13,467 research outputs found

    Evil, Freedom and Heaven

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    By far the most respected response by theists to the problem of evil is some version of the free will defense, which rests on the twin ideas that God could not create humans with free will without them committing evil acts, and that freedom is of such value that it is better that we have it than that we be perfect yet unfree. If we assume that the redeemed in heaven are impeccable, then the free will defense faces what I call the Heaven Dilemma: either the redeemed in heaven are free, in which case it is false that you cannot be free without doing evil, or they are not, in which case (heaven being better than earth) it is false that we are better off with freedom and evil than without either. James Sennett has tried to defend a view of freedom that effectively allows us to be impeccable in heaven so long as we are not on earth, while claiming that we are free in both. I argue that this view leads to a new dilemma: either there is no point to earth at all, and given its miseries, it is wrong for God to make us pass through it to get to heaven (especially if we face the risk of ending up in hell), or Sennett’s view consigns millions who die tragically young to an eternity of unfreedom

    You & Yours

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    An extended example illustrating various theories of personal identity and imagining how duplicates would confront the argument that neither of them is identical with the original

    Address to Canon Law Society

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    The Time has Come ....

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    Don't Fear the Reaper: An Epicurean Answer to Puzzles about Death and Injustice

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    I begin by sketching the Epicurean position on death - that it cannot be bad for the one who dies because she no longer exists - which has struck many people as specious. However, alternative views must specify who is wronged by death (the dead person?), what is the harm (suffering?), and when does the harm take place (before death, when you’re not dead yet, or after death, when you’re not around any more?). In the second section I outline the most sophisticated anti-Epicurean view, the deprivation account, according to which someone who dies is harmed to the extent that the death has deprived her of goods she would otherwise have had. In the third section I argue that deprivation accounts that use the philosophical tool of possible worlds have the counterintuitive implication that we are harmed in the actual world because counterfactual versions of us lead fantastic lives in other possible worlds. In the final section I outline a neo-Epicurean position that explains how one can be wronged by being killed without being harmed by death and how it is possible to defend intuitions about injustice without problematic appeal to possible worlds

    Heaven and Homicide

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    I address the questions of whether or not the very existence of heaven provides a motivation for killing. If universalism is true, then anyone killed will end up there, as will the killer. And given that heaven is infinitely better than earth, killing would be, on this view, the greatest gift possible to the “victim.” But if universalism is not true, there is perhaps an even greater incentive to kill one’s loved ones if one knows them to be currently heaven-bound: that is, to save them from the risk of an infinitely terrible fate, that of somehow damning themselves between now and their natural death. This is an issue that we have all surely wondered about: if we’re going to heaven, what’s so bad about death that it must be condemned? But I think there is also a less-discussed problem raised by the very existence of heaven: that the existence of earth is thereby made redundant. What is earth but an annoying antechamber for heaven, one that we all wish we could bypass? I consider various attempts both to forestall the motivation for altruistic killing and to provide a justification for earth as more than a poor version of purgatory, and fail to find any that are truly compelling. I conclude that the existence of earth is therefore itself an argument against the existence of heaven

    Photo-controlled permeation of spiropyran modified gramicidin A ion channel

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    Thesis (M.S.) University of Alaska Fairbanks, 2006Biomimetic devices show great potential as being molecular sensors of biological species. Gramicidin A (gA) is a well studied ionophore that can be easily modified at the C-terminus to be incorporated into phosphotidylcholine bilayer membrane systems. Potassium permeation of modified gA attached to spiropyran can be controlled with light. Upon ultra-violet irradiation spiropyran transforms to the more polar form merocyanine. The process back to spiropyran is completely reversible upon irradiation with 550 nm light or thermally. Free bilayer membrane vesicles are employed to describe the characteristics of modified ion channels. Characteristics of gA modified with spiropyran are described herein. A device has been created and characterized using electrochemical impedance spectroscopy to analyze potassium permeation through a tethered bilayer membrane system (tBMS) on a sheet of gold utilizing sulfur anchors. The device consists of a tethered phase and a mobile upper phase. The mobile lipid layer incorporates gA modified with spiropyran. The modification allows for control of potassium permeation across the tBMS. Impedance analysis shows good agreement with the ability to control potassium permeation to that of the free vesicle

    On the National Health and Socialized Medicine

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    Interview by Simon Cushing

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    Simon Cushing conducted the following interview with Elizabeth Anderson on 18 June 2014
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