Drumming in immersive virtual reality: the body shapes the way we play

It has been shown that it is possible to generate perceptual illusions of ownership in immersive virtual reality (IVR) over a virtual body seen from first person perspective, in other words over a body that visually substitutes the person's real body. This can occur even when the virtual body is quite different in appearance from the person's real body. However, investigation of the psychological, behavioral and attitudinal consequences of such body transformations remains an interesting problem with much to be discovered. Thirty six Caucasian people participated in a between-groups experiment where they played a West-African Djembe hand drum while immersed in IVR and with a virtual body that substituted their own. The virtual hand drum was registered with a physical drum. They were alongside a virtual character that played a drum in a supporting, accompanying role. In a baseline condition participants were represented only by plainly shaded white hands, so that they were able merely to play. In the experimental condition they were represented either by a casually dressed dark-skinned virtual body (Casual Dark-Skinned - CD) or by a formal suited light-skinned body (Formal Light-Skinned - FL). Although participants of both groups experienced a strong body ownership illusion towards the virtual body, only those with the CD representation showed significant increases in their movement patterns for drumming compared to the baseline condition and compared with those embodied in the FL body. Moreover, the stronger the illusion of body ownership in the CD condition, the greater this behavioral change. A path analysis showed that the observed behavioral changes were a function of the strength of the illusion of body ownership towards the virtual body and its perceived appropriateness for the drumming task. These results demonstrate that full body ownership illusions can lead to substantial behavioral and possibly cognitive changes depending on the appearance of the virtual body. This could be important for many applications such as learning, education, training, psychotherapy and rehabilitation using IVR

The Sense of embodiment in virtual reality

What does it feel like to own, to control, and to be inside a body? The multidimensional nature of this experience together with the continuous presence of one's biological body, render both theoretical and experimental approaches problematic. Nevertheless, exploitation of immersive virtual reality has allowed a reframing of this question to whether it is possible to experience the same sensations towards a virtual body inside an immersive virtual environment as toward the biological body, and if so, to what extent. The current paper addresses these issues by referring to the Sense of Embodiment (SoE). Due to the conceptual confusion around this sense, we provide a working definition which states that SoE consists of three subcomponents: the sense of self-location, the sense of agency, and the sense of body ownership. Under this proposed structure, measures and experimental manipulations reported in the literature are reviewed and related challenges are outlined. Finally, future experimental studies are proposed to overcome those challenges, toward deepening the concept of SoE and enhancing it in virtual applications

First Person Perspective of Seated Participants Over a Walking Virtual Body Leads to Illusory Agency Over the Walking

Agency, the attribution of authorship to an action of our body, requires the intention to carry out the action, and subsequently a match between its predicted and actual sensory consequences. However, illusory agency can be generated through priming of the action together with perception of bodily action, even when there has been no actual corresponding action. Here we show that participants can have the illusion of agency over the walking of a virtual body even though in reality they are seated and only allowed head movements. The experiment (n = 28) had two factors: Perspective (1PP or 3PP) and Head Sway (Sway or NoSway). Participants in 1PP saw a life-sized virtual body spatially coincident with their own from a first person perspective, or the virtual body from third person perspective (3PP). In the Sway condition the viewpoint included a walking animation, but not in NoSway. The results show strong illusions of body ownership, agency and walking, in the 1PP compared to the 3PP condition, and an enhanced level of arousal while the walking was up a virtual hill. Sway reduced the level of agency. We conclude with a discussion of the results in the light of current theories of agency

First person perspective of seated participants over a walking virtual body leads to illusory agency over the walking

Agency, the attribution of authorship to an action of our body, requires the intention to carry out the action, and subsequently a match between its predicted and actual sensory consequences. However, illusory agency can be generated through priming of the action together with perception of bodily action, even when there has been no actual corresponding action. Here we show that participants can have the illusion of agency over the walking of a virtual body even though in reality they are seated and only allowed head movements. The experiment (n = 28) had two factors: Perspective (1PP or 3PP) and Head Sway (Sway or NoSway). Participants in 1PP saw a life-sized virtual body spatially coincident with their own from a first person perspective, or the virtual body from third person perspective (3PP). In the Sway condition the viewpoint included a walking animation, but not in NoSway. The results show strong illusions of body ownership, agency and walking, in the 1PP compared to the 3PP condition, and an enhanced level of arousal while the walking was up a virtual hill. Sway reduced the level of agency. We conclude with a discussion of the results in the light of current theories of agency

Body ownership increases the interference between observed and executed movements

When we successfully achieve willed actions, the feeling that our moving body parts belong to the self (i.e., body ownership) is barely required. However, how and to what extent the awareness of our own body contributes to the neurocognitive processes subserving actions is still debated. Here we capitalized on immersive virtual reality in order to examine whether and how body ownership influences motor performance (and, secondly, if it modulates the feeling of voluntariness). Healthy participants saw a virtual body either from a first or a third person perspective. In both conditions, they had to draw continuously straight vertical lines while seeing the virtual arm doing the same action (i.e., drawing lines) or deviating from them (i.e., drawing ellipses). Results showed that when there was a mismatch between the intended and the seen movements (i.e., participants had to draw lines but the avatar drew ellipses), motor performance was strongly 'attracted' towards the seen (rather than the performed) movement when the avatar's body part was perceived as own (i.e., first person perspective). In support of previous studies, here we provide direct behavioral evidence that the feeling of body ownership modulates the interference of seen movements to the performed movements

First-person Perspective Virtual Body Posture Influences Stress: A virtual reality body ownership study

In immersive virtual reality (IVR) it is possible to replace a person's real body by a life-sized virtual body that is seen from first person perspective to visually substitute their own. Multisensory feedback from the virtual to the real body (such as the correspondence of touch and also movement) can also be present. Under these conditions participants typically experience a subjective body ownership illusion (BOI) over the virtual body, even though they know that it is not their real one. In most studies and applications the posture of the real and virtual bodies are as similar as possible. Here we were interested in whether the BOI is diminished when there are gross discrepancies between the real and virtual body postures. We also explored whether a comfortable or uncomfortable virtual body posture would induce feelings and physiological responses commensurate with the posture. We carried out an experiment with 31 participants in IVR realized with a wide field-of-view head-mounted display. All participants were comfortably seated. Sixteen of them were embodied in a virtual body designed to be in a comfortable posture, and the remainder in an uncomfortable posture. The results suggest that the uncomfortable body posture led to lesser subjective BOI than the comfortable one, but that participants in the uncomfortable posture experienced greater awareness of their autonomic physiological responses. Moreover their heart rate, heart rate variability, and the number of mistakes in a cognitive task were associated with the strength of their BOI in the uncomfortable posture: greater heart rate, lower heart rate variability and more mistakes were associated with higher levels of the BOI. These findings point in a consistent direction that the BOI over a body that is in an uncomfortable posture can lead to subjective, physiological and cognitive effects consistent with discomfort that do not occur with the BOI over a body in a comfortable posture

Decreased corticospinal excitability after the illusion of missing part of the arm

Previous studies on body ownership illusions have shown that under certain multimodal conditions, healthy people can experience artificial body-parts as if they were part of their own body, with direct physiological consequences for the real limb that gets ‘substituted.' In this study we wanted to assess (a) whether healthy people can experience ‘missing’ a body-part through illusory ownership of an amputated virtual body, and (b) whether this would cause corticospinal excitability changes in muscles associated with the ‘missing’ body-part. Forty right-handed participants saw a virtual body from a first person perspective but for half of them the virtual body was missing a part of its right arm. Single pulse transcranial magnetic stimulation was applied before and after the experiment to left and right motor cortices. Motor evoked potentials (MEPs) were recorded from the first dorsal interosseous (FDI) and the extensor digitorum communis (EDC) of each hand. We found that the stronger the illusion of amputation and arm ownership, the more the reduction of MEP amplitudes of the EDC muscle for the contralateral sensorimotor cortex. In contrast, no association was found for the EDC amplitudes in the ipsilateral cortex and for the FDI amplitudes in both contralateral and ipsilateral cortices. Our study provides evidence that a short-term illusory perception of missing a body-part can trigger inhibitory effects on corticospinal pathways and importantly in the absence of any limb deafferentation or disuse

Over my fake body: body ownership illusions for studying the multisensory basis of own-body perception

Which is my body and how do I distinguish it from the bodies of others, or from objects in the surrounding environment? The perception of our own body and more particularly our sense of body ownership is taken for granted. Nevertheless, experimental findings from body ownership illusions (BOIs), show that under specific multisensory conditions, we can experience artificial body parts or fake bodies as our own body parts or body, respectively. The aim of the present paper is to discuss how and why BOIs are induced. We review several experimental findings concerning the spatial, temporal, and semantic principles of crossmodal stimuli that have been applied to induce BOIs. On the basis of these principles, we discuss theoretical approaches concerning the underlying mechanism of BOIs. We propose a conceptualization based on Bayesian causal inference for addressing how our nervous system could infer whether an object belongs to our own body, using multisensory, sensorimotor, and semantic information, and we discuss how this can account for several experimental findings. Finally, we point to neural network models as an implementational framework within which the computational problem behind BOIs could be addressed in the future

The sense of body ownership relaxes temporal constraints for multisensory integration

Experimental work on body ownership illusions showed how simple multisensory manipulation can generate the illusory experience of an artificial limb as being part of the own-body. This work highlighted how own-body perception relies on a plastic brain representation emerging from multisensory integration. The flexibility of this representation is reflected in the short-term modulations of physiological states and perceptual processing observed during these illusions. Here, we explore the impact of ownership illusions on the temporal dimension of multisensory integration. We show that, during the illusion, the temporal window for integrating touch on the physical body with touch seen on a virtual body representation, increases with respect to integration with visual events seen close but separated from the virtual body. We show that this effect is mediated by the ownership illusion. Crucially, the temporal window for visuotactile integration was positively correlated with participants' scores rating the illusory experience of owning the virtual body and touching the object seen in contact with it. Our results corroborate the recently proposed causal inference mechanism for illusory body ownership. As a novelty, they show that the ensuing illusory causal binding between stimuli from the real and fake body relaxes constraints for the integration of bodily signals