336 research outputs found

    Capacity and Procedural Accounts of Impaired Memory in Depression

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    Findings of impaired memory in states of dysphoria or depression are summarized and subsumed under different accounts of mood-related memory deficits. Theoretical accounts based on the assumption of a storage system of limited capacity are compared to accounts which emphasize the role of procedures and strategies in attending and remembering. Two reanalyses of a recent experiment in the process-dissociation paradigm are reported. They address issues of dysphoria-related differences in automatic versus controlled uses of memory in a task of word-stem completion. The two reanalyses rest on different assumptions about the relation between automatic and controlled components, but they converge in highlighting the advantages of a procedural rather than capacity-based view of memory deficits. finally. similarities to other research domains and theoretical approaches are outlined

    Spared unconscious influences of spatial memory in diencephalic amnesia

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    Spatial memory is crucial to our daily lives and in part strongly depends on automatic, implicit memory processes. This study investigates the neurocognitive basis of conscious and unconscious influences of object–location memory in amnesic patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome (N = 23) and healthy controls (N = 18) using a process-dissociation procedure in a computerized spatial memory task. As expected, the patients performed substantially worse on the conscious memory measures but showed even slightly stronger effects of unconscious influences than the controls. Moreover, a delayed test administered after 1 week revealed a strong decline in conscious influences in the patients, while unconscious influences were not affected. The presented results suggest that conscious and unconscious influences of spatial memory can be clearly dissociated in Korsakoff’s syndrome

    Creating Non-Believed Memories for Recent Autobiographical Events

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    A recent study showed that many people spontaneously report vivid memories of events that they do not believe to have occurred [1]. In the present experiment we tested for the first time whether, after powerful false memories have been created, debriefing might leave behind nonbelieved memories for the fake events. In Session 1 participants imitated simple actions, and in Session 2 they saw doctored video-recordings containing clips that falsely suggested they had performed additional (fake) actions. As in earlier studies, this procedure created powerful false memories. In Session 3, participants were debriefed and told that specific actions in the video were not truly performed. Beliefs and memories for all critical actions were tested before and after the debriefing. Results showed that debriefing undermined participants' beliefs in fake actions, but left behind residual memory-like content. These results indicate that debriefing can leave behind vivid false memories which are no longer believed, and thus we demonstrate for the first time that the memory of an event can be experimentally dissociated from the belief in the event's occurrence. These results also confirm that belief in and memory for an event can be independently-occurring constructs

    The Influence of Object Relative Size on Priming and Explicit Memory

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    We investigated the effects of object relative size on priming and explicit memory for color photos of common objects. Participants were presented with color photos of pairs of objects displayed in either appropriate or inappropriate relative sizes. Implicit memory was assessed by speed of object size ratings whereas explicit memory was assessed by an old/new recognition test. Study-to-test changes in relative size reduced both priming and explicit memory and had large effects for objects displayed in large vs. small size at test. Our findings of substantial size-specific influences on priming with common objects under some but not other conditions are consistent with instance views of object perception and priming but inconsistent with structural description views

    Episodic Source Memory over Distribution by Quantum-Like Dynamics – A Model Exploration

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    In source memory studies, a decision-maker is concerned with identifying the context in which a given episodic experience occurred. A common paradigm for studying source memory is the ‘three-list’ experimental paradigm, where a subject studies three lists of words and is later asked whether a given word appeared on one or more of the studied lists. Surprisingly, the sum total of the acceptance probabilities generated by asking for the source of a word separately for each list (‘list 1?’, ‘list 2?’, ‘list 3?’) exceeds the acceptance probability generated by asking whether that word occurred on the union of the lists (‘list 1 or 2 or 3?’). The episodic memory for a given word therefore appears over distributed on the disjoint contexts of the lists. A quantum episodic memory model [QEM] was proposed by Brainerd, Wang and Reyna [8] to explain this type of result. In this paper, we apply a Hamiltonian dynamical extension of QEM for over distribution of source memory. The Hamiltonian operators are simultaneously driven by parameters for re-allocation of gist-based and verbatim-based acceptance support as subjects are exposed to the cue word in the first temporal stage, and are attenuated for description-dependence by the querying probe in the second temporal stage. Overall, the model predicts well the choice proportions in both separate list and union list queries and the over distribution effect, suggesting that a Hamiltonian dynamics for QEM can provide a good account of the acceptance processes involved in episodic memory tasks

    The Influence of Direct and Indirect Speech on Mental Representations

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    Language can be viewed as a set of cues that modulate the comprehender's thought processes. It is a very subtle instrument. For example, the literature suggests that people perceive direct speech (e.g., Joanne said: 'I went out for dinner last night') as more vivid and perceptually engaging than indirect speech (e.g., Joanne said that she went out for dinner last night). But how is this alleged vividness evident in comprehenders' mental representations? We sought to address this question in a series of experiments. Our results do not support the idea that, compared to indirect speech, direct speech enhances the accessibility of information from the communicative or the referential situation during comprehension. Neither do our results support the idea that the hypothesized more vivid experience of direct speech is caused by a switch from the visual to the auditory modality. However, our results do show that direct speech leads to a stronger mental representation of the exact wording of a sentence than does indirect speech. These results show that language has a more subtle influence on memory representations than was previously suggested
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