, involving a difficulty to personalise new sensorimotor information, and an abnormal adherence to premorbid beliefs about the body.Peer reviewedFinal Published versio

The default-mode, ego-functions and free-energy: a neurobiological account of Freudian ideas

This article explores the notion that Freudian constructs may have neurobiological substrates. Specifically, we propose that Freud’s descriptions of the primary and secondary processes are consistent with self-organized activity in hierarchical cortical systems and that his descriptions of the ego are consistent with the functions of the default-mode and its reciprocal exchanges with subordinate brain systems. This neurobiological account rests on a view of the brain as a hierarchical inference or Helmholtz machine. In this view, large-scale intrinsic networks occupy supraordinate levels of hierarchical brain systems that try to optimize their representation of the sensorium. This optimization has been formulated as minimizing a free-energy; a process that is formally similar to the treatment of energy in Freudian formulations. We substantiate this synthesis by showing that Freud’s descriptions of the primary process are consistent with the phenomenology and neurophysiology of rapid eye movement sleep, the early and acute psychotic state, the aura of temporal lobe epilepsy and hallucinogenic drug states