Problems of Kantian Nonconceptualism and the Transcendental Deduction

In this paper, I discuss the debate on Kant and nonconceptual content. Inspired by Kant’s account of the intimate relation between intuition and concepts, McDowell (1996) has forcefully argued that the relation between sensible content and concepts is such that sensible content does not severally contribute to cognition but always only in conjunction with concepts. This view is known as conceptualism. Recently, Kantians Robert Hanna and Lucy Allais, among others, have brought against this view the charge that it neglects the possibility of the existence of essentially nonconceptual content that is not conceptualised or subject to conceptualisation. Their critique of McDowell amounts to nonconceptualism. However, both views, conceptualist and nonconceptualist, share the assumption that intuition is synthesised content in Kant’s sense. My interest is not in the validity of the philosophical positions of conceptualism or nonconceptualism per se. I am particularly interested in the extent to which the views that McDowell and Hanna and Allais respectively advance are true to Kant, or can validly be seen as Kantian positions. I argue that although McDowell is right that intuition is only epistemically relevant in conjunction with concepts, Hanna and Allais are right with regard to the existence of essentially nonconceptual content (intuitions) independently of the functions of the understanding, but that they are wrong with regard to non-conceptualised intuition being synthesised content in Kant’s sense. Kantian conceptualists (Bowman 2011; Griffith 2012; Gomes 2014) have responded to the recent nonconceptualist offensive, with reference to A89ff./B122ff. (§13)—which, confusingly, the nonconceptualists also cite as evidence for their contrary reading—by arguing that the nonconceptualist view conflicts with the central goal of the Transcendental Deduction, namely, to argue that all intuitions are subject to the categories. I contend that the conceptualist reading of A89ff./B122ff. is unfounded, but also that the nonconceptualists are wrong to believe that intuitions as such refer strictly to objects independently of the functions of the understanding, and that they are mistaken about the relation between figurative synthesis and intellectual synthesis. I argue that Kant is a conceptualist, albeit not in the sense that standard conceptualists assume. Perceptual knowledge is always judgemental, though without this resulting in the standard conceptualist claim that, necessarily, all intuitions or all perceptions per se stand under the categories (strong conceptualism). I endorse the nonconceptualist view that, for Kant, perception per se, i.e. any mere or ‘blind’ intuition of objects (i.e. objects as indeterminate appearances) short of perceptual knowledge, does not necessarily stand under the categories. Perception is not yet perceptual knowledge. In this context, I point out the common failure in the literature on the Transcendental Deduction, both of the conceptualist and nonconceptualist stripe, to take account of the modal nature of Kant’s argument for the relation between intuition and concept insofar as cognition should arise from it

Middle Ordovician acritarchs and problematic organic-walled microfossils from the Saq-Hanadir transitional beds in the QSIM-801 well, Saudi Arabia

Core samples from the QSIM-801 water well, drilled in central Saudi Arabia, cover a 93-foot interval spanning the transition between the Sajir Member of the Saq Formation, that consists mainly of sandstones of tidal sand flat environments, and the Hanadir Member of the Qasim Formation, characterized by argillaceous graptolitic mudstones, corresponding to a tidal delta front. The samples contain abundant, exceptionally well-preserved and diverse palynomorphs, which include cryptospores, acritarchs and chitinozoans, other problematic organic-walled microfossils as well as other organic particles such as cuticle-like fragments. The studied interval is biostratigraphically well constrained by the presence of chitinozoans of the formosa and pissotensis Zones of late-early to late Darriwilian age (Middle Ordovician) in the uppermost Saq Formation and Hanadir Member. The biostratigraphic age of the Sajir Member considered to span the Dapingian–Darriwilian boundary, is re-discussed based on the results herein. The uppermost part of the Sajir Member yielded the ichnofossil, Phycodes fusiforme. Acritarch assemblages from the Sajir Member of the Saq Formation are poorly diversified and dominated by sphaeromorphs. More diverse assemblages of acritarchs, associated with enigmatic forms, occur in the Hanadir Member of the Qasim Formation. The contact between the two formations and the transition between the palynomorph assemblages are sharp, suggesting a stratigraphic hiatus. A quantitative analysis allows us to discuss the paleoenvironmental changes and possibly climatic changes associated with an hypothesis of ice house conditions during this period. Among the diagnostic acritarch taxa observed are Frankea breviuscula, F. longiuscula, Baltisphaeridium ternatum, Dasydorus cirritus, Dicrodiacrodium ancoriforme, Poikilofusa ciliaris, Pterospermopsis colbathii and Uncinisphaera fusticula. These are associated with other typical forms known to range across the Lower–Middle Ordovician boundary, such as Aremoricanium rigaudae, Aureotesta clathrata, Barakella fortunata, B. rara, Baltisphaeridium klabavense, Glaucotesta latiramosa and Striatotheca spp. Galeate and peteinoid acritarchs are also well represented, as well as tiny forms of ultraplanctonic size. Three new species of acritarchs are proposed: Frankea longiuscula var. darriwilense var. nov, Micrhystridium regulum sp. nov, and Tyrannus proteus sp. nov. Repeated occurrences throughout the section of cryptospores, problematic microfossils such as organic filaments, cuticle-like tissues, striated and pigmented leiospheres frequently in clusters, are interpreted to reflect recurrent terrestrial and freshwater inputs in the depositional environment. Single-specimen, high-resolution analyses using Confocal Laser Scanning Microscopy on the enigmatic form Tyrannus proteus sp. nov. show fluorescence emission spectra and microstructural properties significantly different from those of typical marine acritarchs from the same levels

New insights on the systematics, palaeoecology and palaeobiology of a plesiosaurian with soft tissue preservation from the Toarcian of Holzmaden, Germany

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2017. The attached document is the author’s submitted version of the journal article. You are advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it. The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00114-017-1472-

Kant on the role of the imagination (and images) in the transition from intuition to experience

In this chapter I will argue against both of these interpretations and will begin to develop an alternate account of imagination in experience. Against those who minimize imagination’s role, I will highlight the distinctive contribution of the imagination to experience. In particular, I will foreground the specific role that the imagination plays in making possible the distinct mental act, intermediate between intuition and experience, that Kant calls “perception [Wahrnehmung]” as the “empirical consciousness [Bewußtsein]” of appearances (cf. B207). Because perception involves images essentially (cf. A120), and because Kant understands experience itself to be a “synthesis of perceptions” (cf. B218), this strongly suggests (against minimalists) that experience, too, will incorporate images into the manner in which it allows us to cognize physical objects. By highlighting the contribution of imagination prior to experience, my own account, therefore, overlaps in part with the readings that seek instead to maximize the role of imagination. Against maximalists, however, I will argue that imagination contributes only in (and after) the transition from intuition to perception, rather than already being at work in the stage of intuition itself. More specifically, I will argue that Kant takes the activity of imagination to make perception possible by acting on already-formed intuitions in order to bring about the consciousness of them, rather than to bring the intuitions about in the first place. I will also argue that this synthesis of intuitions should be kept distinct from the activity of understanding

Franchising as a tool for company growth

Import 21/08/2007Prezenční152 - Katedra podnikohospodářsk