47,260 research outputs found

    Authority without privilege: How to be a Dretskean conciliatory skeptic on self-knowledge

    Get PDF
    Dretske is a ‚Äúconciliatory skeptic‚ÄĚ on self-knowledge. Take some subject S such that S thinks that P and S knows that she has thoughts. Dretske‚Äôs theory can be put as follows: S has a privileged way of knowing what she thinks, but she has no privileged way of knowing that she thinks it. There is much to be said on behalf of conciliatory skepticism and Dretske‚Äôs defense of it. We aim to show, however, that Dretske‚Äôs defense fails, in that if his defense of CS‚Äôs skeptical half succeeds, then his defense of CS‚Äôs conciliatory half fails. We then suggest a potential way forward. We suggest in particular that the correct way of being a Dretskean conciliatory skeptic is to deny that S has a privileged way of knowing about her thoughts, but to grant that she is nonetheless an authority on her thoughts

    Dretske on Self-Knowledge and Contrastive Focus: How to Understand Dretske’s Theory, and Why It Matters

    Get PDF
    Dretske‚Äôs theory of self-knowledge is interesting but peculiar and can seem implausible. He denies that we can know by introspection that we have thoughts, feelings, and experiences. But he allows that we can know by introspection what we think, feel, and experience. We consider two puzzles. The first puzzle, PUZZLE 1, is interpretive. Is there a way of understanding Dretske‚Äôs theory on which the knowledge affirmed by its positive side is different than the knowledge denied by its negative side? The second puzzle, PUZZLE 2, is substantive. Each of the following theses has some prima facie plausibility: there is introspective knowledge of thoughts, knowledge requires evidence, and there are no experiences of thoughts. It is unclear, though, that these claims form a consistent set. These puzzles are not unrelated. Dretske‚Äôs theory of self-knowledge is a potential solution to PUZZLE 2 in that Dretske‚Äôs theory is meant to show how,, and can all be true. We provide a solution to PUZZLE 1 by appeal to Dretske‚Äôs early work in the philosophy of language on contrastive focus. We then distinguish between ‚ÄúClosure‚ÄĚ and ‚ÄúTransmissibility‚ÄĚ, and raise and answer a worry to the effect that Dretske‚Äôs theory of self-knowledge runs counter to Transmissibility. These results help to secure Dretske‚Äôs theory as a viable solution to PUZZLE 2

    Germanics under Construction

    Get PDF

    Professionalizing Second-Language Teaching

    Get PDF

    The Perils of Parsimony

    Get PDF
    It is widely thought in philosophy and elsewhere that parsimony is a theoretical virtue in that if T1 is more parsimonious than T2, then T1 is preferable to T2, other things being equal. This thesis admits of many distinct precisifications. I focus on a relatively weak precisification on which preferability is a matter of probability, and argue that it is false. This is problematic for various alternative precisifications, and even for Inference to the Best Explanation as standardly understood
    • ‚Ķ
    corecore