Embodiment and Presence in Virtual Reality After Stroke. A Comparative Study With Healthy Subjects

Abstract

[EN] The ability of virtual reality (VR) to recreate controlled, immersive, and interactive environments that provide intensive and customized exercises has motivated its therapeutic use after stroke. Interaction and bodily presence in VR-based interventions is usually mediated through virtual selves, which synchronously represent body movements or responses to events on external input devices. Embodied self-representations in the virtual world not only provide an anchor for visuomotor tasks, but their morphologies can have behavioral implications. While research has focused on the underlying subjective mechanisms of exposure to VR on healthy individuals, the transference of these findings to individuals with stroke is not evident and remains unexplored, which could affect the experience and, ultimately, the clinical effectiveness of neurorehabilitation interventions. This study determined and compared the sense of embodiment and presence elicited by a virtual environment under different perspectives and levels of immersion in healthy subjects and individuals with stroke. Forty-six healthy subjects and 32 individuals with stroke embodied a gender-matched neutral avatar in a virtual environment that was displayed in a first-person perspective with a head-mounted display and in a third-person perspective with a screen, and the participants were asked to interact in a virtual task for 10 min under each condition in counterbalanced order, and to complete two questionnaires about the sense of embodiment and presence experienced during the interaction. The sense of body-ownership, self-location, and presence were more vividly experienced in a first-person than in a third-person perspective by both healthy subjects (p < 0.001, eta(2)(p) = 0.212; p = 0.005, eta(2)(p) = 0.101; p = 0.001, eta(2)(p) = 0.401, respectively) and individuals with stroke (p = 0.019, eta(2)(p) = 0.070; p = 0.001, eta(2)(p) = 0.135; p = 0.014, eta(2)(p) = 0.077, respectively). In contrast, no agency perspective-related differences were found in any group. All measures were consistently higher for healthy controls than for individuals with stroke, but differences between groups only reached statistical significance in presence under the first-person condition (p < 0.010, eta(2)(p) = 0.084). In spite of these differences, the participants experienced a vivid sense of embodiment and presence in almost all conditions. These results provide first evidence that, although less intensively, embodiment and presence are similarly experienced by individuals who have suffered a stroke and by healthy individuals, which could support the vividness of their experience and, consequently, the effectiveness of VR-based interventions.This study was funded by Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad of Spain (Project RTC-2017-6051-7 and Grant BES-2014-068218), Fundació la Marató de la TV3 (Grant 201701-10), and Universitat Politècnica de València (Grant PAID-10-18). We acknowledge the support of NVIDIA Corporation with the donation of the Titan Xp GPU used for this research.Borrego, A.; Latorre, J.; Alcañiz Raya, ML.; Llorens Rodríguez, R. (2019). Embodiment and Presence in Virtual Reality After Stroke. A Comparative Study With Healthy Subjects. Frontiers in Neurology. 10:1-8. https://doi.org/10.3389/fneur.2019.01061S1810Berlucchi, G., & Aglioti, S. (1997). 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