Evidence for surprise minimization over value maximization in choice behavior

Classical economic models are predicated on the idea that the ultimate aim of choice is to maximize utility or reward. In contrast, an alternative perspective highlights the fact that adaptive behavior requires agents' to model their environment and minimize surprise about the states they frequent. We propose that choice behavior can be more accurately accounted for by surprise minimization compared to reward or utility maximization alone. Minimizing surprise makes a prediction at variance with expected utility models; namely, that in addition to attaining valuable states, agents attempt to maximize the entropy over outcomes and thus 'keep their options open'. We tested this prediction using a simple binary choice paradigm and show that human decision-making is better explained by surprise minimization compared to utility maximization. Furthermore, we replicated this entropy-seeking behavior in a control task with no explicit utilities. These findings highlight a limitation of purely economic motivations in explaining choice behavior and instead emphasize the importance of belief-based motivations

Imbalanced decision hierarchy in addicts emerging from drug-hijacked dopamine spiraling circuit

Despite explicitly wanting to quit, long-term addicts find themselves powerless to resist drugs, despite knowing that drug-taking may be a harmful course of action. Such inconsistency between the explicit knowledge of negative consequences and the compulsive behavioral patterns represents a cognitive/behavioral conflict that is a central characteristic of addiction. Neurobiologically, differential cue-induced activity in distinct striatal subregions, as well as the dopamine connectivity spiraling from ventral striatal regions to the dorsal regions, play critical roles in compulsive drug seeking. However, the functional mechanism that integrates these neuropharmacological observations with the above-mentioned cognitive/behavioral conflict is unknown. Here we provide a formal computational explanation for the drug-induced cognitive inconsistency that is apparent in the addicts' “self-described mistake”. We show that addictive drugs gradually produce a motivational bias toward drug-seeking at low-level habitual decision processes, despite the low abstract cognitive valuation of this behavior. This pathology emerges within the hierarchical reinforcement learning framework when chronic exposure to the drug pharmacologically produces pathologicaly persistent phasic dopamine signals. Thereby the drug hijacks the dopaminergic spirals that cascade the reinforcement signals down the ventro-dorsal cortico-striatal hierarchy. Neurobiologically, our theory accounts for rapid development of drug cue-elicited dopamine efflux in the ventral striatum and a delayed response in the dorsal striatum. Our theory also shows how this response pattern depends critically on the dopamine spiraling circuitry. Behaviorally, our framework explains gradual insensitivity of drug-seeking to drug-associated punishments, the blocking phenomenon for drug outcomes, and the persistent preference for drugs over natural rewards by addicts. The model suggests testable predictions and beyond that, sets the stage for a view of addiction as a pathology of hierarchical decision-making processes. This view is complementary to the traditional interpretation of addiction as interaction between habitual and goal-directed decision systems

Long-term associative learning predicts verbal short-term memory performance

Studies using tests such as digit span and nonword repetition have implicated short-term memory across a range of developmental domains. Such tests ostensibly assess specialized processes for the short-term manipulation and maintenance of information that are often argued to enable long-term learning. However, there is considerable evidence for an influence of long-term linguistic learning on performance in short-term memory tasks that brings into question the role of a specialized short-term memory system separate from long-term knowledge. Using natural language corpora, we show experimentally and computationally that performance on three widely used measures of short-term memory (digit span, nonword repetition, and sentence recall) can be predicted from simple associative learning operating on the linguistic environment to which a typical child may have been exposed. The findings support the broad view that short-term verbal memory performance reflects the application of long-term language knowledge to the experimental setting

Cerebral processing of voice gender studied using a continuous carryover fMRI design

Normal listeners effortlessly determine a person's gender by voice, but the cerebral mechanisms underlying this ability remain unclear. Here, we demonstrate 2 stages of cerebral processing during voice gender categorization. Using voice morphing along with an adaptation-optimized functional magnetic resonance imaging design, we found that secondary auditory cortex including the anterior part of the temporal voice areas in the right hemisphere responded primarily to acoustical distance with the previously heard stimulus. In contrast, a network of bilateral regions involving inferior prefrontal and anterior and posterior cingulate cortex reflected perceived stimulus ambiguity. These findings suggest that voice gender recognition involves neuronal populations along the auditory ventral stream responsible for auditory feature extraction, functioning in pair with the prefrontal cortex in voice gender perception

Prefrontal Cortex Lesions Impair Object-Spatial Integration

How and where object and spatial information are perceptually integrated in the brain is a central question in visual cognition. Single-unit physiology, scalp EEG, and fMRI research suggests that the prefrontal cortex (PFC) is a critical locus for object-spatial integration. To test the causal participation of the PFC in an object-spatial integration network, we studied ten patients with unilateral PFC damage performing a lateralized object-spatial integration task. Consistent with single-unit and neuroimaging studies, we found that PFC lesions result in a significant behavioral impairment in object-spatial integration. Furthermore, by manipulating inter-hemispheric transfer of object-spatial information, we found that masking of visual transfer impairs performance in the contralesional visual field in the PFC patients. Our results provide the first evidence that the PFC plays a key, causal role in an object-spatial integration network. Patient performance is also discussed within the context of compensation by the non-lesioned PFC

Measuring the effects through time of the influence of visuomotor and visuotactile synchronous stimulation on a virtual body ownership illusion

Previous studies have examined the experience of owning a virtual surrogate body or body part through specific combinations of cross-modal multisensory stimulation. Both visuomotor (VM) and visuotactile (VT) synchronous stimulation have been shown to be important for inducing a body ownership illusion, each tested separately or both in combination. In this study we compared the relative importance of these two cross-modal correlations, when both are provided in the same immersive virtual reality setup and the same experiment. We systematically manipulated VT and VM contingencies in order to assess their relative role and mutual interaction. Moreover, we present a new method for measuring the induced body ownership illusion through time, by recording reports of breaks in the illusion of ownership ("breaks") throughout the experimental phase. The balance of the evidence, from both questionnaires and analysis of the breaks, suggests that while VM synchronous stimulation contributes the greatest to the attainment of the illusion, a disruption of either (through asynchronous stimulation) contributes equally to the probability of a break in the illusion

The Illusion of Owning a Third Arm

Could it be possible that, in the not-so-distant future, we will be able to reshape the human body so as to have extra limbs? A third arm helping us out with the weekly shopping in the local grocery store, or an extra artificial limb assisting a paralysed person? Here we report a perceptual illusion in which a rubber right hand, placed beside the real hand in full view of the participant, is perceived as a supernumerary limb belonging to the participant's own body. This effect was supported by questionnaire data in conjunction with physiological evidence obtained from skin conductance responses when physically threatening either the rubber hand or the real one. In four well-controlled experiments, we demonstrate the minimal required conditions for the elicitation of this “supernumerary hand illusion”. In the fifth, and final experiment, we show that the illusion reported here is qualitatively different from the traditional rubber hand illusion as it is characterised by less disownership of the real hand and a stronger feeling of having two right hands. These results suggest that the artificial hand ‘borrows’ some of the multisensory processes that represent the real hand, leading to duplication of touch and ownership of two right arms. This work represents a major advance because it challenges the traditional view of the gross morphology of the human body as a fundamental constraint on what we can come to experience as our physical self, by showing that the body representation can easily be updated to incorporate an additional limb

If I Were You: Perceptual Illusion of Body Swapping

The concept of an individual swapping his or her body with that of another person has captured the imagination of writers and artists for decades. Although this topic has not been the subject of investigation in science, it exemplifies the fundamental question of why we have an ongoing experience of being located inside our bodies. Here we report a perceptual illusion of body-swapping that addresses directly this issue. Manipulation of the visual perspective, in combination with the receipt of correlated multisensory information from the body was sufficient to trigger the illusion that another person's body or an artificial body was one's own. This effect was so strong that people could experience being in another person's body when facing their own body and shaking hands with it. Our results are of fundamental importance because they identify the perceptual processes that produce the feeling of ownership of one's body

Embodiment and Presence in Virtual Reality After Stroke. A Comparative Study With Healthy Subjects

[EN] The ability of virtual reality (VR) to recreate controlled, immersive, and interactive environments that provide intensive and customized exercises has motivated its therapeutic use after stroke. Interaction and bodily presence in VR-based interventions is usually mediated through virtual selves, which synchronously represent body movements or responses to events on external input devices. Embodied self-representations in the virtual world not only provide an anchor for visuomotor tasks, but their morphologies can have behavioral implications. While research has focused on the underlying subjective mechanisms of exposure to VR on healthy individuals, the transference of these findings to individuals with stroke is not evident and remains unexplored, which could affect the experience and, ultimately, the clinical effectiveness of neurorehabilitation interventions. This study determined and compared the sense of embodiment and presence elicited by a virtual environment under different perspectives and levels of immersion in healthy subjects and individuals with stroke. Forty-six healthy subjects and 32 individuals with stroke embodied a gender-matched neutral avatar in a virtual environment that was displayed in a first-person perspective with a head-mounted display and in a third-person perspective with a screen, and the participants were asked to interact in a virtual task for 10 min under each condition in counterbalanced order, and to complete two questionnaires about the sense of embodiment and presence experienced during the interaction. The sense of body-ownership, self-location, and presence were more vividly experienced in a first-person than in a third-person perspective by both healthy subjects (p < 0.001, eta(2)(p) = 0.212; p = 0.005, eta(2)(p) = 0.101; p = 0.001, eta(2)(p) = 0.401, respectively) and individuals with stroke (p = 0.019, eta(2)(p) = 0.070; p = 0.001, eta(2)(p) = 0.135; p = 0.014, eta(2)(p) = 0.077, respectively). In contrast, no agency perspective-related differences were found in any group. All measures were consistently higher for healthy controls than for individuals with stroke, but differences between groups only reached statistical significance in presence under the first-person condition (p < 0.010, eta(2)(p) = 0.084). In spite of these differences, the participants experienced a vivid sense of embodiment and presence in almost all conditions. These results provide first evidence that, although less intensively, embodiment and presence are similarly experienced by individuals who have suffered a stroke and by healthy individuals, which could support the vividness of their experience and, consequently, the effectiveness of VR-based interventions.This study was funded by Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad of Spain (Project RTC-2017-6051-7 and Grant BES-2014-068218), Fundació la Marató de la TV3 (Grant 201701-10), and Universitat Politècnica de València (Grant PAID-10-18). We acknowledge the support of NVIDIA Corporation with the donation of the Titan Xp GPU used for this research.Borrego, A.; Latorre, J.; Alcañiz Raya, ML.; Llorens Rodríguez, R. (2019). Embodiment and Presence in Virtual Reality After Stroke. A Comparative Study With Healthy Subjects. Frontiers in Neurology. 10:1-8. https://doi.org/10.3389/fneur.2019.01061S1810Berlucchi, G., & Aglioti, S. (1997). 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How We Know It Hurts: Item Analysis of Written Narratives Reveals Distinct Neural Responses to Others' Physical Pain and Emotional Suffering

People are often called upon to witness, and to empathize with, the pain and suffering of others. In the current study, we directly compared neural responses to others' physical pain and emotional suffering by presenting participants (n = 41) with 96 verbal stories, each describing a protagonist's physical and/or emotional experience, ranging from neutral to extremely negative. A separate group of participants rated “how much physical pain”, and “how much emotional suffering” the protagonist experienced in each story, as well as how “vivid and movie-like” the story was. Although ratings of Pain, Suffering and Vividness were positively correlated with each other across stories, item-analyses revealed that each scale was correlated with activity in distinct brain regions. Even within regions of the “Shared Pain network” identified using a separate data set, responses to others' physical pain and emotional suffering were distinct. More broadly, item analyses with continuous predictors provided a high-powered method for identifying brain regions associated with specific aspects of complex stimuli – like verbal descriptions of physical and emotional events.United States. Air Force Office of Scientific Research (Office of Naval Research, grant number N000140910845