Is there a semantic system for abstract words?

Two views on the semantics of concrete words are that their core mental representations are feature-based or are reconstructions of sensory experience. We argue that neither of these approaches is capable of representing the semantics of abstract words, which involve the representation of possibly hypothetical physical and mental states, the binding of entities within a structure, and the possible use of embedding (or recursion) in such structures. Brain based evidence in the form of dissociations between deficits related to concrete and abstract semantics corroborates the hypothesis. Neuroimaging evidence suggests that left lateral inferior frontal cortex supports those processes responsible for the representation of abstract words

Confabulation: damage to a specific inferior medial prefrontal system

Confabulation, the pathological production of false memories, occurs following a variety of aetiologies involving the frontal lobes, and is frequently held to be underpinned by combined memory and executive deficits. However, the critical frontal regions and specific cognitive deficits involved are unclear. Studies in amnesic patients have associated confabulation with damage to the orbital and ventromedial prefrontal cortex. However neuroimaging studies have associated memory control processes which are assumed to underlie confabulation with the right lateral prefrontal cortex. We used a confabulation battery to investigate the occurrence and localisation of confabulation in an unselected series of 38 patients with focal frontal lesions. 12 patients with posterior lesions and 50 healthy controls were included for comparison. Significantly higher levels of confabulation were found in the Frontal group, confirming previous reports. More detailed grouping according to lesion location within the frontal lobe revealed that patients with orbital, medial and left lateral damage confabulated in response to questions probing personal episodic memory. Patients with orbital, medial and right lateral damage confabulated in response to questions probing orientation to time. Performance-led analysis revealed that all patients who produced a total number of confabulations outside the normal range had a lesion affecting either the orbital region or inferior portion of the anterior cingulate. These data provide striking evidence that the critical deficit for confabulation has its anatomical location in the inferior medial frontal lobe. Performance on tests of memory and executive functioning showed considerable variability. Although a degree of memory impairment does seem necessary, performance on traditional executive tests is less helpful in explaining confabulation

Inhibition and young children's performance on the Tower of London task

Young children, when performing problem solving tasks, show a tendency to break task rules and produce incomplete solutions. We propose that this tendency can be explained by understanding problem solving within the context of the development of “executive functions” – general cognitive control functions, which serve to regulate the operation of the cognitive system. This proposal is supported by the construction of two computational models that simulate separately the performance of 3–4 year old and 5–6 year old children on the Tower of London planning task. We seek in particular to capture the emerging role of inhibition in the older group. The basic framework within which the models are developed is derived from Fox and Das’ Domino model [Fox, J., & Das, S. (2000). Safe and sound: Artificial intelligence in hazardous applications. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press] and Norman and Shallice’s [Norman, D.A., & Shallice, T. (1986). Attention to action: Willed and automatic control of behaviour. In R. Davidson, G. Schwartz, & D. Shapiro (Eds.), Consciousness and Self Regulation (Vol. 4). New York: Plenum] theory of willed and automatic action. Two strategies and a simple perceptual bias are implemented within the models and comparisons between model and child performance reveal a good fit for the key dependent measures (number of rule breaks and percentage of incomplete solutions) of the two groups

Set-relevance determines the impact of distractors on episodic memory retrieval

Abstract We investigated the interplay between stimulus-driven attention and memory retrieval with a novel interference paradigm that engaged both systems concurrently on each trial. Participants encoded a 45-min movie on Day 1 and, on Day 2, performed a temporal order judgment task during fMRI. Each retrieval trial comprised three images presented sequentially, and the task required participants to judge the temporal order of the first and the last images ("memory probes") while ignoring the second image, which was task irrelevant ("attention distractor"). We manipulated the content relatedness and the temporal proximity between the distractor and the memory probes, as well as the temporal distance between two probes. Behaviorally, short temporal distances between the probes led to reduced retrieval performance. Distractors that at encoding were temporally close to the first probe image reduced these costs, specifically when the distractor was content unrelated to the memory probes. The imaging results associated the distractor probe temporal proximity with activation of the right ventral attention network. By contrast, the precuneus was activated for high-content relatedness between distractors and probes and in trials including a short distance between the two memory probes. The engagement of the right ventral attention network by specific types of distractors suggests a link between stimulus-driven attention control and episodic memory retrieval, whereas the activation pattern of the precuneus implicates this region in memory search within knowledge/content-based hierarchies

Effects of focal frontal lesions on response inhibition

This study examined the performance of 38 normal subjects and 43 patients with focal lesions of the frontal lobes on a simple go-nogo task where the probability of the nogo stimulus was either 75% or 25%. Patients with lesions to the superior medial parts of the frontal lobes, in particular to the left superior portion of Brodmann area 6 (which includes the supplementary motor areas and the premotor areas for the right hand) had an increased number of false alarms (incorrect responses to the nogo stimulus). These results indicate that area 6 is specifically involved in the inhibition of response. Patients with lesions to the right anterior cingulate (areas 24 and 32) were slower and more variable in their reaction time. These findings could be explained by an inability to sustain stimulus-response contingencies. Lesions to the right ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (Brodmann areas 44, 45, 47) also increased the variability of response, perhaps by disrupting monitoring performance

An architecturally constrained model of random number generation and its application to modeling the effect of generation rate

Random number generation (RNG) is a complex cognitive task for human subjects, requiring deliberative control to avoid production of habitual, stereotyped sequences. Under various manipulations (e.g., speeded responding, transcranial magnetic stimulation, or neurological damage) the performance of human subjects deteriorates, as reflected in a number of qualitatively distinct, dissociable biases. For example, the intrusion of stereotyped behavior (e.g., counting) increases at faster rates of generation. Theoretical accounts of the task postulate that it requires the integrated operation of multiple, computationally heterogeneous cognitive control (“executive”) processes. We present a computational model of RNG, within the framework of a novel, neuropsychologically-inspired cognitive architecture, ESPro. Manipulating the rate of sequence generation in the model reproduced a number of key effects observed in empirical studies, including increasing sequence stereotypy at faster rates. Within the model, this was due to time limitations on the interaction of supervisory control processes, namely, task setting, proposal of responses, monitoring, and response inhibition. The model thus supports the fractionation of executive function into multiple, computationally heterogeneous processes

Cognitive control: componential or emergent?

The past twenty-five years have witnessed an increasing awareness of the importance of cognitive control in the regulation of complex behavior. It now sits alongside attention, memory, language and thinking as a distinct domain within cognitive psychology. At the same time it permeates each of these sibling domains. This paper reviews recent work on cognitive control in an attempt to provide a context for the fundamental question addressed within this Topic: is cognitive control to be understood as resulting from the interaction of multiple distinct control processes or are the phenomena of cognitive control emergent

Development and Validation of a Modified Multiple Errands Test for Adults with Intellectual Disabilities

Background: The aims of the current study were to adapt a version of the MET for people with intellectual disabilities (IDs) and assess its ecological and construct validity. Material and Methods: Using a correlational design, 40 participants with IDs were invited to complete a battery of neuropsychological assessments and the modified Multiple Errands Test for Intellectual Disabilities (mMET-IDs). Results: The ability to successfully complete tasks on the mMET-IDs correlated significantly with measures of the Supervisory Attentional System, namely, the Tower of London Test and the Six Parts Test. However, performance on the mMET-IDs and the Six Parts Test could be accounted for by Verbal IQ and receptive vocabulary. The mMET-IDs failed to correlate with the DEX-IR. Conclusions: The mMET-IDs can be successfully used to assess some aspects of the Supervisory Attentional System in people with IDs. Further development is needed, however, to improve the ecological validity of the mMET-IDs

Task Switching: A PDP Model

When subjects switch between a pair of stimulus–response tasks, reaction time is slower on trial N if a different task was performed on trial N-1. We present a parallel distributed processing (PDP) model that simulates this effect when subjects switch between word reading and color naming in response to Stroop stimuli. Reaction time on ‘switch trials’ can be slowed by an extended response selection process which results from (a) persisting, inappropriate states of activation and inhibition of task-controlling representations; and (b) associative learning, which allows stimuli to evoke tasks sets with which they have recently been associated (as proposed by Allport & Wylie, 2000). The model provides a good fit to a large body of empirical data, including findings which have been seen as problematic for this explanation of switch costs, and shows similar behavior when the parameters are set to random values, supporting Allport and Wylie’s proposal

Introspective physicalism as an approach to the science of consciousness

Most ‘theories of consciousness’ are based on vague speculations about the properties of conscious experience. We aim to provide a more solid basis for a science of consciousness. We argue that a theory of consciousness should provide an account of the very processes that allow us to acquire and use information about our own mental states – the processes underlying introspection. This can be achieved through the construction of information processing models that can account for ‘Type-C’ processes. Type-C processes can be specified experimentally by identifying paradigms in which awareness of the stimulus is necessary for an intentional action. The Shallice (1988b) framework is put forward as providing an initial account of Type-C processes, which can relate perceptual consciousness to consciously performed actions. Further, we suggest that this framework may be refined through the investigation of the functions of prefrontal cortex. The formulation of our approach requires us to consider fundamental conceptual and methodological issues associated with consciousness. The most significant of these issues concerns the scientific use of introspective evidence. We outline and justify a conservative methodological approach to the use of introspective evidence, with attention to the difficulties historically associated with its use in psychology