The Characteristics and Limits of Rapid Visual Categorization

Visual categorization appears both effortless and virtually instantaneous. The study by Thorpe et al. (1996) was the first to estimate the processing time necessary to perform fast visual categorization of animals in briefly flashed (20 ms) natural photographs. They observed a large differential EEG activity between target and distracter correct trials that developed from 150 ms after stimulus onset, a value that was later shown to be even shorter in monkeys! With such strong processing time constraints, it was difficult to escape the conclusion that rapid visual categorization was relying on massively parallel, essentially feed-forward processing of visual information. Since 1996, we have conducted a large number of studies to determine the characteristics and limits of fast visual categorization. The present chapter will review some of the main results obtained. I will argue that rapid object categorizations in natural scenes can be done without focused attention and are most likely based on coarse and unconscious visual representations activated with the first available (magnocellular) visual information. Fast visual processing proved efficient for the categorization of large superordinate object or scene categories, but shows its limits when more detailed basic representations are required. The representations for basic objects (dogs, cars) or scenes (mountain or sea landscapes) need additional processing time to be activated. This finding is at odds with the widely accepted idea that such basic representations are at the entry level of the system. Interestingly, focused attention is still not required to perform these time consuming basic categorizations. Finally we will show that object and context processing can interact very early in an ascending wave of visual information processing. We will discuss how such data could result from our experience with a highly structured and predictable surrounding world that shaped neuronal visual selectivity

Key Visual Features for Rapid Categorization of Animals in Natural Scenes

In speeded categorization tasks, decisions could be based on diagnostic target features or they may need the activation of complete representations of the object. Depending on task requirements, the priming of feature detectors through top–down expectation might lower the threshold of selective units or speed up the rate of information accumulation. In the present paper, 40 subjects performed a rapid go/no-go animal/non-animal categorization task with 400 briefly flashed natural scenes to study how performance depends on physical scene characteristics, target configuration, and the presence or absence of diagnostic animal features. Performance was evaluated both in terms of accuracy and speed and d′ curves were plotted as a function of reaction time (RT). Such d′ curves give an estimation of the processing dynamics for studied features and characteristics over the entire subject population. Global image characteristics such as color and brightness do not critically influence categorization speed, although they slightly influence accuracy. Global critical factors include the presence of a canonical animal posture and animal/background size ratio suggesting the role of coarse global form. Performance was best for both accuracy and speed, when the animal was in a typical posture and when it occupied about 20–30% of the image. The presence of diagnostic animal features was another critical factor. Performance was significantly impaired both in accuracy (drop 3.3–7.5%) and speed (median RT increase 7–16 ms) when diagnostic animal parts (eyes, mouth, and limbs) were missing. Such animal features were shown to influence performance very early when only 15–25% of the response had been produced. In agreement with other experimental and modeling studies, our results support fast diagnostic recognition of animals based on key intermediate features and priming based on the subject's expertise

A simple rule to describe interactions between visual categories

Acknowledgements: We thank Prof Thomas Palmeri for helpful comments on a previous version of the manuscript. This research did not receive any specific grant from funding agencies in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors. Peer Review The peer review history for this article is available at https://publons.com/publon/10.1111/ejn.14890. DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT The programmes used to run the two experiments and the collected data are available on the OSF website (OSF.IO/ASB4E). A substantial proportion of the stimuli were sourced from the copyright protected Corel database and thus cannot be shared on OSF.Peer reviewedPublisher PD

The Time-Course of Visual Categorizations: You Spot the Animal Faster than the Bird

Background: Since the pioneering study by Rosch and colleagues in the 70s, it is commonly agreed that basic level perceptual categories (dog, chair…) are accessed faster than superordinate ones (animal, furniture…). Nevertheless, the speed at which objects presented in natural images can be processed in a rapid go/no-go visual superordinate categorization task has challenged this ‘‘basic level advantage’’. Principal Findings: Using the same task, we compared human processing speed when categorizing natural scenes as containing either an animal (superordinate level), or a specific animal (bird or dog, basic level). Human subjects require an additional 40–65 ms to decide whether an animal is a bird or a dog and most errors are induced by non-target animals. Indeed, processing time is tightly linked with the type of non-targets objects. Without any exemplar of the sam

A Markovian event-based framework for stochastic spiking neural networks

In spiking neural networks, the information is conveyed by the spike times, that depend on the intrinsic dynamics of each neuron, the input they receive and on the connections between neurons. In this article we study the Markovian nature of the sequence of spike times in stochastic neural networks, and in particular the ability to deduce from a spike train the next spike time, and therefore produce a description of the network activity only based on the spike times regardless of the membrane potential process. To study this question in a rigorous manner, we introduce and study an event-based description of networks of noisy integrate-and-fire neurons, i.e. that is based on the computation of the spike times. We show that the firing times of the neurons in the networks constitute a Markov chain, whose transition probability is related to the probability distribution of the interspike interval of the neurons in the network. In the cases where the Markovian model can be developed, the transition probability is explicitly derived in such classical cases of neural networks as the linear integrate-and-fire neuron models with excitatory and inhibitory interactions, for different types of synapses, possibly featuring noisy synaptic integration, transmission delays and absolute and relative refractory period. This covers most of the cases that have been investigated in the event-based description of spiking deterministic neural networks

Ultra-Rapid Categorization of Fourier-Spectrum Equalized Natural Images: Macaques and Humans Perform Similarly

BACKGROUND: Comparative studies of cognitive processes find similarities between humans and apes but also monkeys. Even high-level processes, like the ability to categorize classes of object from any natural scene under ultra-rapid time constraints, seem to be present in rhesus macaque monkeys (despite a smaller brain and the lack of language and a cultural background). An interesting and still open question concerns the degree to which the same images are treated with the same efficacy by humans and monkeys when a low level cue, the spatial frequency content, is controlled. METHODOLOGY/PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: We used a set of natural images equalized in Fourier spectrum and asked whether it is still possible to categorize them as containing an animal and at what speed. One rhesus macaque monkey performed a forced-choice saccadic task with a good accuracy (67.5% and 76% for new and familiar images respectively) although performance was lower than with non-equalized images. Importantly, the minimum reaction time was still very fast (100 ms). We compared the performances of human subjects with the same setup and the same set of (new) images. Overall mean performance of humans was also lower than with original images (64% correct) but the minimum reaction time was still short (140 ms). CONCLUSION: Performances on individual images (% correct but not reaction times) for both humans and the monkey were significantly correlated suggesting that both species use similar features to perform the task. A similar advantage for full-face images was seen for both species. The results also suggest that local low spatial frequency information could be important, a finding that fits the theory that fast categorization relies on a rapid feedforward magnocellular signal

Evolutionary approaches to epistemic justification

What are the consequences of evolutionary theory for the epistemic standing of our beliefs? Evolutionary considerations can be used to either justify or debunk a variety of beliefs. This paper argues that evolutionary approaches to human cognition must at least allow for approximately reliable cognitive capacities. Approaches that portray human cognition as so deeply biased and deficient that no knowledge is possible are internally incoherent and self-defeating. As evolutionary theory offers the current best hope for a naturalistic epistemology, evolutionary approaches to epistemic justification seem to be committed to the view that our sensory systems and belief-formation processes are at least approximately accurate. However, for that reason they are vulnerable to the charge of circularity, and their success seems to be limited to commonsense beliefs. This paper offers an extension of evolutionary arguments by considering the use of external media in human cognitive processes: we suggest that the way humans supplement their evolved cognitive capacities with external tools may provide an effective way to increase the reliability of their beliefs and to counter evolved cognitive biases

Top-down modulation of visual processing and knowledge after 250 ms supports object constancy of category decisions

People categorize objects slowly when visual input is highly impoverished instead of optimal. While bottom-up models may explain a decision with optimal input, perceptual hypothesis testing (PHT) theories implicate top-down processes with impoverished input. Brain mechanisms and the time course of PHT are largely unknown. This event-related potential study used a neuroimaging paradigm that implicated prefrontal cortex in top-down modulation of occipitotemporal cortex. Subjects categorized more impoverished and less impoverished real and pseudo objects. PHT theories predict larger impoverishment effects for real than pseudo objects because top-down processes modulate knowledge only for real objects, but different PHT variants predict different timing. Consistent with parietal-prefrontal PHT variants, around 250 ms, the earliest impoverished real object interaction started on an N3 complex, which reflects interactive cortical activity for object cognition. N3 impoverishment effects localized to both prefrontal and occipitotemporal cortex for real objects only. The N3 also showed knowledge effects by 230 ms that localized to occipitotemporal cortex. Later effects reflected (a) word meaning in temporal cortex during the N400, (b) internal evaluation of prior decision and memory processes and secondary higher-order memory involving anterotemporal parts of a default mode network during posterior positivity (P600), and (c) response related activity in posterior cingulate during an anterior slow wave (SW) after 700 ms. Finally, response activity in supplementary motor area during a posterior SW after 900 ms showed impoverishment effects that correlated with RTs. Convergent evidence from studies of vision, memory, and mental imagery which reflects purely top-down inputs, indicates that the N3 reflects the critical top-down processes of PHT. A hybrid multiple-state interactive, PHT and decision theory best explains the visual constancy of object cognition