Ambiguous figures and the content of experience

Representationalism is the position that the phenomenal character of an experience is either identical with, or supervenes on, the content of that experience. Many representationalists hold that the relevant content of experience is nonconceptual. I propose a counterexample to this form of representationalism that arises from the phenomenon of Gestalt switching, which occurs when viewing ambiguous figures. First, I argue that one does not need to appeal to the conceptual content of experience or to judgements to account for Gestalt switching. I then argue that experiences of certain ambiguous figures are problematic because they have different phenomenal characters but that no difference in the nonconceptual content of these experiences can be identified. I consider three solutions to this problem that have been proposed by both philosophers and psychologists and conclude that none can account for all the ambiguous figures that pose the problem. I conclude that the onus is on representationalists to specify the relevant difference in content or to abandon their position

20 questions on Adaptive Dynamics

Abstract Adaptive Dynamics is an approach to studying evolutionary change when fitness is density or frequency dependent. Modern papers identifying themselves as using this approach first appeared in the 1990s, and have greatly increased up to the present. However, because of the rather technical nature of many of the papers, the approach is not widely known or understood by evolutionary biologists. In this review we aim to remedy this situation by outlining the methodology and then examining its strengths and weaknesses. We carry this out by posing and answering 20 key questions on Adaptive Dynamics. We conclude that Adaptive Dynamics provides a set of useful approximations for studying various evolutionary questions. However, as with any approximate method, conclusions based on Adaptive Dynamics are valid only under some restrictions that we discuss

The Relationship Between Belief and Credence

Sometimes epistemologists theorize about belief, a tripartite attitude on which one can believe, withhold belief, or disbelieve a proposition. In other cases, epistemologists theorize about credence, a fine-grained attitude that represents one’s subjective probability or confidence level toward a proposition. How do these two attitudes relate to each other? This article explores the relationship between belief and credence in two categories: descriptive and normative. It then explains the broader significance of the belief-credence connection and concludes with general lessons from the debate thus far

Emergence of Cooperation and Evolutionary Stability in Finite Populations

To explain the evolution of cooperation by natural selection has been a major goal of biologists since Darwin. Cooperators help others at a cost to themselves, while defectors receive the benefits of altruism without providing any help in return. The standard game dynamical formulation is the 'Prisoner's Dilemma', in which two players have a choice between cooperation and defection. In the repeated game, cooperators using direct reciprocity cannot be exploited by defectors, but it is unclear how such cooperators can arise in the first place. In general, defectors are stable against invasion by cooperators. This understanding is based on traditional concepts of evolutionary stability and dynamics in infinite populations. Here we study evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations. We show that a single cooperator using a strategy like 'tit-for-tat' can invade a population of defectors with a probability that corresponds to a net selective advantage. We specify the conditions required for natural selection to favour the emergence of cooperation and define evolutionary stability in finite populations.Organismic and Evolutionary BiologyEconomicsMathematic

Inclusive search for same-sign dilepton signatures in pp collisions at root s=7 TeV with the ATLAS detector

An inclusive search is presented for new physics in events with two isolated leptons (e or mu) having the same electric charge. The data are selected from events collected from p p collisions at root s = 7 TeV by the ATLAS detector and correspond to an integrated luminosity of 34 pb(-1). The spectra in dilepton invariant mass, missing transverse momentum and jet multiplicity are presented and compared to Standard Model predictions. In this event sample, no evidence is found for contributions beyond those of the Standard Model. Limits are set on the cross-section in a fiducial region for new sources of same-sign high-mass dilepton events in the ee, e mu and mu mu channels. Four models predicting same-sign dilepton signals are constrained: two descriptions of Majorana neutrinos, a cascade topology similar to supersymmetry or universal extra dimensions, and fourth generation d-type quarks. Assuming a new physics scale of 1 TeV, Majorana neutrinos produced by an effective operator V with masses below 460 GeV are excluded at 95% confidence level. A lower limit of 290 GeV is set at 95% confidence level on the mass of fourth generation d-type quarks

Measurement of the top quark-pair production cross section with ATLAS in pp collisions at \sqrt{s}=7\TeV

A measurement of the production cross-section for top quark pairs(\ttbar) in $pp$ collisions at \sqrt{s}=7 \TeV is presented using data recorded with the ATLAS detector at the Large Hadron Collider. Events are selected in two different topologies: single lepton (electron $e$ or muon $\mu$) with large missing transverse energy and at least four jets, and dilepton ($ee$, $\mu\mu$ or $e\mu$) with large missing transverse energy and at least two jets. In a data sample of 2.9 pb-1, 37 candidate events are observed in the single-lepton topology and 9 events in the dilepton topology. The corresponding expected backgrounds from non-\ttbar Standard Model processes are estimated using data-driven methods and determined to be $12.2 \pm 3.9$ events and $2.5 \pm 0.6$ events, respectively. The kinematic properties of the selected events are consistent with SM \ttbar production. The inclusive top quark pair production cross-section is measured to be \sigmattbar=145 \pm 31 ^{+42}_{-27} pb where the first uncertainty is statistical and the second systematic. The measurement agrees with perturbative QCD calculations.Comment: 30 pages plus author list (50 pages total), 9 figures, 11 tables, CERN-PH number and final journal adde

Measurement of the production of a W boson in association with a charm quark in pp collisions at √s = 7 TeV with the ATLAS detector

The production of a W boson in association with a single charm quark is studied using 4.6 fb−1 of pp collision data at s√ = 7 TeV collected with the ATLAS detector at the Large Hadron Collider. In events in which a W boson decays to an electron or muon, the charm quark is tagged either by its semileptonic decay to a muon or by the presence of a charmed meson. The integrated and differential cross sections as a function of the pseudorapidity of the lepton from the W-boson decay are measured. Results are compared to the predictions of next-to-leading-order QCD calculations obtained from various parton distribution function parameterisations. The ratio of the strange-to-down sea-quark distributions is determined to be 0.96+0.26−0.30 at Q 2 = 1.9 GeV2, which supports the hypothesis of an SU(3)-symmetric composition of the light-quark sea. Additionally, the cross-section ratio σ(W + +c¯¯)/σ(W − + c) is compared to the predictions obtained using parton distribution function parameterisations with different assumptions about the s−s¯¯¯ quark asymmetry

Thermal decomposition of allantoin as probed by matrix isolation FTIR spectroscopy

The optimized geometries, energies of the possible conformers of allantoin (2,5-dioxo-4-imidazolidinyl urea, the diureide of glyoxylic acid) as well as the barriers for conformational interconversion have been calculated using the density functional theory [DFT(B3LYP)/6-311++G(d,p)] method. The calculations predicted the existence of four conformers (gC, tT, g′C, and g′T; where the first and second symbols in the name of the conformers designate the conformation around the exocyclic NHC–NHCO and CNH–CO axes, respectively), with the gC form contributing to more than 98% of the population in gas phase at room temperature. This conformer is different from that corresponding to the monomeric unit found in crystalline RS-allantoin (g′C; Mootz, D. Acta Crystallogr.1965, 19, 726), stressing the importance of intermolecular H-bonding in determining the structure of the crystal. Upon sublimation under vacuum (10−6 mbar), the compound was found to undergo extensive decomposition to urea, isocyanic acid, NH3, and carbon. The identification of the decomposition products was made by using matrix isolation infrared spectroscopy. In consonance with the theoretical predictions, the allantoin molecules surviving thermal decomposition were found to undergo conformational isomerization and be present in the cryogenic argon matrix in both the gC and g′C conformations. The solid state room temperature infrared spectrum of allantoin was also investigated and assigned

Presentism remains

Here I examine some recent attempts to provide a new way of thinking about the philosophy of time that question the central role of ‘presentness’ within the definition of presentism. The central concern raised by these critics turns on the intelligibility and theoretical usefulness of the term ‘is present’ (cf. Correia and Rosenkrantz in Thought 4:19–27, 2015; Deasy in Nous, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12109; Williamson in Modal logic as metaphysics, OUP, Oxford, 2013). My overarching aim is to at least challenge such concerns. I begin with arguments due to Deasy (Nous, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12109). Deasy develops a view that he calls ‘transientism’ and that he takes to be a well-motivated version of presentism. I show that both this way of thinking about presentism and the argument supposedly motivating it all fail. I then move to an argument due to Correia and Rosenkrantz (Thought 4:19–27, 2015). Correia and Rosenkrantz purport to show that presentism can be salvaged without making recourse to the term ‘is present’. I demonstrate that their arguments fail. I then move on to a view, proposed and defended by Merricks (Truth and ontology, OUP, Oxford, 2007), Tallant (Erkenntnis 79:479–501, 2014), and Zimmerman (Philos Pap 25:115–126, 1996), and show that it has the wherewithal to meet the challenges raised by Williamson (Modal logic as metaphysics, OUP, Oxford, 2013) who, as noted above, raises genuine concerns about our capacity to define presentism